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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I explore a number of contemporary science fiction 
franchises in order to ascertain how the figure of the action heroine has 
evolved throughout her recent history. There has been a tendency in film 
criticism to view these strong women as „figuratively male‟ and therefore 
not „really‟ women, which, I argue, is largely due to a reliance on the 
psychoanalytic paradigms that have dominated feminist film theory since its 
beginnings. Building on Elisabeth Hills‟s work on the character of Ellen 
Ripley of the Alien series, I explore how notions of „becoming‟ and the 
„Body without Organs‟ proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari can 
be activated to provide a more positive set of readings of active women on 
screen. These readings are not limited by discussions of sex or gender, but 
discuss the body in terms of its increased capacities as it interacts with the 
world around it. I do not argue for a Deleuzian analysis of cinema as such, 
because this project is concerned with aspects of representation which did 
not form part of Deleuze‟s philosophy of cinema. Rather I use Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s work to explore alternative ways of reading the active women 
these franchises present and the benefits they afford. Through these 
explorations I demonstrate, however, that applying the Deleuzoguattarian 
„method‟ is a potentially risky undertaking for feminist theory. 
Deconstructing notions of „being‟ and „identity‟ through the project of 
becoming may have benefits in terms of addressing „woman‟ beyond 
binaristic thought, but it may also have negative consequences. What may 
be liberating for feminist film theory may be also be destructive. This is 
because through becoming we destabilise a position from which to address 
potentially ideologically unsound treatments of women on screen.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is both an examination of the representation of the body in the 
contemporary popular American science fiction cinema and, where 
appropriate, the discursive response to it. The primary focus of this project 
is the representation and reception of the female body. The female body 
here is given primacy as this is a political project. It has its roots in, and is a 
response to, feminist discussion of film, and it explores new methods of 
analysis for the female-embodied subject on screen. It is a challenge to 
dominant modes of reading these women through the psychoanalytic theory 
of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan and its appropriation by the feminist 
scholars such as Laura Mulvey (1975, 1981) and Mary Ann Doane (1987, 
1991). Science fiction is a genre that now regularly presents us with strong, 
active, independent women. It is therefore necessary to explore other 
theoretical models to analyse this subject that do not reduce the action 
heroine to exhibiting a figurative masculinity. As Elisabeth Hills has argued, 
“feminists working within the dominant theoretical model of psychoanalysis 
have had extremely limited spaces with which to discuss the transformative 
and transgressive potential of the action heroine” (39). The purpose of this 
project is to expand these spaces and explore new ways to address the action 
heroine, specifically in relation to the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari.  
 
This is not to say that the work undertaken in this area by the likes of 
Mulvey is redundant, but that it can now be activated in an alternative 
fashion. Fredric Jameson writes in The Political Unconscious that:  
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Texts come before us the always-already-read; we apprehend 
them through sedimented layers of previous interpretations; 
or – if the text is brand-new – through the sedimented 
reading habits and categories developed by those inherited 
interpretive traditions. (9) 
 
 
 
This need not be the case. The texts that are examined in this project, the 
Alien series
1
, the Matrix franchise
2
, the Batman franchise
3
 and the X-Men 
film trilogy
4
 are prime examples of texts under the sediment of which 
Jameson speaks. For example, any new exploration of Alien (Ridley Scott, 
1979) as a singular text requires an excavation through its critical history to 
prove its validity. Any attempt to appropriate Lt. Ellen Ripley (Sigourney 
Weaver) as a positive feminist icon must wrestle her away from a 
psychoanalytically inclined interpretative convention that would see the 
character as passive or only in terms of „lack‟.  This psychoanalytic tradition 
is one that insists that her activity and power are, problematically, seen as 
appropriations of masculinity. But, as Jameson  continues:  
 
No interpretation can be effectively disqualified on its own terms by 
a simple enumeration of inaccuracies or omissions, or by a list of 
                                                          
1
 For the purposes of this project, the Alien series refers to the films Alien (Ridley Scott, 
1979), Aliens (James Cameron, 1986), Alien 3 (David Fincher, 1992), Alien Resurrection 
(Jean-Pierre Jeunet) Alien vs. Predator (Paul W. Anderson, 2004) and Alien vs. Predator: 
Requiem (Colin and Greg Strause, 2007). 
2
 For the purposes of this project, the Matrix franchise refers to the films The Matrix (The 
Wachowski Brothers, 1999), The Matrix Reloaded (The Wachowski Brothers, 2003) and 
The Matrix Revolutions (The Wachowski Brothers, 2003), the feature-length documentary 
The Matrix Revisited (2001), the video games Enter the Matrix (2003), the collection of 
Matrix inspired animations The Animatrix (2003) and the graphic novels The Matrix 
Comics and The Matrix Comics: Volume Two (2005). 
3
 For the purposes of this project the Batman franchise refers primarily to the Warner 
Brothers film franchise consisting of Batman (Tim Burton, 1989), Batman Returns (Tim 
Burton, 1992), Batman Forever (Joel Schumacher, 1995), Batman and Robin (Joel 
Schumacher, 1997) Batman Begins (Christopher Nolan, 2005). I also have brief recourse to 
the comic books The Dark Knight Returns (1986) and Batman: Year One (1987). My 
consideration of Catwoman examines Batman Returns and Catwoman (Pitof, 2004). 
4
 The X-Men trilogy includes X-Men (Bryan Singer, 2000), X-Men 2 (Bryan Singer, 2003) 
and X-Men: The Last Stand (Brett Ratner, 2006). 
Green 10 
 
unanswered questions. Interpretation is not an isolated act, but takes 
place within a Homeric battlefield, on which a host of interpretive 
options are either openly or implicitly in conflict. (10) 
 
 
This project does not do „battle‟ with psychoanalysis as such, but rather 
challenges its status as the dominant methodology for feminist film theory. I 
do not deny psychoanalysis‟s extremely important role in the advancement 
of the theorisation of women and female identification in film. I do, 
however, propose that since the representation of women in the science 
fiction film, and indeed the action cinema more generally, has changed since 
feminist film theory‟s beginnings, so new theories are required to explore 
the subjects that are now regularly presented to us.  
 
As Hills has argued, “psychoanalytic accounts which theorise sexual 
difference within the framework of linked binary oppositions ... necessarily 
position normative female subjectivity as passive or in terms of lack” (39). 
This is because psychoanalysis “regards the body as a developmental union 
or aggregate of partial objects, organs, drives, orifices, each with their own 
significance, their own modalities of pleasure” (Grosz Volatile Bodies 169). 
Hills advocates reading the body of the action heroine from a 
Deleuzoguattarian perspective. Rather than view the body how Elizabeth 
Grosz implies that psychoanalysis does, as an entity with prescribed 
meanings, functions and desires, the body should be seen as existing in a 
constant process of „becoming‟, or as a „Body without Organs‟ (BwO). 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s conception of the BwO sees the body as existing in a 
state of becoming, constantly forming assemblages with the world around it. 
This body is one without the “internal cohesion and latent significance” 
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(Grosz Volatile Bodies 169) provided by psychoanalytic accounts, but is in a 
constant state of flux as it connects with other bodies. This body is not 
reducible to what a body does, but rather an experiment allowing us to 
ascertain what a body can do. As Lori Brown notes, for Deleuze and 
Guattari it is important that we understand the body‟s “potential for 
interacting with other bodies, whether or not that interaction will bring harm 
to either body and whether there is potential for exchange or a joining 
together to form a still stronger body” (268). This project examines the 
possibilities that a Deleuzoguattarian reading of the body can provide in 
addressing the action heroine. It is an analysis which views her 
„transgressions‟ as positive becomings which subvert traditional gender 
roles and codes.  
 
This dissertation begins with a review of the elements of Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s concept of becoming that are important to this project. It has been 
broadly recognised that Deleuze and Guattari “refuse to offer their readers a 
closed system or „recipe‟ to work from” (Colombat 10) but rather offer a 
conceptual „tool box‟ for their readers to work with. Therefore, the terms 
Deleuze and Guattari use are complex and slippery, and it is necessary to 
attempt to pinpoint these elements as a basis of discussion. This review also 
aims to broaden Hills‟s discussion to consider the complexities of adopting 
Deleuze and Guattari for feminist film theory. This is because further 
investigation reveals a number of potential pitfalls with undertaking the 
Deleuzoguattarian method. I demonstrate this with a discussion of the 
feminist response to Deleuze and Guattari in line with Elizabeth Grosz‟s 
balanced appraisal in her Volatile Bodies. Although there are benefits to 
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looking beyond the psychoanalytic paradigm for addressing women on film 
for feminist interpretation, it remains that turning to Deleuze and Guattari is 
a potentially problematic undertaking. This is because they aim to undo the 
notions of „being‟ and „identity‟ by breaking down the individuated subject 
through this process of becoming. Therefore the category of „woman‟ itself 
is left in a precarious position, and how we proceed to speak about women 
is unclear.   
 
Underpinning this project is Louis Althusser‟s notion of the „guilt‟ of 
interpretation: “as there is no such thing as an innocent reading, we must say 
what reading we are guilty of” („From Capital to Marx‟s Philosophy‟ 14). 
Althusser continues: “we must abandon the mirror myths of immediate 
vision and reading, and conceive knowledge as a production” (24). There is, 
as Jameson has also argued in Unconscious, always a political impetus 
behind interpretation of this sort. If, as Althusser impels us to, we conceive 
knowledge itself as a production, it comes that interpretation itself, and the 
context of interpretation, is as much in need of interpreting as the interpreted 
object. This thesis therefore does not treat film and its criticism as two 
separate objects, but rather as an intertwined object of study that is in a 
constant state of flux. The text and its criticism come together to be read 
together as co-text. 
 
The first section of this thesis has this historicising of the interpretative 
method as its purpose. Its object of analysis is both the Alien films and 
critical and theoretical responses to them. As Yvonne Tasker notes, Ripley 
has been an especially privileged character within the trajectory of the 
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action heroine, describing her as a “significant development” as she 
combined “icons of the action narrative with borrowings from the horror 
film” (Spectacular Bodies 15). In a review of literature devoted to the Alien 
series, Pamela Church Gibson notes how “the films should be 
contextualized not only within the parameters of critical theory itself, but 
could now be reviewed in retrospect, as products of particular political 
moments which they, in so many ways, reflect” („“You‟ve Been In My Life 
So Long”‟ 41).  I begin with Scott‟s original film Alien, examining the 
cultural climate in which the film was made and the academic climate in 
which it was received and I explore how these intertwine. Sherrie Inness has 
argued that in order to assess the aesthetic of the action heroine, “one needs 
to recognise how second-wave feminism rippled through society” (5). As 
women‟s real lives in society began to change with the successes of the 
second wave feminist movement, so did their representation on screen. I 
argue that the film‟s presentation of Ripley and the Alien, and indeed much 
of the mise-en-scene, is itself is a product of an increased interest in 
psychoanalysis as a discourse. This is seen through the film‟s sexualised 
imagery, in particular the sexualisation of the eponymous Alien.  
 
Furthermore, I examine the interpretive „bias‟ that criticism of this film has 
sometimes suffered. This largely manifests itself it in the desire to sex the 
Alien as either male or female. Critics can fall to either side of the gender 
binary to suit their argument, or as a result of a changing cultural climate. 
For example, many critics read the Alien as inter-sexed after the advent of 
Queer theory in the early 1990s. I propose a number of challenges to 
negative readings of Ripley and accusations of sexism in her treatment by 
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Scott. Following Hills, I argue that a Deleuzoguattarian analysis of Ripley 
may be liberating when assessing her as a positive cultural figure for 
feminism. Here I have recourse to ideas of becoming and the body explored 
in Deleuze and Guattari‟s A Thousand Plateaus (1980). 
 
Following my analysis of Alien, I pay closer attention to its sequel Aliens 
(James Cameron, 1986). At the conclusion of Alien, Ripley drifts into space 
in an escape pod. Aliens shows her recovery 67 years later, and her eventual 
return to the Alien planet with a squadron of Marines. The film itself is very 
much a product of the 1980s action cinema, utilising „musculinity‟ and the 
„hard-body‟ aesthetic discussed by Tasker in Spectacular Bodies. I focus on 
two differing aspects of this film for my discussion: firstly the inclusion of a 
child called Newt (Carrie Henn) whom Ripley and the Marines discover as 
being the only surviving colonist after an Alien attack. Ripley‟s relationship 
with this child is more often discussed in terms of mothering or maternity 
than not. This, I argue, is a product of the cultural context. Secondly, is the 
inclusion of what the narrative discusses as the Alien „Queen‟. This clearly 
imposes the human biological/sociological gender binary onto the Alien 
species. As there are now two types of Aliens, this Alien, responsible for 
laying the eggs from which the Alien of Alien hatched, is Ripley‟s female, 
alien counterpart. If we view the predominance of the theme of mothering 
and maternity as a product as much of the academic climate as the text, we 
can open up discussions of the female body in this film and view this 
intergenerational female to female relationship in an alternative way.  
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My analysis of Alien 3 (David Fincher, 1993) concentrates on the Queer 
associations of the text and examines criticism from its period of 
production. I again make reference here to the philosophy of Deleuze and 
Guattari. This is because the Alien figure in this film takes on a new 
configuration: the „face-hugger‟ lays its egg not in a human character, but a 
Rottweiler called Spike. The Alien then takes a partially canine form in 
Alien 3, whereas in Alien and Aliens the Aliens have been humanoid. 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s notion of the subject in a continual process of 
„becoming‟ as opposed to „being‟ is of considerable relevance to this new 
figure. Here we are given a visualisation of a Deleuzoguattarian interaction 
of bodies, an image of a body and its „potential for interacting with other 
bodies‟. The conception of the Alien here is one of a creature in a constant 
state of evolution and becoming, whose power rests in its ability to adapt 
physically to new environment with speed and to literally join together with 
other bodies „to form a still stronger body‟.  
 
The analysis of Alien Resurrection (Jean Pierre Jeunet, 1997), where Ripley 
has been „resurrected‟ via the technique of cloning, strengthens a 
Deleuzoguattarian reading as the film “explores even more comprehensively 
the theme of liminality, of threshold states and double natures” (Kaveney 
From Alien to The Matrix 189) and the joining together of bodies. The 
character of Ripley here is not the Ripley we have seen in the previous Alien 
films. Her DNA has become entwined with that of the Alien Queen, and 
vice versa. This leads to a new presentation of the Aliens: one that is white 
skinned with blue eyes and a „Queen‟ Alien that, like humans, feels pain in 
childbirth. But it also offers us a new Ripley, a character who is, as Anna 
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Powell suggests in Deleuze and Horror Cinema (2005), now „becoming-
animal‟ with the Alien. I do, however, note the risky nature of 
Deleuzoguattarian analysis here, as the film can be seen to end somewhat 
precariously. Having undergone this change at a molecular level, the Clone 
Ripley may be capable of both positive and negative becomings because we 
are no longer sure what her capacities may be.  
 
My analysis of Alien vs. Predator (Paul W S Anderson, 2004) and Alien vs. 
Predator: Requiem (Colin and Greg Strause, 2007) explores how the figure 
of the Alien has mutated since its initial appearance in 1979. Both films pits 
the Alien against the Predator of Predator (John McTiernan, 1987) and 
Predator 2 (Stephen Hopkins, 1990) drawing their inspiration from a 
computer game and comic book series of the same name. The Alien, I 
argue, has moved through the postmodern aesthetic of Alien 3 and the 
parody of Alien Resurrection to become what Jameson calls „blind parody‟:  
 
In this situation parody finds itself without a vocation: it has lived, 
and that strange new thing pastiche slowly comes to take its place. 
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, 
idiosyncratic style … but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, 
without any of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric 
impulse … pastiche is thus blank parody. Postmodernism; Or, The 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. (18) 
 
 
The Alien is included in these texts with little regard to its intellectually 
provocative nature and functions mainly as a selling point. The narrative of 
Alien vs. Predator vaguely shadows that of the Alien series: the film has one 
lone human survivor, Alexa Woods (Sanna Lathan). Likewise Alien vs. 
Predator: Requiem draws loosely from the themes of Aliens as there are 
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only three survivors at the close of the film: Kelly (Reiko Aylesworth), her 
biological daughter Molly (Ariel Gade) and Kelly‟s former romantic partner 
Dallas (Steven Pasquale). Not only is „Dallas‟ is an allusion to Tom 
Skeritt‟s character in Alien, but the closing shots of the trio in the helicopter 
escaping the scene of carnage echo those of Aliens where Ripley, Next and 
Hicks are fleeing the Sulaco. 
 
The purpose of chapter one is to demonstrate how Ripley can act as a „lens‟ 
to view contemporaneous ideas of femininity and the representation of 
women in cinema. However, ultimately I aim to relocate these texts and 
explore how a Deleuzoguattarian frame may be applied. I do not wish to 
imply that this in an „innocent reading‟, but rather a „justified crime‟ as 
Althusser defines it: a reading which “takes responsibility for its crime … 
and defends it by proving its necessity” (15). My readings of Ripley from a 
Deleuzoguattarian perspective build on those of Hills and will demonstrate 
how her becomings can separate her from readings that reduce her 
appearance and actions to a symbolic masculinity. 
 
My discussion of the Matrix franchise in chapter two continues the 
discussion of another co-text, and explores the Matrix films alongside the 
vast discursive reaction to them. „The Matrix‟ is an especially complex text 
to locate. The franchise began in 1999 with the release of the first film The 
Matrix (The Wachowski Brothers, 1999). Although its success at the box 
office was not spectacular, its release on home video and eventually the 
conversion to Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) made the film a financial 
success. This led to the two sequels The Matrix: Reloaded (The Wachowski 
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Brothers, 2003) and The Matrix: Revolutions (The Wachowski Brothers, 
2003). With these sequels came a number of other products: the video game 
Enter the Matrix (2003), a collection of Japanese-influenced animated short 
films The Animatrix (2003), as well as the comic books The Matrix Comics 
(2003) and The Matrix Comics: Volume Two (2005). 
 
However, it is not unusual for a film franchise to include this array of media 
spin offs. For example, the James Bond franchise regularly releases video 
games such as Nightfire (2002) and Everything or Nothing (2004), and the 
Star Wars franchise continues to release animations such as Ewoks (1985) 
and, more recently, The Clone Wars (2008). What distinguishes the Matrix 
franchise from the other examples is the narrative interweaving of these 
separate elements. For example, the first short film on The Animatrix DVD, 
„Final Flight of the Osiris‟ (Andy Jones, 2003) is situated in the narrative 
chronology of the filmic trilogy, between The Matrix and The Matrix: 
Reloaded – „Final Flight of the Osiris‟ shows a hovercraft previously not 
seen in the diegetic world of the Matrix series delivering a piece of software 
which is the focus of the meeting that begins The Matrix: Reloaded. The 
video game Enter the Matrix is regularly interspersed with clips from The 
Matrix: Reloaded as well as film clips that were filmed alongside The 
Matrix: Reloaded and linked to The Matrix: Reloaded‟s narrative.  
 
I discuss the film in relation to the many „discursive hooks‟ that the 
franchise contains – meaning the inclusion of references to cultural works 
and philosophical concepts that people are encouraged to use as a basis for 
discussion. I use as examples the references to texts such as Room 101 from 
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George Orwell‟s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) and, most importantly for 
this discussion, Jean Baudrillard‟s Simulacra and Simulation (1984). The 
deliberate placing and the quotation from Simulacra and Simulation 
encourages a reading of the film in light of this text. I argue that the film has 
equal relevance to Foucault‟s theories of the body as set out in Discipline 
and Punish (1975) as here we encounter a nightmare of the docile body. 
 
It is not just this intertextual play that is of concern. The Matrix has also 
attracted an immense amount of discursive attention in the form of popular 
philosophy anthologies. These include volumes such as William Irwin‟s The 
Matrix and Philosophy (2002) and More Matrix and Philosophy (2005), as 
well as popular theological anthologies such as Garrett and Seay‟s The 
Gospel Reloaded (2003). But these have occurred precisely because they are 
encouraged by the text‟s repeated allusions to philosophy and religion, and 
to literary and filmic texts. The anthologies themselves also have a formula: 
they (generally) include an essay about Baudrillardian philosophy, an essay 
about Trinity, an essay about Marxism and an essay about epistemology. It 
is for this reason that Slavoj Žižek described The Matrix as a Rorschach test 
(240) – a text of which any reading of the text is available to the reader. 
Chapter two explores both of these occurrences – the intertextuality of the 
individual elements of the franchise and the emergence of the popular 
philosophy anthologies devoted to discussing the philosophy of the Matrix – 
as similar in design. The Matrix is a text that deliberately sets out to engage 
discourse. The anthologies act as a metatext – they join together as a text to 
read as is The Matrix itself. 
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After situating the Matrix franchise as an especially playful one, I turn my 
attention to the character of Trinity. I argue that Trinity also functions as a 
discursive hook, or more specifically half of Trinity. Trinity‟s digital self 
has attracted far more critical attention than her material self. In the space of 
the Matrix, Trinity is clad in tight, black PVC, with short hair. Her 
androgyny is often discussed. However her material body remains relatively 
unexplored. I discuss Trinity in relation to another set of screen women 
treated with similar critical ambivalence. I have recourse here to the great 
wealth of writing on women in film noir, in particular the writing concerned 
with the femme fatale. One observation made is that this figure has a 
counterpart, as Sylvia Harvey has labelled them, “the boring, potentially 
childbearing sweethearts” (38) of film noir. These characters are almost 
always eclipsed by the femme fatale in criticism discussing women in film 
noir.  I examine Trinity as her character develops throughout the film 
trilogy, and also her characterisation in „A Detective Story‟ (Shinichirô 
Watanabe, 2003), a short film which comprises part of The Animatrix. „A 
Detective Story‟ in particular lends Trinity to be considered as a femme 
fatale as it draws particularly from the noir aesthetic of chiaroscuro, 
featuring urban landscapes and other noir tropes. As the films are set for 
long spaces outside of the Matrix, it appears peculiar that her material body 
is overlooked, as it is this body that is so important to the narrative. My 
discussion of Trinity begins to explore Trinity as a BwO as a starting point 
to address this critically neglected material body.  
 
Following on from my discussion of the Matrix series comes a discussion of 
the character of Batman in chapter three. When using the Batman franchise 
Green 21 
 
as an object of study, one is similarly faced with the problem of definition. 
Jim Collins has noted the complexity of situating the Batman as an object of 
analysis. This is because the character has been subject to “multiple 
narrativizations” (164) over his history, which is complicated because many 
of these narratives are “not just continuations of an Ur text, but, in the case 
of [Burton‟s] Batman and Batman: Year One, very ambitious attempts to 
reconstruct the beginnings” (164).  
 
Batman as a character dates back to 1939, when he first appears in a comic 
strip in Detective Comics (DC). His popularity led to his own volume 
Batman in 1940. This led to a fifteen episode serial, shown in cinemas in 
1943 and a second serial in 1949. Then came the television series Batman 
(1966 – 1968), created by the American Broadcast Company (ABC) and its 
„spin-off‟ movie, Batman: The Movie (Leslie H. Martinson, 1966). Batman 
returned to screen with Tim Burton‟s Batman (1989) and Batman Returns 
(1992), both distributed by Warner Brothers, whose franchise was continued 
by Joel Schumacher with Batman Forever (1995) and Batman and Robin 
(1997). For the purpose of this study, however, I shall be addressing the 
Warner Brother film franchise, as well as the offshoot Catwoman (2004), as 
Catwoman is character who has been an adversary to Batman since her first 
appearance in Batman #1 (Spring 1940) having featured in the ABC 
television series and Burton‟s Batman Returns. 
 
Batman has been chosen as a figure for study for two reasons. Firstly, 
Batman functions as a transient sign that has responded to critical evaluation 
in a variety of ways. Batman has, since the publication in Fredric 
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Wertham‟s The Seduction of Innocent (1954), been associated with „Queer‟ 
readings. Wertham‟s study identifies the figure of Batman as an especially 
popular figure of young male homosexual fantasy. However, rather than 
close down readings of Batman as a figure of homosexual desire and 
identification, I argue that his reading had the adverse effect of further 
circulating these readings in culture. The Wayne household, consisting of 
Batman, Dick Grayson/Robin and Alfred the Butler, has according to 
Wertham, functioned as a homosexual “wish-dream” (190). I argue that 
Wertham assisted the Queer readings of the Batman world become 
legitimate, and thus serves as another example of critical writing influencing 
the thematic and aesthetic concerns of a text. Through an analysis of 
Forever and Batman and Robin, I examine how Schumacher has 
deliberately employed a camp aesthetic and engaged with Queer discourse.  
 
Secondly, I explore the difference in Nolan‟s imagining of the body of 
Batman and I return to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari and their 
notions of becoming and the BwO. I look specifically at becoming-animal 
as it is “found in the mutations and hybrids of myth” (Powell Deleuze and 
Horror Cinema 67). Batman, unlike superheroes such as Superman, 
Spiderman, and the X-Men, does not have a superbody: he does not have 
any special powers or supernatural mutations. Although Batman differs 
from these other characters in this way, he shares with them the 
“estrangement and the liminal status” (Kaveney Superheroes! 5) that shapes 
the character of the superhero. His position as a superhero, then, is due to 
the training and disciplining of his body in addition to his use of 
technologically advanced weaponry and chemistry. He can fly because he 
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has hand glider-like wings, he can disappear because he can create instant 
smoke screens. The supernatural element of the Batman films pertains more 
to his adversaries; the Joker comes back from the dead, Catwoman has nine 
lives. What this means then, in relation to Deleuze and Guattari, is that 
Batman is in a process of becoming-animal, in this case becoming-bat. 
 
Batman Begins, as the title suggests, explores Batman‟s origins: why and 
how he „becomes‟ the Batman. The tale has been told many times before in 
the comic books and in both Batman and Batman Forever: Bruce Wayne, 
when witnessing the murder of his parents on the streets of Gotham City, 
vows to return to Gotham to cleanse the streets of crime. Batman Begins, 
however, shows this origin story in a considerably different manner. 
Whereas the myth is recounted on a single page in DC in November 1939, 
and recounted in flashbacks in Burton‟s 1989 Batman, Nolan spends large 
quantities of screen time explaining the importance of both the bat 
iconography and the process Wayne undergoes in order to become this 
figure. 
 
Batman Begins differs from the previous filmic adaptations in that it is 
bereft of the supernatural element completely, and is therefore more 
concerned with what the human body can do. Wayne is shown to have 
disciplined his body to be the Batman, to use scientifically-advanced 
gadgets designed by Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman) for use by the military 
which have been considered redundant by his father‟s company Wayne 
Enterprises. The bat origin is given more depth – in the original comic the 
choice is quite arbitrary – one flies into the window when he is trying to 
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think of a figure that will instil fear in the criminals he is attempting to 
defeat. In Batman Begins, a flashback shows Wayne falling down a well in 
the grounds of his family home, Wayne Manor, and being attacked by a 
swarm of bats before he is rescued by his father. It is Wayne‟s becoming-bat 
as he is becoming Batman which is foregrounded in Nolan‟s narrative, how 
he forms a BwO. Although, as Lori Brown has noted, this body is “formed 
out of an ongoing series of different becomings” (265), Rosi Braidotti notes 
that it is “stable enough ... to undergo constant, though necessarily 
contained, fluxes of transformation” („Teratologies‟ 159).  
 
Following my discussion of the Batman‟s becoming-bat, I will focus on the 
characterisations of Catwoman, one of the most renowned characters from 
the Batman world who appears in almost all Batman media. This section 
will explore these differences in representation between the Batman and 
Catwoman‟s becoming-animal. In Batman Returns and Catwoman, the 
characters of Selina Kyle (Michelle Pfeiffer) and Patience Phillips (Halle 
Berry) become-cat at a molecular level which leads them to further 
becomings. Kyle in Batman Returns is murdered by her boss Max Schrek 
(Christopher Walken) after he discovers her reading his private files 
revealing a dastardly plan to steal Gotham‟s power supply, and she is 
resurrected with catlike qualities. Similarly, Phillips is murdered on Laurel 
Hedare‟s (Sharon Stone) orders after Patience is discovered to have 
overheard Hedare‟s plan to market a poisonous and addictive beauty cream. 
Both films feature extended sequences of their resurrection. During Kyle‟s a 
number of cats congregate around her body, biting and scratching her until 
she flickers back to life. In Catwoman, Midnight, an Egyptian Mau that has 
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been following Phillips, breathes life back into her body and she is 
resurrected with catlike reflexes, senses, abilities and cravings. Pfeiffer‟s 
Catwoman is more subtly catlike throughout most of the film, although she 
is in the early stages of her transition shown to gorge on a carton of milk. 
Although these Catwomen are becoming-animal in a different way to 
Wayne‟s becoming-bat because their transformations are literally molecular 
and supernatural, their becomings offer them a useful way of transgressing 
and evading traditional gender codes and conventions. A Deleuzoguattarian 
analysis of each film‟s conclusion allows for a more positive reading of 
each Catwoman‟s final position. Rather than being excluded from a society 
which no longer tolerates their transgressions, it is an active rejection of 
societal norms which may serve to empower each character.  
 
The discussion of the body with Deleuze and Guattari leads us to a 
discussion of the X-Men films to conclude this dissertation. Again, the X-
Men have their origins in comic books, but it is the films, particularly as 
they were released at the beginning of this century, that are of interest. The 
mutants in the X-Men films are superhuman, literally post-human. It is 
explained that they are in possession of their powers because they belong to 
the next stage in „human evolution‟. They represent a post-
Deleuzoguattarian ontological fantasy of „becoming‟- bodies that are not 
assessed by what they are but by what they can do and potentials they have. 
It is the fact that the human characters attempt to classify them, eradicate 
them or reduce them to molar being that precipitates the action in the three 
films. The films themselves are occupied with characters that typify certain 
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aspects to Deleuzoguattarian theory. For example, Rogue (Anna Paquin) as 
the girl epitomises certain qualities of becoming-woman and Wolverine, a 
becoming-animal. Braidotti has recognised that “contemporary culture has 
shifted the issue of genetic mutations from the high tech laboratories into 
popular culture” („Teratologies‟ 157). As well as allowing a number of new 
monsters into popular imagery, this also allows this new band of 
Deleuzoguattarian superhero. 
 
Here I pay particular attention to the character of Jean Grey (Famke 
Janssen). A Deleuzoguattarian frame is especially useful in certain instances 
for analysing the female body on screen independent of psychoanalysis. But 
as the trilogy progresses her representation becomes increasingly 
problematic and the benefits of such analysis are less clear. A distinct 
change occurs in her character in the third film The Last Stand (Brett 
Ratner, 2006). At the close of X-Men 2 (Bryan Singer, 2003), she sacrifices 
herself in order to save the remainder of the X-Men, but is resurrected in the 
opening stages of The Last Stand as the „Dark Phoenix‟ – her alter-ego that 
had, as the narrative explains, hitherto been kept dormant in her 
subconscious. Grey is shown to be vastly more powerful than any of the 
patriarchs that feature in the films, but this power is shown to be 
overwhelmingly destructive and beyond even her control. It is here that the 
risks of the Deleuzoguattarian method become their most apparent. This is 
because the becomings Grey/Phoenix undergo are ultimately uncontrollable. 
The becoming-molecular she represents – which involves her literally 
reducing everything around her to its molecular components – reveals that 
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the process may take us into dangerous areas where chaos and death are the 
logical consequences. 
 
It is through this last analysis that I conclude that although 
Deleuzoguattarian readings may open spaces in order to discuss the active 
female on screen that allow her freedom from a restrictive psychoanalytic 
paradigm, with that analysis there is something vital to be lost. Although I 
am in agreement with Hills that “some new model of understanding has to 
be developed to take account of the new and changing representations of 
women in the action cinema” (39), I am apprehensive about proposing a 
complete turn towards Deleuzoguattarian readings. This for two reasons. 
Firstly, this is because they are not inclined to critique representations of 
this nature. Secondly, the potential risks of adopting the Deleuzoguattarian 
method of becoming to both „woman‟ and real women may outweigh the 
advantages it has for looking beyond the binary machine. 
 
As Inness has stated, the rise of the action heroine was dependent on 
movements in real women‟s lives: a greater social independence allowed the 
representation of strong, active women as not only possible, but plausible. If 
as Inness claims, that these images resound in turn and are “influencing real 
life” (15), the characterisation of Jean Grey potentially has very real 
negative consequences for women. As Inness notes, “we have yet to 
discover ... where these new notions will take us” (15), and it is the purpose 
of this study to expose the problematic representations in this series to 
prevent them negating the continued transgressive potential of the action 
heroine.  
Green 28 
 
Literature Review 
 
The concept of „becoming‟ is one that runs throughout Deleuze‟s 
philosophy and that is expanded in Deleuze‟s work with Guattari in A 
Thousand Plateaus. Becoming, as Stagoll identifies, is encapsulated by the 
phrase „becoming-different‟ (21) or becoming-other i.e. that which departs 
from the dominant and normative identities, practices and codes enforced by 
society at a given time. These codes and identities are what Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as molar identities or molar aggregates, which are 
“molecular elements that group themselves into relatively stable 
configurations” (Lorraine Irigaray and Deleuze 121). All becoming can 
therefore be seen as a form of resistance to dominant cultural ideals. This is 
because it is these codes that attempt to thwart becoming – the free flow of 
desire – by restricting it to regimented ways of being. In this sense, 
becoming is always a political undertaking. Becoming is an “antidote to 
what Deleuze considers to be the western tradition‟s predominant and 
unjustifiable focus upon being and identity” (Stagoll 21) through the 
rejection and displacement of these notions of being and identity.  
 
Molar identities or aggregates, for Deleuze and Guattari, form part of a 
binary and include dualisms such as male/female, human/animal and 
subject/object. They are absolutes and cannot account for difference and 
positions between the points of a given binary. But this does not mean that 
the molar concepts cannot alter over time and throughout different societies. 
As they are „aggregates‟ of molecular elements they can be subject to 
change and shifts. The molar identity „par excellence‟ has remained „Man‟: 
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the standard from which all activity and thought is compared. Deleuze and 
Guattari do not formulate a becoming-man, because in their philosophy of 
becoming there can be no becoming-man. As Patty Sotirin explains, 
“becomings resonate to the subordinate figure in the dualisms constituted 
around man as the dominant figure” (103). Becoming is the process through 
which one eschews and deconstructs these restrictive molar identities and 
begins to think of the world beyond. Becomings encourage life beyond the 
binary by finding new possibilities for the subject beyond the molar 
boundaries of being: “becoming explodes the ideas about what we are and 
what can be beyond the categories that seem to contain us” (Sotirin 99). 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s philosophy of becoming has been an attractive one 
for feminists looking to challenge the normative definition of woman or 
dissatisfied with the prescriptive position of woman in philosophy. 
However, its relationship with feminist theory has been complex and many 
writers present some serious misgivings about their work and what it may 
mean both for „woman‟ as a signifier and for real embodied women. 
 
This literature review will firstly examine the key elements of Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s philosophy of becoming and explain why they are important to 
this project and the texts I examine. I will then continue to discuss how 
Deleuzoguattarian concepts, in particular the concept of becoming-woman, 
have been received by writers from a feminist perspective. I undertake this 
in relation to Elizabeth Grosz‟s series of drawbacks and advantages as 
presented in her Volatile Bodies as she offers a particularly balanced 
appraisal of the advantages and drawbacks of the Deleuzoguattarian 
method. As we shall, the adoption of Deleuzoguattarian theory by feminists 
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has been a long and complex undertaking. This is perhaps because Deleuze 
and Guattari‟s philosophy is inherently dependent upon „risk‟, entering the 
self and the concept of „woman‟ into what Jerry Aline Flieger as described 
as a “journey of diminishment” (39). They continually ask the reader to 
push the boundaries of what is safe and what is known about themselves and 
the world they inhabit in order to challenge the dominant order of things. 
Although this element of disintegration has some attractions for feminism as 
a project, by challenging the molar concept of „woman‟ Deleuze and 
Guattari “urge women to conceive of a molecular political movement” 
which is “no longer confined to the subject of woman‟s rights, bodies, 
histories and oppressions” (Sotirin 103). Deleuze and Guattari ask feminism 
to shift its concerns to the project of becoming instead of politics based of 
the perceived identity of woman. To ask a movement that has struggled for 
decades to find a position from which to speak in philosophy and culture is 
a particular worry. Their pronouncements raise a number of questions, not 
only because they seem to be adhering to the „man standard‟ they critique, 
but they also imply that their project is a utopian one divorced from the 
realities women‟s political struggles. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari propose several different types or stages of becoming, 
the first of which is becoming-woman. This is not to say that becoming is a 
linear process that is the same process for each entity that enters into 
becoming: “becoming is a rhizome” (A Thousand Plateaus 239). Deleuze 
and Guattari use the rhizome as an example because it grows in a 
significantly different manner to other plant life. The roots of plants such as 
couch grass and mint are prolific and do not adhere to any strict course 
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(Sotirin 100). The root may break off in different directions at different 
speeds and therefore “its function appears to be much more complex”, and 
prevents this concepts and subjects “from being trapped in a closed static 
system” (Colombat 15).  
 
Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari claim that “a kind of order or apparent 
progression can be established for the segments of becoming in which we 
find ourselves; becoming-woman, becoming-child; becoming-animal, -
vegetable, or –mineral; becomings-molecular of all kinds, becomings-
particles” (A Thousand Plateaus 272). They explain: “on the near side, we 
encounter becomings-woman, becomings-child ... on the far side, we find 
becomings-elementary,  -cellular, -molecular, and even becomings-
imperceptible” (A Thousand Plateaus 248). As Deleuze and Guattari attach 
particular significance to becoming-woman and it has particular significance 
to feminism, it is with becoming-woman that this review will begin. 
 
Claire Colebrook has written that “if man is the concept of being then his 
other is the beginning of becoming” („Introduction‟ 12). Deleuze and 
Guattari insist that the process of becoming must be begun by undertaking a 
becoming-woman because “becoming-woman, more than any other 
becoming, possesses a special introductory power” (A Thousand Plateaus 
248). Becoming-woman does not mean that biologically identified men 
must become literally women or behave in „feminine‟ ways or like a 
woman. Nor does it mean that the female-embodied subject is necessarily 
privileged in the passage of becoming. As Rosi Braidotti reminds us, 
biologically identified women have not automatically become-woman in the 
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Deleuzoguattarian sense: “women are not a priori molecular; they too have 
to become-women” („Woman‟ 303). Rather than literally becoming a 
woman, one must adopt a philosophical position, standpoint or perspective 
that is „outside‟ or detached from traditional Western philosophical concepts 
such as being, identity, the subject, and mind and body. It involves 
demolishing molar aggregates, concepts and identities, positioning oneself 
against the „man standard‟. As Elizabeth Grosz explains, “becoming-woman 
represents the dismantling of molar sexualities, molar identities, definite 
sexual positions as the prevailing social order defines them” (177) and this 
social order is one which does “tend to privilege men” (177).  
 
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not say that embodied women are closer 
to becoming-woman than embodied men, Rosi Braidotti recognises that 
“Deleuze does grant a head start to the feminists” („Nomadism with a 
Difference‟ 308). Although Braidotti does not continue to define which 
feminists she or Deleuze are discussing, she states this is because “they are 
the women who have already taken their distance from the institution of 
traditional femininity” („Nomadism with a Difference‟ 308). These 
feminists, for Braidotti, “are disidentified with its modes, codes, qualities, 
and prerequisites” („Nomadism with a Difference‟ 308). Breaking down and 
questioning the molar concept of woman, which much third-wave feminism 
has endeavoured to, represents a process of thought akin to becoming-
woman.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari locate becoming-woman as the starting point of the 
process of becoming because, as Claire Colebrook states, “it is woman that 
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blocks or jams the conceptual machinery that grounds man” („Introduction‟ 
11). Therefore “all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-
woman. It is the key to all the other becomings” (A Thousand Plateaus 277) 
because „woman‟ is automatically positioned opposite „man‟ in the binary 
machine. Becoming-woman is a metaphoric positioning against the 
normative, the molar. Deleuze and Guattari recognise, as do many feminist 
philosophers such as Christine Battersby, that Western philosophy has, since 
its very beginnings, been dominated by male thinkers and that the subject in 
philosophy is positioned as, and presumed to be, male/masculine. Indeed, so 
pervasive is this standard that even feminist philosophies suffer from this 
bias. As Grosz explains: “the very categories, concepts, and methodologies 
for both phallocentricism and its critique are received from our received 
history of texts and knowledges” (164). Colebrook echoes this by stating 
that feminism “has always been obliged to use the master‟s tools to destroy 
his house” („Introduction‟ 4). Therefore, while becoming-woman does not 
directly concern a relation to real, embodied women, it has, as Paul Patton, 
comments “everything to do with the incorporeal body of woman as it 
figures in the social imaginary” (81). This is one of the dominances that 
Deleuze and Guattari seek to subvert through their concepts of becoming. 
To think „woman‟, as opposed to man, is to start on the line of becoming-
woman, is to begin to escape the molar terms of thought. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, „woman‟ is a molar concept, which like subject 
positions such as „man‟, „white‟ etc. must become destabilised. This is 
woman “as defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and 
assigned as a subject” (A Thousand Plateaus 275). As Grosz states, “if one 
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is a woman, it remains necessary to become-woman as a way of putting into 
question the coagulations, rigidifications, and impositions required by 
patriarchal power relations” (176).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari advocate what they term a „micropolitics‟. Feminism, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, offers what he describes as a „macropolitics‟ 
because it has tended to be concerned with the molar identity „woman‟. 
However, they do not dismiss the very real need for feminism to relate to 
molar concepts: “it is, of course, indispensible for women to conduct a 
molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own 
history, their own subjectivity” (A Thousand Plateaus 276). But Deleuze 
and Guattari continue to declare that “it is dangerous to confine oneself to 
such a subject, which does not function without drying up a spring or 
stopping a flow” (A Thousand Plateaus 276). There is a sense, however, in 
their work that this molar politics prohibits the life of becoming which is 
ultimately the life that they advocate. 
 
But, as Christina Gordan argues, Deleuze and Guattari wish to use 
becoming-woman, and becoming more generally, as a means to eradicate all 
forms of biological essentialism (95). Rather than man or woman, Deleuze 
and Guattari want to do away with the male/female binary and think in 
terms of the production of a “thousand tiny sexes” (A Thousand Plateaus 
278). As Verena Andermatt Conley argues, these „tiny sexes‟ would take on 
“a lesser importance” (27) than the binary of male/female, 
masculine/feminine. A benefit of this is, as Todd May explains: “when we 
no longer privilege the masculine over the feminine, when we see that these 
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categories bleed into each other, then we are no longer worried about the 
„essence‟ of the masculine or the feminine” (13). This process can therefore 
be attractive to third-wave feminisms that have been concerned with 
deconstructing the notion of an „essence‟ of woman and deconstruct 
„feminine‟ identities. As embodied entities we are somewhere on the 
threshold between the molar aggregates of „male‟ and „female‟, „masculine‟ 
and „feminine‟. Powell similarly agrees, describing becoming-woman as 
“molecular, non-genitalised and minoritarian. It intends to fragment, not 
reinforce, essentialist gender binaries” (Deleuze and Horror Cinema 73).  
 
The figure of the girl in Deleuzoguattarian philosophy is a privileged one 
but like the „woman‟ of becoming-woman functions conceptually and is 
detached from the reality of the embodied girl. Lorraine notes how the girl 
may even be privileged above becoming-woman: 
Becoming-girl may entail deconstructing patterns of stabilized 
molecular flow to an earlier node of an unfolding series of molar 
aggregates. Thus, the girl represents an earlier node or branch in a 
series of disjuncts leading to the other molar entities opposed to her.  
Irigaray and Deleuze 185.  
 
Grosz also writes:  
The privileged personage, the figure of resistance they advocate, is 
the little girl. Not the little as vehicle for (pederastic) fantasy or the 
little girl as pure innocence, or indeed the girl as a romantic or 
representative figure, but rather the girl as the site of a culture‟s most 
intensified disinvestments and recasting of the body. 174-5.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari describe her as: “an abstract line, or a line of flight” 
and claim that “girls do not belong to an age group, sex, order or kingdom: 
they slip in everywhere, between orders, acts, ages, sexes” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 277). The girl therefore acts as a figurehead for their demolition of 
the binary machine. The girl is not man, not woman, not adult, not child, not 
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animal – she is on the strata, situated on the threshold between many of 
Western society‟s grand molar aggregates. 
 
She is also presented as a tragic figure by Deleuze and Guattari: “the girl‟s 
becoming is stolen first, in order to impose a history, or prehistory, upon 
her” (A Thousand Plateaus 276). Lorraine supports Deleuze and Guattari by 
noting how “the girl is told how she is and is not to behave, while the boy is 
allowed a greater freedom of movement. The girl is the first victim and a 
trap for the boy” (Irigaray and Deleuze 185). Deleuze and Guattari state that 
“it is not the girl who becomes a woman; it is becoming-woman that 
produces the universal girl” (A Thousand Plateaus 277). The body then is an 
unmarked, an in-between, what Elfving describes as the ideal “condition for 
the binary subject positions and sexualities of boy, man and also woman” 
(76). For Deleuze and Guattari, when the girl becomes a woman, i.e. when 
she physically develops into a woman during puberty, she reaches the molar 
condition of woman. She has entered into a system of signification, defined 
by her sex and subject to the characteristic features of the feminine defined 
by patriarchal culture. Her body then joins the molar system of aggregates 
as it is sexualised and forced to be read in certain ways. 
 
However, Deleuze and Guattari are also guilty of „stealing‟ the body of the 
girl. As Sotirin notes, “the notion that the girl is a becoming seems also to 
„take away‟ her body” (107). Similarly, Grosz notes how “the girl‟s 
specificity, her body, is once again robbed, this time ... by Deleuze and 
Guattari, who render it equivalent to a generalized and indeterminate in-
betweenness” (175). The girl is presented as the block of becoming, a 
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subversion of the dualisms of molar identity so often imposed upon the 
subject and force it into rigid subject positions.  If Deleuze and Guattari 
state that “the only way to get outside the dualism is to be-between, to pass 
between, the intermezzo” (277), the girl then „becomes‟ something quite 
different, a vehicle towards true becoming.  
 
If all becomings pass through and produce the girl, she is therefore denied 
any specificity. She “remains contemporaneous to each opposable term, 
man, woman, child, adult” (277) but she is nothing in herself. Taru Elfving 
has noted although the challenge of the body girl in Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
philosophy provides an insight into the workings of the binary machine, 
ultimately “this abstract notion of the girl is problematic in stripping her of 
any specificity” (76). The body of the girl is written over and ridden over in 
favour of becoming.   
 
The figure of the girl is significant in this project as girls feature in a number 
of the films this project examines. The first figure is the Newt (Carrie Henn) 
in Aliens, and the second is Rogue (Anna Paquin) in the X-Men films. As we 
shall see, the criticisms levied at Deleuze and Guattari‟s figure of the girl 
are clear in the character of Rogue, as her mutation involves her continually 
being written over by other mutants‟ powers. 
 
Another concept Deleuze and Guattari use in their formulation of becoming 
is becoming-animal which seeks to break down the binary of human/animal 
and displace „man‟ as the focus of thought. Becoming-animal, in a similar 
manner to becoming-woman, does not indicate a process of becoming, or 
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behaving more like an animal, although becoming-animal may involve 
„animalistic‟ or „bestial‟ behaviours. As Deleuze and Guattari write: “you 
become animal only molecularly. You do not become a barking molar dog, 
but by barking, if it is done with enough feeling, with enough necessity and 
composition, you emit a molecular dog” (A Thousand Plateaus 275). It is 
not simply that the act of imitation (barking like a dog) is a becoming-
animal. As Lorraine explains: “making a list or correlations between oneself 
and a dog and correlating behaviors of corresponding parts can only impose 
a new plane of organization on an already stratified subject” (182). 
Becoming-animal continues the project of destabilising molar identities that 
begins through becoming-woman in order to “break old behavior patterns” 
(182).   
 
Rather, it is that one‟s capacities have altered akin to that of the dog. By 
adopting non-human behaviours in the act of barking, the body‟s capacities 
and flows alter to create an affinity between the human and dog. They are 
linked by capacity. Because becoming does not have an end as such, 
“becoming-animal does not mean acting in order to impersonate or be like 
an animal, it means changing and varying inhuman (animal) ways without 
any sense of pre-given purpose or goal” (Colebrook Gilles Deleuze 145). It 
is a “feel for the animal‟s movements, perceptions and becomings” 
(Colebrook Gilles Deleuze 136). Or, as Lorraine describes it, “one allows 
oneself to be „contaminated‟ by the dog particles in a way that sweeps 
human patterns of molecular flow into dog patterns of organization and 
behavior at the expense of human ones” (Irigaray and Deleuze 182). It is a 
meeting of the two on the threshold.  
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Becoming-animal is Deleuze and Guattari‟s tenth plateau and relates to 
Deleuze‟s larger ontological project of rethinking „man‟/humanity as the 
centre of thought. As Grosz acknowledges, Deleuze and Guattari “produce a 
radical antihumanism that renders animals, nature, atoms, even quasars as 
modes of radical alterity” (179). Becoming-animal is a response to the 
perception of humanity at the centre point of importance of the universe. As 
Colebrook explains, “the problem with the human is not that it is one 
concept among others, but that it presents itself as the origin of all concepts, 
as the presence from which all concepts arise or become” („Introduction‟ 
11). The becoming-animal allows another avenue, a line of flight, away 
from the man-standard by encouraging connections with other sentient 
beings and acknowledging that man does not necessarily have dominion. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari identify three types of animal in A Thousand Plateaus: 
the first being the bourgeois or Oedipal family pet, the second being State 
animals – genii and species subject to classification, and third being 
“demonic animals, pack or affect animals” (A Thousand Plateaus 241). The 
first of these animals has little interest for Deleuze and Guattari. They 
describe them as “sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty 
history, „my‟ cat, „my‟ dog. These animals invite us to regress” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 240). For Deleuze and Guattari, these animals have lost their 
transgressive potential. Because they have been co-opted and tamed by 
humanity, this means that their potentials have been curtailed in order to 
form another part of the bourgeois family home. They have become human 
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or humanised, and therefore correspond more to the molar aggregate of 
„human‟. 
 
The second type of animal is similarly problematic for Deleuze and 
Guattari. Here we see the animal as it is classified by humanity. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, this is another instance of the animal becoming integrated into 
and subject to the societal codes concerned with being and identity. The 
animal in this second sense is classified by what it is, by what it can do and 
therefore subject to Western society‟s preoccupation with classification. But 
Deleuze and Guattari are concerns with possibilities, what may become, 
what an animal may be able to do and pushing limits. These are animals-
with-organs discussed in terms of what they are and what they do, by their 
biological functions and socio-cultural inheritance, rather than animals that 
can invite you into becoming-different.  
 
It is the third type of animal that is of import to Deleuze and Guattari, as it is 
in the pack that becomings may more readily occur. Indeed, as they write, 
“a becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population” (A 
Thousand Plateaus  239). It is being part of a pack that challenges one‟s 
individual or individuated identity. It is a field, a zone that is rich in 
transformative potentials and lines of flights from the man-standard. It is a 
threshold where these becomings can readily take place as it is a “major line 
of flight from identity” (Grosz 174). 
 
Anna Powell has written that “vampires, werewolves and other hybrids of 
horror fantasy are inspirational images of human affinity with beasts, plants 
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and minerals” (Deleuze and Horror Cinema 67). The films I examine 
feature similar hybrid figures. The concept of becoming-animal is important 
to this project due to the science fiction genre being awash with figures that 
are mutant or hybrid. In the Alien films, we are confronted with an alien 
subject whose very existence depends upon a molecular becoming with a 
host, taking on its form. In the Batman films and Catwoman, we are 
presented with two figures, Batman and Catwoman, who are becoming-
animal in various ways. The X-Men films feature many characters such as 
Wolverine, Sabretooth, Toad and Mystique who have become-animal at a 
molecular level through genetic mutation and are thrown onto further lines 
of flight. 
 
In Deleuze and Guattari‟s „mapping‟ of becoming, “becomings-molecular 
take over where becomings-animal leave off” as the purpose of becoming is 
to “become progressively more molecular” (A Thousand Plateaus 248). 
True to the philosophy of becoming, becoming-molecular is difficult to 
locate. This is because Deleuze and Guattari are not concerned with being or 
beings, or what they call the “unity of substance” (A Thousand Plateaus 
254). The molecular, for Deleuze and Guattari, is that which is opposed to 
this being and the molar condition. All becoming, as opposed to the molar, 
is therefore molecular. As Sotirin explains, molecular becomings are 
“effects destabilizing dominant molar forms and relations” (103). 
Becoming-molecular therefore continues the breaking down of concepts of 
being into increasingly smaller fragments.  
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The molecular as Tom Conley explains is indicative of Deleuze‟s (and 
Guattari‟s) tendency to study “objects not as they seem to be before the 
naked eye but as dynamic masses of molecules” (172). Deleuze and Guattari 
state “all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower or stone one becomes 
are molecular collectivities, haeccities, not molar subjects, objects, or form 
that we know from the outside and recognize, through science, or by habit” 
(A Thousand Plateaus 275). Therefore they do not think in terms of objects 
and beings but different intensities of matter. Tom Conley explains in 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s philosophy the “chemical definition” of the 
molecule/molecular “is broadened to include subjectivity” (172). It is here 
that we see the breaking down of molar identification points and the desires 
associated with these. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “if this is true, then 
we must say the same of things human” (A Thousand Plateaus 275).  As 
Grosz writes: 
 
If molar unities, like divisions of classes, races, and sexes, attempt to 
form and stabilize an identity, a fixity, a system that functions 
homeostatically, sealing its energies and intensities, molecular 
becomings traverse, create a path, destabilize, energize instabilities, 
vulnerabilities of the molar unities. 172.   
 
Becoming-molecular, then, can be seen as the uncoded flow of desire which 
avoids capture by molar configuration and societal convention. Molecular 
becoming serves life where the molar serves to inhibit life, to reduce it to 
knowable forms contained by dominant codes and representations seen in 
molar aggregates.  
 
Becoming-molecular is an especially useful concept when discussing the 
character of Jean Grey/Phoenix in the X-Men films, in particular the last 
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film of the trilogy, The Last Stand. We may understand becomings, as 
Sotirin has described them, as “processes of desire” (102) that flow away 
from restriction. In this sense, because Grey/Phoenix is described as “all 
desire, and joy, and rage”, the character has a Deleuzian resonance. As we 
shall see, Grey/Phoenix‟s becoming is juxtaposed literally with the 
molecular implying that it is not just the world around her that is 
disintegrating but herself as well. 
 
Grosz writes in a summary of becoming that “becoming-woman 
desediments the masculinity of identity; becoming-child, the modes of 
cohesion and control of the adult; becoming-animal, the anthropocentrism 
of philosophical thought; and becoming-imperceptible replaces, dismantles, 
problematizes the most elementary notions of entity, thingness” (178-9). As 
Gordan has acknowledged, the process of becoming is “ultimately aimed at 
becoming-imperceptible” (91). Grosz explains that this move “towards 
imperceptibility ... is in many ways similar to the quest of physics for the 
microscopic structures of matter, the smallest components, the most 
elementary particle” (Volatile Bodies 179). But, as Stagoll points out, 
“becoming is the very dynamism of change, situated between heterogeneous 
terms and tending towards  no particular goal or end-state” (21). Becoming-
imperceptible, then, is not a position or a static point. As Colebrook states, 
“becoming-imperceptible is not something that can be achieved once and 
for all; it is a becoming, not a being ... it is the challenge of freedom and 
perception: of opening ourselves to the life that passes through us, rather 
than objectifying that life” (Gilles Deleuze 132). Lorraine notes of 
becoming-imperceptible that: 
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Deleuze and Guattari‟s notions of becoming-other and becoming-
imperceptible ... involve challenging conventional body boundaries, 
taking the risk of becoming indiscernible as a social subject, and 
unsettling a coherent sense of personal self. Irigaray and Deleuze 
183. 
 
But she also makes a distinction between becoming-imperceptible and 
becoming-invisible because she “does not get the impression from reading 
[Deleuze‟s] work that he really intends to disappear” (135). Rather, as 
Flieger comments, “the point of becoming, is, in a sense, to lose face, to 
become imperceptible, in order to counteract the very notion of individual 
stature” (47). This is because, according to Andermatt Conley, Deleuze and 
Guattari see a world in which “humans are forced to live in a world of 
clichés” (28). In this world of clichés, which is perpetuated by 
“prefabricated images”, many embodied humans “have tended also to 
become molar” (28).  To become-imperceptible is to continually dismantle 
this world of representation and cliché and to perpetually see rethink life 
anew.  
 
However, this project is, to an extent, concerned with the ways that women 
are shaped by dominant codes and with exploring the potential of 
Deleuzoguattarian theory to provide readings that undermine these codes. In 
sense, it is concerned with how these women are „perceptible‟. Becoming-
imperceptible remains an important consideration, however, as I explore 
how and to what extent these female-embodied characters move towards 
becoming-imperceptible. Ripley, Trinity, the Catwomen and Jean 
Grey/Phoenix all undertake becomings which allow them to transgress 
dominant codes surrounding femininity. They therefore all journey toward 
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becoming-imperceptible to varying extents with varying successes. For 
example, where the Catwoman‟s becoming-animal allows her to escape 
convention and lead a new of becoming-imperceptible, Jean Grey/Phoenix‟s 
becoming-molecular demonstrates how becoming-imperceptible has the 
potential to be extremely destructive.  
 
Feminist Responses to Deleuze and Guattari 
 
Writing in 1994, Elizabeth Grosz comments that at that point, “most 
feminists have said nearly nothing about [Deleuze and Guattari]” (161). 
Writing in later in 2000, Verena Andermatt Conley acknowledges that “only 
recently and reluctantly have feminists taken a positive turn in the direction 
of Gilles Deleuze‟s philosophy”5 (18). It is clear that in the years in-between 
these two appraisals there had been a marked proliferation in feminist 
discourse addressing Deleuze:  the volume in which Andermatt Conley‟s 
essay appears, Deleuze and Feminism, comprises of a number of revisionist 
articles examining the relationship between Deleuze and feminist theory 
indicating clearly that the two areas of thought have entered into a dialogue.  
 
                                                          
5
 Conley‟s comments do not however pertain to the arena of Film Studies. It was as early as 
the early 1980s that feminist film scholars began to turn to Deleuze‟s own work in order to 
attempt to build more positive models of female-embodied spectatorship than afforded by 
the Freudian and Lacanian models that were then becoming dominant in the realm of 
spectatorship studies. Gaylyn Studlar and Kaja Silverman are two early advocates of 
Deleuzian theorising. Both writers have recourse to Deleuze‟s work on masochism On 
Coldness and Cruelty (1973) in order to challenge then dominant discourse of Oedipal 
psychoanalysis. They looked to the pre-Oedipal masochistic phase to account for 
spectatorial pleasure. It has, however, argued that Studlar‟s work at least is not entirely 
successful in creating the models desired (Constable, Thinking in Images).  
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Feminism has historically had an uneasy relationship with Deleuze and 
Guattari. Alice Jardine offered one of the first critiques of Deleuze and 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s work and focuses on the potential risks of becoming-
woman for the real female-embodied subject. As Grosz acknowledges, she 
“clearly articulates the anxieties posed for feminists by Deleuze‟s radical 
refiguring of ontology” (161). Jardine‟s article presents concerns regarding 
the dissolution of the molar category of woman and the appropriation of 
woman and women‟s struggles for Deleuze and Guattari‟s project. She 
quotes Deleuze and Guattari‟s comment that saying that real “woman as a 
molar entity has to become-woman in order that man also becomes- or even 
can become-woman” (A Thousand Plateaus 275-6, original emphasis). In 
short, Jardine fears that women must be first to disappear, because the 
process of becoming heads towards becoming-imperceptible.  
 
This clearly would leave the category of „woman‟, and indeed real women, 
in a very precarious position. As Grosz explains: “her anxieties seem related 
to the apparent bypassing or detour around the very issues with which 
feminist theory has tended to concern itself: „identity‟, otherness, gender, 
oppression ... all central and driving preoccupations of feminist thought” 
(162). Although becoming-woman is part of a larger philosophical project, 
Jardine‟s article highlights the huge sacrifice there is to be made in 
abandoning a molar identity politics in favour of a minoritarian politics of 
becoming. 
 
Verena Conley‟s essay is an attempt to historicise the work of Deleuze, and 
in part aims to account for the increased discursive activity surrounding his 
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philosophy towards the dawn of the twenty-first century. Echoing Jardine, 
she situates the Capitalism and Schizophrenia volumes as very much the 
result of the revolutionary spirit of 1968. She implies that one reason why 
feminist writers had turned more favourably upon Deleuze and Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s work more recently is the emergence of third-wave feminisms. It 
is often said that one shortfall of second-wave feminism is that it does not 
account for difference amidst the category of woman. As Colebrook 
comments, “the problem with this „second-wave‟ feminism was its 
assumption that women‟s identity existed and was knowable” („Introduction 
10). It is this assumption which much third-wave feminism has endeavoured 
to undo. It is perhaps in the second wave that we can see the benefits of 
breaking down the „molar‟ identity of woman, allowing a discussion of 
woman‟s multiple identities as it intersects with issues such as class and 
race.  
 
As Colebrook also notes, “it is in this third-wave, or poststructuralist phase, 
that feminism encounters the work of Gilles Deleuze” („Introduction‟ 10). 
This led to an increased interest in feminism‟s potential intersection with 
Deleuzoguattarian ideas in the 1990s. In her Volatile Bodies, Elizabeth 
Grosz offers what she describes as “clearly a highly selective” (167) use of 
Deleuzian and Deleuzoguattarian philosophy in that she develops “only 
those elements of their work, only those plateaus, that are useful for feminist 
reconceptions of the body, for rethinking materiality” (166). She does this 
because she believes that they can “provide an altogether different way of 
understanding the body in its connections with other bodies, both human 
and nonhuman, animate and inanimate” (165).  
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Grosz discusses a number of oppositions that feminist writing has raised in 
relation to Deleuze and Guattari‟s work even though “it is not always clear 
to [her] that these objections are justified” (163). She recognises that many 
of the problems feminists have encountered are serious and significant, and 
cannot be overcome easily. The first problem she discusses is Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s apparent “male appropriation of women‟s politics, struggles, 
theories, knowledges” (163) which was also of concern to Jardine. This is a 
major critique levied against them and the concept of becoming-woman 
because becoming-woman involves a deliberate placing of your self in a 
position akin to the subordinated position of women outside of dominant 
culture, philosophy and politics. Grosz comments, “at the least Deleuze and 
Guattari can be accused of aestheticizing and romanticizing women‟s 
troubles” (163).  
 
However, it is a stark reality that Deleuze and Guattari are writing from the 
position of dominance as white, male Western men whose academic 
position presumably provides them with both a cultural and economic 
authority. As Braidotti has commented, “only a subject who historically has 
profited from the entitlements of subjectivity and rights of citizenship can 
afford to put his „solidity‟ into question” („Nomadism with a Difference‟ 
310). However, it should be remembered that this position of dominance is 
one that the project of becoming, at least in theory, attempts to undo or 
dislodge. Indeed, Braidotti also comments that “Deleuze shows more 
sensitivity of the woman‟s question than many of his followers so far” 
because he is “singularly attuned to the issues linked to the dissymmetrical 
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power relations between the sexes” („Nomadism with a Difference‟ 306). 
This is certainly true in comparison to many of Deleuze‟s contemporaries. 
For example, the question of sexual difference is barely glimpsed at in 
Michel Foucault‟s corporeal philosophy in his Discipline and Punish.  
 
This leads to Grosz‟s second objection, where she notes that the metaphors 
and concepts that Deleuze and Guattari use tend to “neutralize women‟s 
sexual specificity” (163). This is seen both in their concept of becoming-
woman and in the concept of the girl. The use of these concepts denies the 
very real question of real corporeality, sexual difference and women‟s lived 
experience. Colebrook recognises that “becoming must then go beyond 
binary oppositions and pass through to other becomings, so that man and 
woman can be seen as events within a field of singularities, events, atoms 
and particles” („Introduction‟ 2). But this is a massive undertaking which 
assumes that „woman‟ is not a helpful category on the road to real political 
equality.  
 
Indeed, the very notion of dismantling what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 
the „molar woman‟ is cause for anxiety itself. Braidotti has questioned 
whether feminists can “actually afford to let go of their sex-specific forms 
of political agency” (Patterns of Dissonance 120). Colebrook states that “we 
might argue that this strategy is typical of a masculine cannibalisation of 
thought [because] women‟s non-identity and writing have always been used 
to shore up a male identity that refuses to acknowledge genuine otherness” 
(„Introduction‟ 4). It seems a grand request, and risk, that real women 
abandon the progresses of the feminist movement in favour of a life of 
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becoming that may, eventually, lead to a greater social equality for all. In 
this sense it is a utopian philosophy that may not be successfully practicable. 
 
Grosz also offers a number of drawbacks which foreground the flaws in 
fundamental areas of Deleuze and Guattari‟s theories. Her claim that 
Deleuze and Guattari “seem to have little if any awareness of the 
masculinity of their own pronouncements, of the sexual particularity of their 
own theoretical position” (182) implies that their philosophy of becoming 
has failed at a fundamental level. If they propose becoming and the erosion 
of molar identities such as „woman‟ in order to escape the „man standard‟, 
that their philosophy suffers „masculinity‟ and „sexual particularity‟ 
suggests that they have, to an extent, failed in their own project. As Lorraine 
articulates the problem: 
 
Deleuze and Guattari seem to assume a stable standard against 
which war machines must continually be launched. The man-
standard thus becomes a kind of point of origin, or worse, a point of 
reference required for orienting the direction of deterritorializing 
lines of flight. Irigaray and Deleuze 186. 
 
 
This leads Lorraine to suggest that “the kind of becoming they describe is a 
masculine one with a masculine bias” (Irigaray and Deleuze 186). It may be 
that in their formulation it is the male/masculine subject whose becomings 
are privileged. It is clear that Deleuze and Guattari are adamant that „man‟ is 
the standard from which lines of flight, becomings and deterritorialisations 
must flow. In this formulation the man standard, however, seems to remain. 
Flieger also supports this observation by commenting that “the essay does 
seem to be written from a masculine subject position” (39). 
 
Green 51 
 
Lorraine is also concerned that Deleuze and Guattari‟s concept of 
becoming-woman is to “trade in stereotypes” regarding femininity and the 
experience of the female-embodied subject. Indeed, this is echoed in Paul 
Patton‟s work Deleuze and the Political. After acknowledging that 
becoming-woman has little to do with „real‟ women, he states becoming-
woman is “creating a molecular or micro-femininity in the subject 
concerned by reproducing the characteristic features, movements or affects 
of what passes for „the feminine‟ in a given form of patriarchal society” 
(81). Although he does not acknowledge it as such, Patton‟s comments 
suggest that Lorraine is accurate in her assessment. What „passes for the „the 
feminine‟‟ sounds remarkably like stereotyping.  
 
Echoing Jardine‟s earlier critique, Grosz is concerned that women in their 
philosophy are “still the vehicles, the receptacles of men‟s becomings” 
(182). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari‟s concept of becoming-woman and, 
therefore, becoming more generally, is dependent upon „woman‟, either as a 
molar category or otherwise, being second to man in binary opposition. It 
remains to be explained how the concept of becoming-woman can offer any 
real change for real women when „woman‟ necessarily remains in a 
subordinate position. As they write, “it is perhaps the special situation of 
women in relation to the man-standard that accounts for the fact that 
becomings, being minoritarian, always pass through a becoming-woman” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 291).   
 
It is clear that the models that Deleuze and Guattari advocate involve very 
real risks for the feminist project. As Lorraine acknowledges, Deleuze and 
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Guattari “caution against their dangers” and “they never minimise the risks 
the pursuits of such lines entails” („Lines of Flight‟ 146). But it is this 
element of risk that means that the application of their ideas for feminism is 
a problematic undertaking. Indeed, as Lorraine acknowledges elsewhere, 
becomings may have “unpredictable effects” (Irigaray and Deleuze 181). 
But it does not somehow seem enough merely to acknowledge these risks 
and proceed with a philosophy that may damage the already precarious 
position of woman.   
 
As Grosz writes, “it is important to tread warily on grounds where one 
knows there are risks involved” (180). Although I have highlighted some of 
the misgivings and problems that feminist writing has encountered when 
addressing Deleuze and Guattari, there has been a dialogue with Deleuze 
and Guattari because there are a number of perceived advantages with their 
work. These advantages will be explored in relation to the central female 
characters of the Alien, The Matrix, Batman and X-Men franchises. 
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Chapter One – The Talented Lieutenant Ripley: The Changing Sign of 
Ripley and the Alien in the Alien Series 
 
 
Since its beginnings with the release of Alien, the Alien series has been the 
subject of much feminist and psychoanalytically inclined criticism. This has 
occurred for a number of reasons. Firstly, the protagonist of the first four 
films is a woman, Lieutenant Ellen Ripley. At the time of its release, the 
inclusion of an active female heroine in popular cinema was rare and largely 
confined to the horror genre. The character of Ripley has therefore been 
retrospectively identified as a major development in the representation of 
the „action heroine‟. As Sherrie Inness has stated, Ripley “led the way for 
the large number of tough female characters who appeared in subsequent 
years” (3). Discussions of Ripley have also engaged with a number of 
prominent issues in feminist theory more generally. Her representation has 
not only been read as symptomatic of the changing role of women in 
society, but she has been used to demonstrate feminist concerns such as 
cultural representations of motherhood.  
 
In addition to the character of Ripley, the series involves a violently 
destructive Alien species. This Alien species is dependent upon a host in 
order to fully develop. These Aliens, in their various incarnations, have also 
attracted much, often contradictory, commentary. This is partly because the 
Aliens exhibit an uncertain „sex‟ in that they have a “fusion of male and 
female organs” (Bundtzen 12). Despite this „fusion‟, early critics tended to 
identify the Alien as either male or female rather than address the Alien as 
inter-sexed. Jim Naureckas (1987) has, for example, argued that “in the first 
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film, all the creature‟s forms ... were iconographically male” (1). Lynda 
Bundtzen (1987), conversely, describes one of its forms as “a graphic 
display of femininity” (12). Writing later, Amy Taubin (1992), however, 
observes that “its toothy, dripping mouth was hermaphroditic: while the 
double jaws represented the inner and outer labia of the vagina dentata the 
projectile movement of the inner jaw was a phallic threat” (9).  
 
That the Alien is dependent upon the body of an Other as a host makes the 
body a major site of horror. The Alien makes a mockery of the human body 
and the boundaries which we have assigned to it in order to understand it. 
For example, Alien sees the male body symbolically raped and giving birth. 
Aliens sees the hard and disciplined bodies of a squadron of male and 
female marines easily disposed of. This indicates that despite efforts to 
prevent it from being so, the body will always be a vulnerable and insecure 
site. Alien 3 sees a new breed of Alien. It takes a partially canine form as it 
gestates inside a dog, revealing that the Alien replicates its hosts‟ DNA.  
Ripley‟s body also supports the Alien as it grows inside her, which collapses 
the boundary that had previously existed between Ripley and the Aliens. 
Alien Resurrection compounds this scenario by offering Ripley‟s Clone as 
protagonist. The figure of Ripley is now genetically entwined with the Alien 
species and vice versa. As Pamela Church Gibson has noted in „“ You‟ve 
Been In My Life So Long‟”, “there is only one constant in that Ripley is 
always played by Weaver – for Ripley mutates, alters and changes 
throughout the films in the same way as the Alien” (38).  
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Criticism regarding the Alien demonstrates a fundamental flaw in much 
early feminist film theory. Many of the psychoanalytically inclined readings 
have approached this Alien body with an essentialism that has denied 
alternate readings. Rather than approaching the Alien as a new body 
demanding a different methodology, critics such as Barbara Creed (1986, 
1990, 1993) have imposed a psychoanalytic framework upon it. This has 
resulted in the Alien body being discussed in terms of the human body, and 
thus not a consideration of the Alien‟s bodily capabilities and potentialities 
in its own right. The Alien itself demonstrates that much of this criticism is 
unavoidably flawed in that we lack a methodology in which to fully address 
its body and its functions without resorting to dichotomous definitions, 
which in some case results in contradiction. This criticism demonstrates that 
a feminist formalist discussion of these texts requires consideration of more 
contemporary theories of identity and the body, as much of this criticism has 
been guided by the belief that these contradictions can be resolved 
discursively. As a result, these texts need to be subject to a reappraisal that 
takes account of the complex nature of these bodies, and I explore how this 
may be possible using the work of Deleuze and Guattari.  
 
This chapter explores the changing bodies of the Ripley and the Alien. 
Through this analysis, I demonstrate how both the figure of Ripley and the 
figure of the Alien have „mutated, altered and changed‟ throughout the 
series. I examine the films chronologically, assessing them within the 
context of their production. However, I also offer an alternative to analysis 
of this nature. Following Elisabeth Hill‟s critique of analyses of the action 
heroine, I offer a number of Deleuzoguattarian assessments of both the 
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figure of Ripley and the Alien in its various incarnations. Hills‟s article is 
motivated by a frustration with feminist theory describing the action heroine 
as “„pseudo males‟ or as being not „really‟ women” (38). She acknowledges 
that Ripley has been “an important site over which changing theoretical 
responses to sexual difference and film have been mapped” (40). Hills 
continues to argue that Ripley “illustrates the importance of creative 
thinking in response to the new signs which occur in her environment, a 
willingness to experiment with new modes of being and the ability to 
transform herself in the process” (40). As we will see, dominant readings 
that are equally dependent on their period of production can close down 
interpretation and leave uncovered alternative ways of reading that explore 
Ripley‟s transgressive potential. Church Gibson has noted now 
psychoanalytic readings of the films “disregard, overlook, or perhaps fight 
shy of Ripley‟s repeated confrontations with this creature” (37). This 
chapter offers readings of Ripley and the Alien that challenge 
psychoanalytic readings and attempts to explore some of the relations that 
previous criticism has not considered. 
 
Sexing Alien and Psychoanalytic Criticism 
 
Released in 1979, the original Alien clearly engages with contemporaneous 
ideas of womanhood and femininity by introducing a female character that 
differed significantly from the representation of women in previous science 
fiction films. Rebecca Bell-Metereau sees Alien as “one of the first science 
fiction films to offer woman as a true heroine and survivor rather than as the 
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helpmate to man” (9). Previous texts in the genre had utilised female 
characters as passive victims needing to be rescued by their male 
counterparts, largely in a manner described by Laura Mulvey in „Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema‟. Bell-Metereau largely views Ripley as a 
positive image of woman, as she is “tough-minded and sensible” (18) and 
notes that the other female character, Lambert (Veronica Cartwright) 
“serves as a foil by behaving in a more stereotypically feminine mode” (16).  
 
This emergence of a strong minded and successful woman was clearly 
dependent on larger social ideas. As Gallardo C and Smith have noted, the 
character of Ripley was “the product of 1960s and „70s Second Wave 
feminism” (3). As women found themselves with greater mobility in 
Western society, the manner in which they were represented in popular 
culture also had to change. Similarly, Inness has commented, “the rise of the 
action heroine was a sign of the different roles available to women in real 
life” (6). The increased political and social mobility of real women made 
this figure not only plausible as a leader of narrative but, in doing so, also 
financially viable. The concept of this strong woman did not „alienate‟ the 
audience in denying a suitable identificatory subject, though, as will be 
discussed later, this figure is not entirely free from compromise. 
 
Alien is set on the Nostromo, a freighter spaceship that is delivering mineral 
ore to Earth. The crew consists of seven diverse individuals: Captain Dallas 
(Tom Skeritt), the handsome male given top billing whom one supposes will 
adopt the mantel of protagonist until he is slaughtered by the Alien off-
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screen in an air vent; Kane (John Hurt), the inquisitive intrepid explorer, 
punished for his curiosity; Warrant Officer Ripley, third in command; 
Lambert, the female and „feminine‟ navigator; Ash (Ian Holm), the Science 
Officer who proves to be an android programmed by, and thus devoted to, 
the Company; Parker (Yaphet Kotto) the only black member of the crew, 
who is presented as a lowly and, at times, vulgar mechanic; and his 
monosyllabic assistant Brett (Harry Dean Stanton).  
 
The film begins as the crew is awakened from cryosleep by the ship‟s 
computer, MU/TH/UR, which the crew refers to as „Mother‟. The opening 
shots, like many science fiction films such as 2001: A Space Odyssey 
(Stanley Kubrick, 1968) and Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977), view the ship 
drifting through space, emphasising the vastness of the vessel. As Harvey 
Greenberg has noted, “detailed immensity has been a commonplace of genre 
iconography” („Reimagining the Gargoyle‟ 88). The film then cuts to the 
interior of the ship, where it tracks down empty clinical corridors, indicating 
that the ship, at this moment, is dormant. This lifeless scene contrasts 
greatly to the opening of Star Wars, where the film cuts from the vast 
exterior to the interior of a spaceship in the midst of battle. The camera 
settles on a computer screen that flickers into action, and shortly afterwards, 
the crew wake up. The camera tracks forward towards a number of 
„cryotubes‟ in which the crew are sleeping, and as the tops of the tubes 
begin to rise, and Kane is shown to stir slowly and silently. 
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It becomes apparent to the crew, and thus the audience, that they are not at 
home and something is amiss. Their return journey has been interrupted. 
The reason provided by Mother is that it has intercepted signal on a nearby 
planet, LV426, which may indicate intelligent life. As part of their contract, 
the crew are forced to investigate or they will receive no payment for their 
work. The crew leaves the main ship in a shuttle which becomes damaged 
whilst setting down on the planet. Dallas, Kane and Lambert (only Kane 
with any enthusiasm) investigate the foreign planet and find a wrecked 
spaceship (Figure 1). Inside, Kane discovers a chamber filled by hundreds 
of organic eggs. As he moves his hand towards one of them, the egg begins 
to open and, as he begins to enthuse about discovering organic life, an alien 
being (which will become known in popular discourse as a „face-hugger‟) 
springs forth, and crashes through the visor of his helmet and attaches itself 
to Kane‟s face. On their return to the space ship, Ripley refuses to let them 
board the ship as Kane is „contaminated‟ and to do so would be breaking the 
Company‟s quarantine regulations. Ash, the science officer, however, 
overrides Ripley‟s decision despite her higher rank, and lets the trio on 
board. On examination by Ash it is discovered that the Alien has implanted 
a tentacle down Kane‟s throat which is feeding him oxygen. The crew are 
unable to remove the creature, as it is discovered its blood is acidic and that 
it is affixed so tightly to Kane‟s skin that any attempt to pull it off would 
remove Kane‟s face. In addition, the face-hugger has another long tentacle 
wrapped around Kane‟s neck which strangles him when the crew interferes. 
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Mysteriously, however, the Alien suddenly disappears leaving Kane with 
little memory of the event besides a nightmare of „smothering‟. Dallas, Ash 
and Ripley search for the Alien which eventually falls from the ceiling, 
apparently dead, but still with reflexes. Whilst the crew dine before 
returning to cryosleep for the remainder of their journey to Earth, there is 
banter and conversation, which is interrupted as Kane begins to wretch. He 
writhes on the table in agony whilst the crew try to aid him, and eventually 
he convulses and a splatter of blood is shown soaking through his white t-
shirt. He convulses again, the blood patch grows, and an Alien of a different 
form (now known as a „chest-burster‟) erupts from his chest (Figure 2), 
screeches, showing metallic teeth, and quickly departs the scene leaving 
Kane‟s twitching corpse and a stunned crew.  
 
There are many connotations in the establishing section of the film that have 
attracted a multitude of psychoanalytic and feminist readings, as bodily and 
sexualised imagery is utilised throughout. The most influential of this 
criticism has been Barbara Creed‟s analysis of the series in a number of 
publications: „Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ (1990), „Horror and the 
Monstrous-Feminine‟ (1986) and „From Here to Modernity‟ (1987). She 
states that Alien is “a complex representation of the monstrous-feminine in 
terms of the maternal figure as perceived within a patriarchal ideology” 
(„Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 128) arguing that one of the primary 
concerns of the film is “the reworking of the primal scene” („Alien and the 
Monstrous Feminine‟ 129). Creed argues that the archaic mother – “the 
mother as the origin of all life” („Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 129) 
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permeates the text as acting as a “vast backdrop for the enactment of all the 
events” („Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 131). This is demonstrated by 
the opening sequence where the dormant ship is explored by the camera, 
and thus the spectator, that settles on the awakening crew operates as “the 
first birth scene” („Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 129) of the text. It is 
her contention that this sequence is exploring the „inner body‟ of the 
Mother, which “culminates with a long tracking shot … which leads to a 
womb-like chamber” („Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 129) in which 
the crew awake. The crew‟s emergence from the pods is seen as a „re-
birthing‟ which implies that “in outer space, birth is a well controlled, clean, 
painless affair … this scene could be interpreted as a primal fantasy in 
which the human subject is born fully developed” („Alien and the Monstrous 
Feminine‟ 129). 
 
The second representation of the primal scene occurs in the wrecked ship 
that Dallas, Kane and Lambert explore. Creed comments that the ship “is 
shaped like a horseshoe, its curved long legs spread apart at the entrance” 
(„Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 129) noting that they enter through a 
„vaginal‟ opening and that the egg chamber in which Kane is „attacked‟ is 
“womb-like” („Alien and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 130). Greenberg 
similarly asserts that the crew enter through “unmistakably vaginal hatches” 
and that “the investigation of the derelict has been interpreted as a symbolic 
return to the maternal womb” („Reimagining the Gargoyle‟ 89). It is here 
that the „violation‟ of Kane occurs “an act of phallic penetration” which sees 
him “taking up the place of the mother, the one who is penetrated” („Alien 
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and the Monstrous Feminine‟ 130) and thus becoming a part of the primal 
scene. Kane‟s ensuing violent and agonising death, which constitutes the 
third primal scene, Creed argues is a result of this forbidden union. The 
male body here is said to have been „feminised‟, in that it has adopted the 
position of the mother to gestate and give birth to the monstrous Alien. 
Similarly Joseph Chien has noted, “the process of impregnation necessarily 
involves, for the male, emasculation in the sense that he must be penetrated 
and fertilized” (14). A further version of the primal scene is considered by 
Creed in Kane‟s body being dispatched into space and as Ripley jettisons 
the escape pod in the final stages.  
 
Both Creed and Greenberg‟s examinations insist upon the bodily imagery 
being feminine. In „From Here to Modernity‟ she argues that, “virtually all 
aspects of the mise-en-scène are designed to signify the female: womb-like 
interiors, fallopian-tube corridors, small claustrophobic spaces” (58, original 
emphasis). Later writings, for example that by Taubin, have suggested the 
imagery throughout the series is not solely „feminine‟, and this implies that 
it is the psychoanalytic framework from which Creed is working that insists 
upon this coding. The wealth of psychoanalytic criticism this text has 
received can be viewed as a product of larger critical concerns. As we have 
seen in the previous section of this thesis, the critical texts were released 
during a period when psychoanalysis dominated feminist film theory. 
 
What is especially interesting concerning Alien as a cultural product in light 
of the emergence of psychoanalytic feminist film theory in the 1970s is that 
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the text could be read as a response to Mulvey‟s charge in „Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema‟. Although the character of Ripley does not entirely 
refute Mulvey‟s thesis, there are certainly moments where Ripley challenges 
Mulvey‟s assertion that narrative is driven by the male protagonist. As 
Church Gibson has noted, “the first film appeared at the very end of the 
1970s, a decade in which film study had been dominated by psychoanalysis 
– and offered itself up almost as a justification of this particular approach” 
(41). It is my contention that Alien is a text that consciously engages with 
psychoanalysis as a discourse. This is clear in the array of psychoanalytic or 
psychoanalytically inclined readings that have been circulated since its 
release. However, I would argue that although the film is specifically 
referencing these themes and ideas, it does not necessarily follow that they 
should be taken up in this manner. What is of interest to this study is, as 
Church Gibson notes above, that while the film can be a „justification‟ of 
the psychoanalytic approach, it also reveals the extent to which 
psychoanalytic ideas had entered the popular imaginary.  
 
It is not the purpose here to critique or build upon Mulvey‟s thesis, as much 
subsequent work on spectatorship in cinema has sought to do, but to explore 
how Alien fits into this schema, as it offers an interesting challenge to the 
work. Firstly, Ripley is the only survivor, and for this to be the case she has 
to assume the position of active protagonist rather than purely as passive 
spectacle. Ripley cannot afford to wait to be rescued by the strong male 
protagonist that normally occupies texts of this genre, as all the male 
characters, and indeed the whole crew, have been killed. She must act in 
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order to survive, and therefore we see a femininity that is active and 
resourceful. Also, it is the male body that is the site of the majority of the 
violence. It is the „rape‟ of Kane and the subsequent „birth‟ of the Alien that 
is the most horrific death. It has been suggested, however, that part of the 
horror of this scene is precisely because it is the male body that is violated 
in this way. Taubin notes, “that a man could be impregnated was the 
ultimate outrage” (9).  
 
However, to suggest that Alien is a completely revolutionary text that 
shatters the somewhat sexist conventions of Hollywood cinema is sadly 
inaccurate. This is demonstrated most overtly in the final scene where 
Ripley disposes of the Alien, an individual scene that has again attracted a 
great wealth of critical attention and criticism (Tasker Spectacular Bodies 
149). Ripley, at this stage, is in the belief that she is alone in the escape pod 
after successfully destroying the Alien along with the remainder of the 
Nostromo. However, as generic convention signals to the audience, she 
most probably is not alone. Ripley begins to undress and prepare herself for 
„hypersleep‟. Greenberg states that when Ripley undresses, “she becomes 
intensely desirable and achingly vulnerable. The sight of her nearly nude 
body is highly arousing” („Reimagining the Gargoyle‟ 93). Gerard Loughlin 
in Alien Sex has described this as “the most obviously voyeuristic scene of 
the film” in which “the pleasure of watching Weaver‟s young body distracts 
the audience from what it fears is about to happen” (108). Although here 
Loughlin assumes that every member of the audience takes voyeuristic 
pleasure in seeing Ripley in semi-nakedness, he is accurate in suggesting 
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that there is a shift here in concerns. Ripley here can act as sexual spectacle. 
Bell-Metereau, as she is arguing for Ripley as a positive feminist icon, 
suggests that this is an innocent part of the scene, as she is undressing as if 
preparing for bed (21). 
 
Ripley notices the Alien when its hand slips out from its hiding place. 
Ripley prepares to do battle with the Alien by donning a spacesuit and 
arming herself with a harpoon. Whatever innocence provided by the 
„bedtime‟ sequence, as suggested by Bell-Metereau, is removed by Scott‟s 
low angle shot as Ripley steps into the suit. Scott‟s choice of camera angle 
foregrounds Ripley‟s crotch, the very locus of sexual differentiation (Figure 
3). This shot of the female crotch presents a contrast with the previous body 
imagery. Whereas in the image of the Alien this genital imagery is 
associated with the monstrous, here it is shown as nicely covered by tiny 
white pants, a convention that Nadine Wills has noted presents the female 
crotch as “socially presentable” (123) where in its natural state, it is not. 
 
Vivian Sobchack discusses this scene in „The Virginity of Astronauts‟. She 
argues that the character of Ripley is sexed and sexualised in this scene 
because until this point she is “hardly female” as she is “confused with her 
companions and denied any sexual difference at all” (106). This is one 
example of criticism that Hills notes is problematic as it positions Ripley as 
figuratively male. Sobchack describes Ripley‟s undressing as “truly 
disturbing and horrific” (106) as: 
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In becoming a woman at the level of the narrative, Ripley is clearly 
marked as a victim; however, in becoming a woman as a fleshy 
representation of biological difference, Ripley takes on the concrete 
configuration of male need, demand, desire and fear. (106-7) 
 
Sobchack is clearly influenced by the traditional psychoanalytic reading as 
she assumes a male dominated point of view. I disagree with Sobchack‟s 
observation for two reasons. Firstly, Ripley‟s difference is more clearly 
marked in an earlier scene where she is attacked and „symbolically raped‟ 
by Ash soon before he is revealed to be an android.  
 
The scene where Ash attacks Ripley in Alien occurs after Ripley has 
discovered the truth about their mission from MU/TH/UR. Ash attacks 
Ripley with some force, ripping her hair out of her head with his hand, and 
knocking her unconscious. He moves Ripley to a bench, picks up a 
pornographic „girlie‟ magazine, rolls it up and attempts to kill Ripley by 
forcing it into her mouth in order to choke her (Figure 4). Ripley here is 
clearly marked as victim, and it takes Parker to beat Ash off. As Kaveney 
observes, “Ripley is helpless against Ash; it is the one time we see her 
without resources” (From Alien to The Matrix 144). Ripley is seen as a 
sexual object that is abused by Ash, in an act that is a “quasi-rape” 
(Kaveney 143) that shadows the violation of Kane and has connotations of 
enforced fellatio. The implications of this scene are reinforced by the 
content of the pornographic magazine and the posters of semi-clad women 
that surround the bench.  
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Loughlin has also noted the sexual significance of this scene, commenting 
on Ash‟s behaviour after Parker has prevented his attack on Ripley. As 
Parker delivers a blow to Ash‟s head, Loughlin notes the “white liquid 
spurting from his mouth” and that “Ash‟s broken neck reveals a squelchy 
interior, with hydraulic fluids ejaculating onto the floor” (109). Through the 
use of the term „ejaculating‟ Loughlin here is clearly aligning the „white 
liquid‟ to semen, implied further when he comments that “Ash thrusts 
himself between Parker‟s legs, as if in a frenzied sexual act” (109). 
 
Not only is Ripley‟s sexual difference emphasised in this earlier scene, but 
she is more clearly marked as a victim, here of a simulated rape. Like the 
final scene, it contains a sexual undercurrent. However, this scene has not 
received as much criticism, possibly due to the fact that Ripley remains fully 
clothed. Secondly, I believe it is possible to read this scene more positively 
once the psychoanalytic paradigms used to assess become destabilised. This 
reading can be provided by a consideration of Susan Lurie‟s argument 
provided in „The Construction of the “Castrated Woman” in Psychoanalysis 
and Cinema‟. It is undeniable that this scene also continues the sexual 
undercurrent of the film, as has been noted by many critics, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the exposure of Ripley‟s body is problematic. 
 
James H. Kavanagh has stated that he would “disagree with an ideological 
denunciation of the film as simply another exercise in conventional sexism” 
(77) on the basis of this scene. “Such criticism,” he argues, “would be hard-
pressed to avoid repressive and self-defeating assumption about what 
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constitutes sexism and irrelevant assumptions about what constitutes the 
film and its ideological discourse” (77). Similarly, Bell-Metereau sates, “the 
viewers who see this scene as sexist do not comment on the parallel opening 
scene” (20-21) in which the crew awakes. Sobchack, as Mulvey before her, 
appears to accept the ideological and theoretical stances prescribed by the 
Oedipal psychoanalytic theory of Freud and Lacan that had dominated film 
theory. Lurie offers a challenge to this theory at a fundamental level: that of 
the origin of castration fears. Where it is assumed in the Oedipal paradigm 
that the female genitals appear castrated and thus inspire castration 
anxieties, Lurie argues that the reason these fears occur is precisely because 
she is not castrated/castratable or “objectively vulnerable” (55) as the male.  
 
If one views the female genitals in this way, by not accepting that they 
always signify a „lack‟ but a “different kind of presence,” (55) then a 
reading of this scene as progressive is possible. The female genitals do not 
become the site of monstrous feminine force that Creed suggests permeates 
the text, nor the site of passivity and inaction as seen in Lambert‟s death. 
Rather, Ripley‟s female body is exposed, purposely by the text, not to 
underscore Ripley as victim as Sobchack suggests, but as victor. This scene 
could very well serve to attempt to dislocate the notion of victimhood from 
the female biology, once the notion of the female biology is unsettled and 
Oedipal myths dismantled. Paula Graham similarly argues in a more „queer‟ 
reading that this moment serves to “empower Ripley as an eroticized 
presence” (201). Therefore the text can be seen to present the female body 
and sexuality as a more positive force. 
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Hills offers an alternative reading of this scene from a Deleuzoguattarian 
perspective, in order to break away from a psychoanalytic perspective which 
she sees as problematic. Like many other thinkers deemed post-structuralist 
such as Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari do not imagine a stable being, but 
one that is in a constant process of becoming as it interacts with various 
technologies and the world around them. As Hills explains: 
 
For Deleuze, then, the body lived to its highest potential is not 
organized according to the particular organs it has, indeed for him it 
is a „Body without Organs‟ consisting instead of a multiplicity of 
independent parts … which can connect and disconnect with other 
machines, elements or object from multiple frames of reference to 
produce particular types of „assemblages‟. (44) 
 
This approach divorces the female anatomy from the negative connotations 
supplied by Freudian psychoanalysis. Therefore, that Ripley‟s body is 
exposed is not as negative or significant. Another important factor regarding 
Deleuze in this context is his challenge to psychoanalysis which functions in 
his view as a “„philosophy of capture‟” (Hills 44). This occurs when a new 
concept such as the action heroine is interpreted through an outmoded 
structure of thought which is problematically applied. Hills writes 
specifically of this final scene that: 
Stripped down to her underwear, she presents audiences with an 
image of a female character who is both victim and her own rescuer: 
a character which breaks down the hierarchical division of active-
male/passive-female. Whilst shots of Ripley in her bikini briefs 
certainly eroticize her image, her actions supply a strong counter-
narrative. (43) 
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Utilising Deleuzoguattarian philosophy here, Ripley‟s body is in a sense 
freed by the coupling of her body with other machines. These provide the 
means of creating a new body which subverts the hierarchal divisions and 
limitations posed by the gender system. When she connects with the 
harpoon she becomes a different body with different capabilities. She is not 
necessarily masculinised or figuratively male. As Hills comments: 
 
From a Deleuzian perspective, it makes no sense to read technology, 
such as a gun, as a fixed referent for the phallus. Rather it can be 
understood as part of a machinic connection … this has nothing to 
do with the attempted compensation for some original „lack‟ but, 
rather, it is an activity which produces a new „body‟. (44) 
 
Hills turns to Deleuzoguattarian theory in order to provide a framework that 
frees Ripley, and the action heroine more generally, from a critical 
inheritance that has (sometimes) reduced her „transgressions‟ to 
appropriations of masculinity. By using Deleuze and Guattari‟s theories of 
the body, Hills finds a position from which to speak of the action heroine‟s 
activity and use of weaponry in a more progressive manner.  
 
Themes of Mothering in Criticism and Aliens 
 
Barbara Creed‟s analysis of Alien discussed above notes that the figure of 
mother is not depicted, yet is always „present‟: 
 
She is there in the images of birth, the representation of the primal 
scene, the womb-like imagery, the long winding tunnels leading to 
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inner chambers, the rows of hatching eggs … she is the generative 
mother. („Alien‟ 131) 
 
Gallardo C and Smith comment that, “Creed‟s outstanding analysis of the 
film prefigures James Cameron‟s concept and design for the monstrous 
Alien Queen in Aliens” (20). Cameron inserts a different kind of Alien that 
will become known as „Queen‟ or „Mother‟ Alien. This „new‟ Alien is an 
egg-layer, a biological function that will align it to the feminine. Ripley is 
once again juxtaposed with this Alien, and the „monstrous femininity‟ it 
encompasses, but in simultaneously more complex and more obvious ways. 
Through the inclusion of the child Newt (Carrie Henn) and the sensitive-yet-
strong figure of marine Corporal Hicks (Michael Biehn), Ripley is allowed 
to develop conservative maternal and personal relationships largely absent 
from the original text. Furthermore, Ripley also maintains a more feminine 
demeanour despite „unfeminine‟ actions and appropriation of heretofore 
„phallic‟ powers. Not only is this achieved because her violent actions are 
performed to protect her „adoptive child‟, but through the comparison of 
Ripley‟s body to the “stereotypically „butch‟” (Graham 205) female marine 
Vasquez (Jenette Goldstein). 
 
Aliens is set 57 years after the close of Alien, as Ripley has been drifting 
through outer space in the escape pod of Alien and the film acts as a logical 
extension of the narrative of Alien (Doherty 185). An early scene in Aliens 
is a dream/nightmare sequence from Ripley‟s point of view. Ripley‟s 
nightmare consists of a „birthing‟ scene similar to that of Kane in the first 
film, where the Alien erupts from Ripley‟s chest. Where the male body was 
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the site of this horror in Alien, „the ultimate outrage‟ has now been 
transferred onto Ripley‟s female body, its more „natural‟ locus. It is 
apparent when she wakes that Ripley has, psychologically, been deeply 
affected by the events shown in Alien. Ripley is told, to her horror, in the 
early stages of the film that the Alien planet, LV426, now has a number of 
colonists living there altering the atmosphere to make it habitable. Ripley is 
persuaded to return to LV426 to „exorcise her demons‟ as she is shown 
again awaking from a violent nightmare clutching her chest. These moments 
for Greenberg and Blackmore, equate her voyage to the trial of a Vietnam 
veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder, an issue they contend was 
pertinent in 1980s America. Ripley is to return to the planet as the 
Company, now known as „Weyland Yutani‟, has lost contact with the 
colonists and suspect an Alien attack. Accompanying her will be a group of 
highly trained Marines and the „Company man‟, Burke (Paul Reiser). 
 
The company of marines that accompany Ripley is as ethnically diverse, if 
not more so, than the crew of the Nostromo, incorporating a black African-
American Sergeant Apone (Al Matthews), the Hispanic female Vasquez, 
Bishop the „synthetic human‟, and a cocky white male Private Hudson (Bill 
Paxton) whose machismo dissolves after the Alien attack, amongst many. 
Thomas Doherty, in his consideration of the Alien trilogy‟s generic 
hybridity, states that the company “would be at home in a World War II 
combat film” and suggests that its inclusion of „marginal groups‟ “is in line 
with the progressively open admissions policy of the military” in 1980s 
America (191). 
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 Vasquez is one of the female marines with which Ripley returns to LV426 
and is stereotypically „butch‟ (Figure 4). She is shown to be engaging in the 
traditionally masculine pursuit of body building in her first screen moments, 
and to hold a typically masculine bravado where the male characters, such 
as Gorman (William Hope) and Burke, do not. Vasquez‟s presentation can 
begin to be understood by Tasker‟s term of „musculinity‟. Tasker argues 
that musculinity occurs when “some of the qualities associated with 
masculinity are written over the muscular female body” (149). Characters 
such as Vasquez, and Ripley to a lesser degree, indicate how “signifiers of 
strength are not limited to the male characters” (149).  
 
The child Newt is the only survivor of the Aliens‟ attack and acts as 
surrogate „daughter‟ to Ripley, allowing Ripley‟s protective instincts to be 
juxtaposed to that of the Alien „Queen‟s‟. Because of the inclusion of this 
character and the theme of mothering that is associated with her, much 
criticism of Aliens has similarly been devoted to themes of mothering. As 
with the predatory creature of the original Alien, this unfamiliar being has to 
be coded within our terms of the familiar, with the creature being termed the 
Alien mother or Queen, not only by the text but discourse concerning the 
text. Considering the artificial nature of Ripley‟s surrogate mothering, and 
the boss Alien‟s determination to prevent and then avenge the destruction of 
its eggs, the text has encouraged a number of readings considering the 
difference between biological mothering and cultural mothering.  
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A consideration of the theme of mothering and criticism devoted to it is 
complicated by the two versions of the film available. In addition to the 
theatrical version of Aliens (James Cameron, 1986) is a Special Edition, 
essentially a director‟s cut, which features several scenes cut from the 
„original‟ film. The first of these scenes is cut from the early stages of the 
film, after Ripley‟s first nightmare and preceding her appearance at her 
inquest. Here Ripley learns of her daughter Amanda‟s death during her own 
period in hypersleep. The second omission is relatively insignificant when 
considering the theme of mothering, and informs us that Ripley has had her 
flight status rescinded and criminal charges dropped but replaced by 
psychiatric evaluation. The third scene tells of a family of colonists on 
LV426, now also referred to as Acheron, and reveals them to be Newt‟s 
mother (Holly de Jong), father (Jay Benedict) and brother Timmy (Terry 
Henn) in the process of discovering the ship that housed the Alien pods in 
Alien. The fourth omission features Hudson boasting to Ripley about the 
marines‟ weaponry, fire power and military prowess. The fifth omission is 
Ripley talking about her daughter with Newt. The sixth and seventh 
omissions are sequences showing sentry machine gun towers exhausting 
their ammunition as the Alien targets are too resilient and numerous for 
them to dispose of.   
 
The first and fifth of these omissions from the theatrical release clearly 
enhance a vision of Ripley as mother and their inclusion in the Special 
Edition certainly alters Ripley‟s motivation in her relationship with Newt. In 
the Special Edition, Ripley is allowed to show her distress in her grief for 
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her deceased daughter and her surrogate mothering of Newt comes from this 
grief. However, in the theatrical release, this relationship appears to arise 
from „nature‟. Newt shies away from the male and female marines, but 
Ripley instantly manages to build a rapport with the child. Although Ripley 
is less conventionally „feminine‟ than her cinematic ancestors in the science 
fiction genre, she conforms more to a feminine behaviour than other female 
characters shown. Most visibly these are the females in the marines, most 
instantly visible in the character of Vasquez, who, as much criticism notes, 
is asked by another of the company, Hudson, whether or not she has been 
mistaken for a man. In the theatrical release Ripley‟s relationship occurs out 
of a natural affinity with the child. The male characters who try to 
communicate with Newt, with the exception of Hicks in the later stages of 
the film, simply do not know how to handle the distressed child, and the 
remainder simply does not even try to.  
 
These two versions of the film offer two very distinct characterisations of 
Ripley and her relationship with Newt. This relationship is integral to the 
film in a number of ways, and has been often discussed in feminist and 
Alien scholarship. On a fundamental level, Ripley‟s affection for the child 
precipitates a large section of the action. After Newt falls through the 
flooring during their flight to the Sulaco, Ripley is determined to rescue her, 
and it is this endeavour that leads Ripley to the Alien egg-chamber and her 
first encounter with the Alien „Queen‟.  
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However, to say that Ripley‟s motivation is derived solely of her natural 
position as a woman is inaccurate. The Special Edition is more interesting as 
a text as it gives Ripley a specific motivation and reason for her attachment 
rather than this instinct emerging purely from nature/culture. In the Special 
Edition the change in Ripley‟s character is not simply an apology for her 
transgressive non-feminine behaviour in Alien, but rather is motivated by a 
distinct event in her life. For this reason textual analysis in this chapter shall 
pertain to the Special Edition of Aliens. This is not because it is Cameron‟s 
„preferred‟ version of the film, as this project is not concerned with debates 
of authorship or the power of the studio within the American film industry. 
Rather this is because the characterisation of Ripley in this film does not 
fully adhere to the notion of biology-as-destiny which is implied in the 
theatrical release.  
 
The two „mothers‟ of this text are pitted against one another directly in the 
concluding scenes, as Newt is captured and Ripley has to enter the boss 
Alien‟s lair to retrieve her. Hicks, at this point, has been seriously injured by 
an Alien, and Bishop is predisposed fetching a spaceship, leaving Ripley 
alone to undertake the mission. Ripley comes across the boss Alien, laying a 
multitude of eggs in a process that bears more resemblance to excretion than 
childbirth. With Newt and a flamethrower in her arms, the boss Alien and 
Ripley appear to come to an arrangement: Ripley may leave quietly with 
Newt, in return for Ripley leaving the Alien eggs intact. Ripley however 
destroys the eggs in “a frenzy of weaponry” (Gabbard 38), seemingly at this 
point for no reason other than revenge for the traumas she has suffered. The 
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boss Alien then retaliates and infiltrates the shuttle returning to the Sulaco, 
leaving Ripley once again to fight the Alien hand-to-hand, this time encased 
in the mechanical shell of a piece of loaded machinery depicted earlier in 
the text. This showdown has been described by Pauline Kael (79) and Susan 
Jeffords (73) as “the battle of the big mamas.”  
 
The creature that lays the eggs is immediately assumed to be „female‟, both 
by the text and responses to the text. As the concept of mothering has been 
so well documented it is perhaps now more fruitful and progressive to 
enquire of the text why Ripley bellows at the creature “get away from her 
you bitch!”, not only immediately associating the creature as female but as a 
derogatory one at that. Other than reiterating Sobchack‟s point that science 
fiction texts, having introduced the viewer to the alien, reintroduces them to 
the familiar (Screening Space 37): the unfamiliar unavoidably is presented 
in terms of the familiar. In our natural world, the female produces eggs, but 
this is not our natural world. As this Alien „gives birth‟ in laying eggs, it is 
undeniable feminised within our understanding. However, as Butler has 
taught us, femininity is distinct from femaleness, and this feminisation is far 
from meaning that the Alien is female. 
 
Christine Battersby offers an interesting challenge to the deconstruction of 
gender proposed by postmodernist and poststructuralist critics such as 
Donna Haraway and Butler respectively. Interestingly, in respect of the 
recent dominance of these theories on the formation of gender identity as 
fragmented and subjective, Battersby argues for an „essence‟ of woman that 
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may be construed as positive, as it offers a position from which to speak of 
female experience without neglecting or silencing woman and denying 
individual experience. In doing so, Battersby argues that maternality, the 
ability of woman (generally) to give birth and reproduce should be utilised 
to constitute a new metaphysics of identity, as, she proposes, existing 
systems of thought have previously only constituted the body as male. The 
female body and its ensuing capacity for childbirth, and thus the 
containment of an other within the self is, she demonstrates, an issue that 
previous philosophical traditions have neglected to theorise, largely as 
philosophers such as Kant simply cannot conceive of this body. 
 
Battersby insists that this capacity for reproduction is essential to an 
understanding of femaleness as: 
  
Whether or not a woman is lesbian, infertile, post-menopausal or 
childless, in modern western cultures she will be assigned a subject-
position linked to a body that has perceived potentialities for birth. 
(16) 
 
This criticism does not in any way challenge this assertion, and links 
femaleness to embodiment in a fashion described by Battersby. Battersby 
argues for five „features‟ or characteristics of the female subject-position as 
it is defined in Western culture. Fundamental to these features is, as noted 
above, natality – “the conceptual link between the paradigm „woman‟ and 
the body that births” (7 original emphasis). The fourth feature Battersby 
notes is how “female identities are fleshy identities” (9) in that this capacity 
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has „tied‟ woman to the natural and physical world in a manner that has not 
affected the male.  
 
What this demonstrates is that woman‟s reproductive capacities are essential 
for an understanding of womanhood and even perhaps that womanhood is 
essential for an understanding of reproduction as Battersby argues. The 
speed at which association is made between the creature and femaleness, 
both by the film and in critical responses, indicates the extent to which this 
prevails. When it becomes apparent that there is a different sort of alien 
other than the ones at first encountered, Bishop muses that “it must be 
something we haven‟t seen yet”, but unfortunately not. We have seen this 
figure many times before, Bundtzen demonstrates in „Monstrous Mothers: 
Medusa, Grendel, and now Alien‟, and it is unfortunate that the creature 
does not challenge these assumptions. It is unlikely that mainstream 
Hollywood production will ever truly be able to show us something we 
„haven‟t seen before‟, but it would be a welcome change for these 
assumptions to remain unfounded. 
 
Tim Blackmore has also argued for a reappraisal of Aliens in light of 
damning criticism. Using Greenberg („Fembo‟), Berenstein, Bundtzen and 
Penley as examples, he notes that a major theme running throughout Aliens 
is the Vietnam War, which these critics have overlooked. Blackmore 
advocates a formalist approach to the text. Looking at Bundtzen‟s article 
reveals some bias at the basic level of textual analysis when she is 
discussing the „sex‟ of the Alien. Bundtzen acknowledges, and then 
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dismisses, the potential for a different reading of the Alien creature. Why 
does the fusion of male and female organs not make the Alien androgynous? 
Why is the creature‟s femininity confirmed by imagery of the female 
genitalia? Why do the phallic elements not confirm the monster‟s 
masculinity as Naureckas suggests above? Bundtzen does not take time to 
elaborate on these claims, or consider in her own analysis why she believes 
this to be the case. What this demonstrates, again, is the inability to 
understand a creature other than in these dichotomous terms. Further to this, 
however, as Blackmore argues, this analysis closes the potential for 
alternate readings denying heteroglossic readings of the text.  
 
After this boss Alien has been dispatched, Ripley returns to cryosleep with 
Newt, Hicks and the remnants of Bishop, a grouping that has, conducive to 
this discussion of mothering, been dubbed a surrogate nuclear family. Krin 
Gabbard argues for this occurrence being the consequence of Reaganite 
„family values‟, as the „family‟ is heralded here as both desirable and 
prevalent, but notes conflict in that “the Reagan revolution has authorized 
nostalgia for the patriarchal nuclear family at the same time that expanded 
roles for women have become all but universally accepted” (35). This 
conservatism is seen not only in the depiction of Ripley, having her action 
excused by the socially acceptable catalyst of her supposed mothering and 
the adoption of her new „family‟, but also the depiction of the Company.  
 
It becomes apparent in the original Alien, as Ripley gains access to Mother 
after the death of Dallas, that the scenario was orchestrated by the Company 
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for the purpose of returning the Alien to Earth for their weapons division. 
The crew had been labelled „expendable‟ in this pursuit. Having the horror 
of this capitalist endeavour so graphically and horrifically depicted has led 
some critics to comment on the film‟s „anti-capitalism‟, with Greenberg 
asserting that Scott‟s film acts as a “critique” („Fembo‟ 169). Where Alien 
referred to Weyland-Yutani as simply „the Company‟ implying a singular, 
globalised corporation, in Aliens it is named and we are shown its 
representatives in the form of Burke and those at the appraisal meeting in 
the early stages. The evil of the Company shown in Alien is displaced in 
Aliens solely on to the character of Burke, whom we learn deliberately 
instructed the colonists to investigate the derelict spaceship containing the 
eggs and offers Ripley and Newt as prey for the face-huggers in order to 
smuggle Alien embryos back to Earth. This endeavour is not presented as 
the desire of a ubiquitous and faceless company, but the greed and 
ruthlessness of the individual typified by the figure of the „yuppie‟ in 1980s 
culture. This “Reaganist solution to the conflicting attitudes of American 
culture in the 1980s … cleans up the unsightly mess left by Alien” by 
“giving us back the traditional values that were so definitively missing from 
the original” (Gabbard 40). 
 
Susan Faludi has written extensively of a perceived adverse cultural and 
discursive reaction to successes in women‟s realisation of social equality in 
Backlash. Faludi describes the backlash as “an attempt to retract the handful 
of small and hard-won victories that the feminist movement did win for 
women” (12) and comprehensively examines a multitude of different media 
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forms. In the chapter „Man Shortages and Barren Wombs‟, Faludi argues 
that backlash opinion makers were discouraging women from delaying 
having a family in favour of developing their careers and entering the labour 
market.  
 
The myth of „infertility epidemic‟ aimed to persuade women that they were 
increasingly less likely to conceive the later they waited to have children. 
Aliens can easily be read as a metaphor for these two supposed tactics. 
Through the lens of the backlash, Ripley becomes another example of a 
„punished‟ career woman. In the theatrical version of Aliens, Ripley is 
entirely without a family and psychologically traumatised. In the Special 
Edition, it is made clear that she has lost her family because of being away 
from them due to her „work‟. On her return to civilisation, she lives entirely 
alone in a miniscule apartment and the only human contact she has is with 
officials from the Company and the Military. Although she is economically 
independent, her material conditions and social status have altered since 
having her pilot‟s license downgraded. Ripley‟s return to civilisation can 
clearly aid Faludi‟s backlash thesis that society at large was trying to 
retrench woman‟s progress towards full equality: in the continuation of the 
Alien narrative, the assertive heroine that survived is now degraded and 
punished for her heroism. The opening stages of Aliens introduce an 
enforced dependence and passivity to Ripley that was largely absent from 
her character at the close of Alien, and must leave the human society to 
regain her assertiveness, as demonstrated once crisis occurs on LV426.  
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Similarly the premier Alien can be read as symptomatic of the fears that 
underpinned the „birth dearth‟ thesis. Faludi describes the birth dearth as a 
pro-natal campaign aimed at white, middle-class women by appealing to 
American society‟s “xenophobia, militarism and bigotry” (52). She argues 
that the creators of the birth dearth discourse sought to pressurise women in 
the workforce into abandoning their career goals in favour of having 
children by presenting their reluctance to procreate as endangering the 
future of American society. As Faludi states, “if white educated middle-
class women didn‟t start reproducing … paupers, fools and foreigners 
would” (52) meaning that:  
 
The United States would lose its world power status, millions would 
be put out of work, multiplying minorities would create „ugly 
turbulence‟, smaller tax bases would diminish the military‟s nuclear 
weapons stockpiles, and a shrinking army would not be able „to 
deter potential Soviet expansionism‟. (53) 
 
Procreation, Faludi suggests, was presented as an issue of national security 
and racial survival. 
 
Gabbard has suggested that the Alien species‟ black skin suggests that the 
Alien is not only a sexual Other, but also a racial Other. The Alien is pitted 
against primarily white characters: the survivors of the Alien attacks at the 
close of both Alien and Aliens are all white. Viewing the juxtaposition of 
Ripley and the Alien as a backlash text, the Alien „mother‟ embodies the 
xenophobic and racist fears that underpin the birth dearth, and Ripley‟s own 
loss and trauma can function as a pro-natal morality tale. Richard Dyer in 
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White similarly explores the racial identity and sexuality of the Alien as a 
non-white other: 
 
It is a specifically white, aghast perception of the unstoppable 
breeding of non-whites, that deep-seated suspicion that non-whites 
are better at sex and reproduction than are whites, that, indeed, to be 
truly white and reproductively efficient are mutually incompatible 
and that, as a result, whites are going to be swamped and engulfed 
by the non-white multitudes. (216) 
 
Similarly Taubin argues: 
 
If Ripley is the prototypical upper-middle-class WASP, the alien 
queen bears a suspicious resemblance to a favourite scapegoat of the 
Reagan/Bush era – the black welfare mother, that parasite on the 
economy whose uncurbed reproductive drive reduced hard-working 
taxpayers to bankruptcy. (95-6)  
 
Arguments supporting a reading of Aliens as a backlash text in terms of its 
parallels to supposed social concerns of the period are numerous, but these 
readings do confirm that the backlash occurred in the manner proposed by 
Faludi. The backlash remains Faludi‟s interpretation of discursive and 
cultural activity throughout the 1980s, and the backlash lens itself provides 
another means of retrospectively interpreting cultural products from this 
period. 
 
It remains, however, that the cultural scenario that Faludi terms a backlash 
may be more appropriately titled a „backwash‟. To label the entirety of 
cultural and discursive activity of a period as a backlash against the 
women‟s movement is inaccurate, as Christina Hoff Sommers has argued in 
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Who Stole Feminism? (1995). Hoff Sommers describes the backlash as 
Faludi describes it as a „myth‟ and demonstrates that “reliable statistical 
evidence for the backlash hypothesis is in terribly short supply” (232). Hoff 
Sommers‟ own work is a reproof of a number of prominent feminist 
thinkers such as Faludi and Naomi Wolf, whose The Beauty Myth is subject 
for a similar denunciation for the manipulation of statistical information. 
Hoff Sommers argues that feminists writing in this manner “are helping no-
one … their divisive and resentful philosophy adds to the woes of our 
society and hurts legitimate feminism” (17). Hoff Sommers attempts to 
contextualise Faludi‟s work and argues that Faludi‟s conviction in a 
concerted effort in the regression of women‟s rights stems from the 
increased influence of Foucauldian thought on the American academy. Hoff 
Sommers refers specifically to Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish in which 
Foucault argues for panoply of dispersed „microphysics‟ of power, where 
institutional power is rigorously applied over the individual through a 
number of tactics.  
 
However, Faludi is not alone in feeling that feminism at this period was 
under a real risk of failure. For example, Naomi Wolf‟s The Beauty Myth 
(1990) was published in the year preceding Backlash Therefore, to dismiss 
Faludi‟s project as a misguided example of stringent sex/gender feminism 
that „hurts legitimate feminism‟ that is purely conflictual is excessive. The 
critical reception to and negative assessment of Aliens from feminist critics 
to the themes of mothering and Ripley‟s feminism is symptomatic of the 
cultural climate that similarly produced Faludi‟s Backlash. Faludi has not 
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simply invented the scenario; rather she has interpreted this discursive 
activity for a political purpose.  
 
Although, as Hoff Sommers examines, Faludi‟s statistics and analysis in 
many areas are dubious, it remains that the 1980s were a period in which a 
significant number of feminist critics felt a weakening in feminist progress 
and potential for regression. Faludi‟s use of the term backlash for this period 
of discursive activity is perhaps too strong, but it is apparent that she is 
reporting on a period where there was clearly some response to the progress 
toward equality for women. It is naïve to have ever thought that women‟s 
integration into a male-centred society would not have gained some 
reaction, positive or negative. However, these negatives cannot, as Hoff 
Sommers demonstrates, be thought to constitute a backlash, but rather a 
backwash – a less violent, negative and considered reaction that 
nevertheless constitutes a response to social changes caused by feminist 
successes, not in a singular contrived motion but a number of disparate 
actions. 
 
From analysis of the backlash scenario, it is clear that there is a strong 
correlation between the social situation of Reaganite America and the 
representation of Ripley. The representation of Ripley here is far more 
conservative as her actions are excused as they are precipitated by her 
maternality. Aliens can be seen as being symptomatic of Faludi‟s contention 
that “by the mid-eighties, as resistance to women‟s rights acquired political 
and social acceptability, it passed into the popular culture” (14). However, 
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to expand Hills‟s analysis of Ripley from a Deleuzoguattarian perspective, 
the relationship that Ripley develops with Newt is just one of many 
assemblages or becomings that Ripley experiences. That Ripley and the 
boss Alien are discussion primarily in terms of mothering, reduces the 
debate only to consider what the female body does, the functions of its 
organs. The Deleuzoguattarian project seeks to go beyond this, and 
envisages a body “that is not determined, not ruled or structured by those 
(organs), whether sexual organs, heart, or lungs” (Olkowski, 57).  
 
In the philosophy of becoming proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, the figure 
of the girl occupies an especially privileged position. This is because the girl 
is “the block of becoming that remains contemporaneous to each opposable 
term, man, woman, child, adult” (A Thousand Plateaus 277). As Patty 
Sotirin explains, she is “an „in-between‟ to all of the most pernicious 
dualisms that constitute us as subjects and that give significance to our most 
fundamental relationships” (107). Thus the inclusion of Newt can be seen to 
allow something quite different than solely acting as a substitute daughter 
for Ripley. She can underscore Ripley‟s becomings. She does not “belong to 
an age group, sex, order, or kingdom ... (she can) slip in everywhere, 
between orders, acts, ages, sexes” (A Thousand Plateaus 277). She reminds 
us how the body is „stolen from us‟ by discourses such as psychoanalysis 
that prescribe limits and meanings on to it. The girl‟s becoming, when she 
becomes a woman, they argue “is stolen first, to impose a history, or 
prehistory on her” (276). Newt can serve to remind us of this history, and 
foreground this history. 
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When Ripley engages in the final battle with the „mother‟ Alien, Ripley 
forms an assemblage with a loader designed for moving heavy objects 
(Figure 5). Ripley here is becoming-machine as joins with the mechanism to 
increase her bodily capacities. In Hills‟s discussion of this final showdown 
between Ripley and the Alien, she suggests that: 
 
A Deleuzian view would refuse this dualistic manner of articulating 
the similarities between them. Their commonality is not simply at 
the level of sexual difference or „maternal desire and instinct‟, but at 
the level of actual capacities and speeds of their bodies and the 
connections they make. (46) 
 
Although the functions of these bodies may in some senses be similar: 
Ripley in Aliens is presented as an adoptive mother to Newt, and the Alien 
as an egg layer, the relationship between the two figures is not strictly 
analogous. A Deleuzoguattarian perspective encourages us to think beyond 
the bounds of human perception and push the body beyond analysis that 
results purely from its capacity. This approach may be useful in re-reading 
this film to claim positive models of identification for women away from 
the backlash thesis and readings that reduce Ripley function solely to that of 
a mother. In refusing to apply the gender binary to the non-human figure of 
the Alien, we may also begin to separate notions of the monstrous from the 
feminine which certain psychoanalytically inclined criticism has 
compounded. 
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Towards the Postmodern and the Abject: Alien 3 
 
As Church Gibson has noted, the Alien 3 and Alien Resurrection have not 
attracted the same wealth of discussion as the first two films. She suggests 
that this may be because “some feminist critics found the new, vulnerable 
Ripley, the female intruder in the celibate world of the all-male penal 
colony, problematic” (46). Alien 3 marks an interesting stage of the Alien 
series, not only as it differs greatly stylistically and thematically from the 
previous instalments, but also as the Alien threat takes on a new physical 
state: firstly in the semi-canine Alien that poses the original threat (Figure 6) 
and secondly in the Alien „Queen‟ that is gestating inside of Ripley. Ripley 
herself also adopts a more androgynous appearance, with a shaved head and 
wearing fatigues (Figure 7). Where Aliens is essentially an action 
blockbuster akin to Cameron‟s previous mode of filmmaking typified by 
The Terminator (James Cameron, 1984), Alien 3 is considerably lower key 
and intimate, returning in theme and atmosphere to Alien. Alien 3 sees the 
eventual death of Ripley, in a self-sacrificial act to prevent the Company 
from retaining the creature that is growing inside of her. As Ripley is 
presented as a „terminal case‟ from the middle stages of the film, the mood 
of the text is considerably bleaker than its predecessors, as there is no 
escape from death this time for the protagonist in which audiences had 
invested considerable time, money and emotion. 
 
The opening titles are interspersed with scenes from the escape shuttle 
jettisoned from the Sulaco in which Ripley, Hicks, Newt and Bishop were 
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shown to escape the mother Alien. These titles tell the viewer that an Alien 
was aboard the escape shuttle, and suggests that one of the company has 
been is carrying an Alien embryo. The escape shuttle crashes on Fiorina (or 
Fury) 161, a remote planet utilised for a prison colony: a “kind of maximum 
security monastery” (Murphy 19) containing serious criminals that have 
converted to fundamentalist Christianity. The nuclear family shown at the 
close of Aliens have not survived: Hicks and Newt are dead, retrospectively 
leaving Ripley once again as the sole survivor. Their bodies are shown 
being removed from the wreckage, not in a clean sterile manner seen in the 
previous films, but “unclean, corrupt, fallen” (Gallardo C and Smith 124) as 
the opening scenes of awakening seen in Alien and Aliens have been 
replaced with those of death and contamination.  
 
This colony consists entirely of „YY chromosome‟ prisoners, bar a small 
number of Company employees: the medical officer Clemens (Charles 
Dance), the prison warden Andrews (Brian Glover) and his assistant 
Aaron/85 (Ralph Brown). As Graham argues, the film is dealing expressly 
with the deviant body (208). These men are supposedly genetically 
predisposed to their horrific crimes. These men are the abjected from 
society, “whom society excludes in order to constitute itself as a stable 
order” (Graham 208). This homosocial community has reason to fear the 
arrival of Ripley in this text, not for her sex or sexuality, but the arrival of 
two more Aliens: the face-hugger that attaches itself to Spike the prison dog, 
and the embryo of an Alien „Queen‟ that is gestating inside of Ripley.  
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Ripley is given a less than warm welcome, and instructed to stay in the 
medical quarters „for her own safety‟, which, much to the annoyance of 
Andrews, she ignores. As she is attempting to retrieve the mangled remains 
of Bishop, she is attacked by a number of the prisoners who attempt to rape 
her, stopped only by one of the other inmates, Dillon (Charles S. Dutton). 
The attempted rape scene, as Gallardo C and Smith suggest, foregrounds 
three main issues (138). Firstly, the motivation for this attempted rape is 
shown to be biologically determined and implies that Andrews is correct in 
„quarantining‟ her for her own good. Secondly, it indicates a failure of the 
spirit over bodily desires: the vow of chastity that Morse so readily 
proclaims the men have taken at the beginning of the film has been broken. 
Thirdly, it suggests that rape is an act of power. There is no flesh revealed in 
the scene, it represents “man defining himself through Woman” (138). As 
Louise Speed has written in „Alien3: A Postmodern Encounter with the 
Abject‟, the prisoners find themselves “without identity through sexual 
differentiation” (125). Ripley‟s arrival creates imbalance in the colony, 
disturbing the boundaries and laws they had created for this all-male 
community. This attempted rape scene may well be as much an attempt at 
sexual congress for genetically predisposed criminals long from female 
company as an attempt to restore some identity from that which Ripley has 
disrupted.  
 
For the first time in the Alien series, it is implied that Ripley indulges in 
sexual activity, here with Clemens. It is Ripley that initiates this act. This 
liaison with Clemens is not incidental. As Kathleen Murphy suggests: 
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It is as though, in satisfying the flesh‟s appetite for primal 
connection, she is assenting to that final crucifixion, the moment that 
she will take leave of the physical home she has defended for so 
long. (20) 
 
Speed similarly sees great significance of this act in her analysis of Ripley 
as an example of Carol Clover‟s „Final Girl‟ as a convention of the slasher 
horror genre. The comparison is also noted by Doherty who comments that 
“the three Aliens could pass for an extended, extraterrestrial stalker film 
where the killer/rapist ultimately achieves his goal, violating, impregnating, 
and destroying the too-adventurous, too-assertive female” (197). Clover 
herself notes Ripley‟s resemblance to the Final Girl in Alien and Aliens 
(„Her Body, Himself‟ 66). She describes Final Girls as those “who not only 
fight back but do so with ferocity and even kill the killer on their own, 
without help from the outside” („Her Body, Himself‟ 84) which also 
adequately relates to Ripley‟s final encounters with the Alien in both Alien 
and Aliens. Sexual inactivity is one characteristic that is vital for the Final 
Girl‟s survival as: 
 
 
The male viewer may be willing to enter into the vicarious 
experience of defending himself from the possibility of symbolic 
penetration on the part of the killer, but real vaginal penetration on 
the diegetic level is evidently more femaleness than he can bear. 
(„Her Body, Himself‟ 97) 
 
However, this convention is subverted in Alien 3. The sex act and any 
physical intimacy occur off-screen. Rather than show this the film cuts from 
Ripley‟s proposition to Clemens, to Murphy (Christopher Fairbank) 
cleaning an air vent. As he notices a hole burnt in the floor, he investigates 
thinking Spike is hiding there, only to be attacked by the Alien and forced 
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into the fan and „diced‟. In light of Clover‟s comments regarding the 
necessity of the sexual inactivity of the Final Girl, this scene foreshadows 
not only Clemens‟s imminent disposal by the Alien and Ripley‟s death at 
the conclusion as “postcoital death, above all when the circumstances are 
illicit, is a staple of the genre” (Men, Women, and Chain Saws 53)  
 
Criticism has argued for many contemporary social influences on the text. 
Amy Taubin has written of Alien 3, “Aids is everywhere in the film” (10). 
Taubin‟s reasoning lies in the iconography of the prisoners with shaved 
heads, the death of Clemens after sex with Ripley, the fetishisation of 
intravenous narcotics, the all-male celibate society being attacked by a 
“mysterious deadly organism” (10). Taubin even suggests that Ripley‟s line, 
“they think we‟re scum and they don‟t give a fuck about one friend of yours 
who‟s died” is “an Aids activism line if ever there was one” (10). With the 
advent of the AIDS epidemic and popular discourse creating the myth that 
AIDS was a homosexual disease, there was a homophobic backlash, which 
Taubin argues is evident in Alien 3. Taubin comments that: 
 
The alien‟s basement lair, with its dripping pipes and sewage 
tunnels, represents not only the fear of the monstrous feminine; but 
homophobia as well. It‟s the uterine and the anal plumbing 
entwined. (10) 
 
 
The liaison between Ripley and Clemens receives new meaning in light of 
Taubin‟s comments and considering the following narrative events. 
Clemens‟s death quickly follows their liaison. Similarly, Ripley discovers 
she is „infected‟ with the „queen‟ Alien. This sexual act is then related to 
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death in the parallel editing with Murphy‟s demise. Indications that the film 
may be „all about AIDS‟ are further implied by Fincher‟s fetishisation of the 
ritual of intravenous injection. Ripley is shown to be injected twice in quick 
succession, in scenes sandwiching the sexual liaison. Needles, tourniquets 
and syringes receiving and injecting fluids are all glamorised and shown in 
fragmented close-ups.   
 
Taubin‟s argument in this article is especially poignant as it is so 
contextualised to the „aftermath‟ of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s. She is 
one of the first critics to describe the bodily imagery in dichotomous terms 
and not to insist that either sex prevails. Here she suggests that both sexes 
are to be feared in the representation of the monstrous other, and this is 
largely because of the social context shortly following the AIDS crisis of the 
mid-1980s and the resulting effect on the homosexual community. 
Hollywood was preparing itself to profit from this crisis and shortly 
produced such texts as Philadelphia (Jonathan Demme, 1993), the story of a 
young lawyer persecuted because of his contraction of the disease through 
homosexual acts. Gallardo C and Smith also note a reference to syphilis and 
other “diseases of the blood” in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (Francis Ford 
Coppola, 1992). 
 
This aside, Taubin‟s article was published shortly after Judith Butler‟s 
hugely influential Gender Trouble. Doherty‟s article similarly follows this 
publication and significantly describes the Alien as “vagina dentata and 
phallic drill, the alien is a cross-dressing monster from the id whose sexual 
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confusion mirrors the shifting gender dynamics of the series” (196, original 
emphasis). Viewing Taubin‟s and Doherty‟s work in this context, the choice 
to not sex the Alien by swaying to one side of the female/male dichotomy is 
especially poignant and indicative of the tremendously broad effect Butler‟s 
work has had on academic criticism. However, to suggest that all criticism 
of the series written at this time adopts this stance is inaccurate. This is 
demonstrated by Graham who despite acknowledging „phallic‟ 
characteristics returns to suggest the creature‟s „femaleness‟: 
 
The alien/other has phallic characteristics, but is generally coded as 
female, both in its reproductive functions, its fatal implacable beauty 
and its amoral survival instincts. (202) 
 
Reasoning for this can be seen in the polemical purpose for Graham‟s essay. 
Graham is attempting to formulate a platform from which to discuss a 
heretofore under-discussed area: that of lesbian spectatorship. Much theory, 
such as Evans and Gamman, reacts to Mulvey‟s original thesis has argued 
that there is no position from which to speak in concrete terms about rigid 
subject positions be they „lesbian‟ or „heterosexual‟. Graham is aware of 
this and seeks “not to argue for a definitive structure of lesbian 
identification, but to offer a conceptualization of how lesbian spectatorship 
might work in specific narratives” (217) in an approach that is indicative of 
the advent of Queer theory.  
 
Graham rereads the final scene of Alien discussed above from a (potentially) 
lesbian point of view. Noting that this scene has been “criticized by 
feminists because it objectifies the female body as site of sexual violence” 
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(200) she suggests that “lesbians may, however, respond quite differently to 
this scene” (201). Suggesting that the lesbian spectator resists identification 
with the feminine object is a grand claim that assumes a lesbian spectatorial 
position as stable and fixed. However, Graham is attempting to pioneer 
work in this area and thus her work can provide a point for reaction in this 
area. Her choice to sex the Alien can thus be seen as symptomatic of this 
purpose. Although there are still contradictions in criticism of this period, 
these writings show that Queer concerns had, by this period of the early to 
mid-nineties, infiltrated not only cultural texts, but the criticism concerning 
these films. 
 
The Alien that emerges from Spike‟s entrails is perhaps the most interesting 
incarnation of the Alien shown thus far in the series, as it takes a partially 
canine form. Previously, the Alien has adopted a humanoid form, and has 
only erupted from the human form. This new incarnation is rarely discussed 
in criticism but has interesting implications when considering Otherness and 
the formation of identity. Previously it was assumed that the Alien naturally 
adopted a humanoid form, but this new quadruped Alien demonstrates it is 
dependent upon its host for its future physicality. As will be explored further 
in Alien Resurrection, the Alien must fuse with the DNA of its host in order 
to develop.  
 
Similarly, the Alien inside of Ripley has connotations as there is no longer 
as clear a distinction between the self and the Other as seen in Alien and 
Aliens. Absent from Alien 3 is a dramatic and lengthy „show down‟ between 
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the Alien and Ripley because the distinction between the two figures does 
not exist in the same way. This Alien is destroyed by a communal effort, 
and the hand to hand battle is taken place not by Ripley but by her ally 
Dillon. This Alien is an interesting concept as the unfamiliar is now seen as 
familiar for a reason. The Alien can only come into being through the body 
of an/Other; the Alien has to partially adopt the form of this Other.  On a 
superficial level, this factor corresponds to Deleuzoguattarian theories of the 
body. The creature has an ability to „become‟ with its victim at a molecular 
level. 
 
Becoming Deleuzoguattarian: Alien Resurrection 
 
After Ripley‟s self-sacrifice at the conclusion of Alien 3, a further chapter of 
the saga seemed unlikely. However, the power of the franchise prevailed 
and Ripley was „resurrected‟ for the fourth episode of the series. In a 
conversation between Ripley and Dr. Gediman (Brad Dourff), she, and 
therefore the viewer, is informed that she is not exactly the Ellen Ripley of 
the previous three films: she is clone number eight, made from traces of the 
DNA in her blood found on Fiorina 161. She has been created a laboratory 
by a new batch of evil scientists, working not for the Company, but the 
„United  Systems Military‟ in order to extract the Alien foetus that was 
growing inside of her. The Clone Ripley is described thoroughly 
derogatively as merely a “meat by-product” by General Perez (Dan 
Hedaya), who is in charge of the primary operation to bring the Alien back 
to Earth. It is in this instalment, as discussed by Powell in Deleuze and 
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Horror Cinema, that the Alien series resonates most clearly with Deleuzian 
and Deleuzoguattarian philosophy.  
 
From its very beginning, Alien Resurrection establishes itself as a film 
concerned with the themes of genetic mutation, hybridity and fusion 
between the species of „human‟ and „alien‟. Jackie Stacey has drawn 
attention to the credit sequence, describing it as showing “cellular mutations 
in flowing motion” which cross “the usual internal/external boundary of 
bodily integrity” (253). The first half of the sequence features an 
indeterminate mass of flesh, membrane and hair that warps and twists 
revealing eyes and teeth, which are characteristic of both human and alien 
bodies. It is a fleshy amalgamation of these two bodies. For Stacey, this 
sequence “places the mutability of the cell at the heart of [Alien 
Resurrection‟s] spectacular display of monstrous bodies”, because in its 
“golden flow” the cells “mutate into more monstrous distortions” (254). 
Indeed, her description of this sequence resonates with the Deleuzian and 
Deleuzoguattarian „lexicon‟ as they are philosophies concerned with flows 
and mutations. 
 
The action in Alien Resurrection is precipitated by a transaction between 
General Perez and the crew of the Betty, led once again by a male character 
Captain Elgyn (Michael Wincott), a likely protagonist who, like Dallas, is 
slaughtered in the early stages of the film. Perez has paid Elgyn for the 
bodies of a mining crew to act as host for the „Queen‟s‟ eggs. Similarly to 
the first film the human body is commodified by „the powers that be‟ to 
enable the life of the Alien for their own benefit. As in the previous texts, 
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the Aliens prove uncontrollable, escape the laboratories and quickly 
despatch most of the military aboard the spaceship, leaving the remainder of 
the crew of the Betty to escape to Earth.  
 
The Ripley of this film can be seen to epitomise Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
concept of becoming-animal through the assemblage formed with the Alien 
species. The genetic mutation that has occurred in her fusion with the Alien 
species has resulted in the Clone Ripley having certain Alien qualities and 
behaviours. For example, after the fight that ensues from her first encounter 
with the crew of the Betty, she is hit in the face with a dumbbell. 
Considering the force of the blow, she, surprisingly, only looks slightly 
startled and her nose begins to bleed. Not only does this reveal that she is 
stronger and more resilient in her new body, but after she wipes the blood 
from her face and flicks it onto the floor, it burns the floor like an acid. 
However, this burning is significantly different from the sequence shown in 
Alien when the crew of the Nostromo discover the face-hugger has acidic 
blood. In Alien, this is a fairly long sequence because it involves the crew 
running down a number of the ship‟s floors as the blood burns through 
them. Therefore, the Clone Ripley‟s acidic blood is not shown to be as 
potent: she is not entirely human and not entirely Alien, but a hybrid 
between the two. She is positioned on a threshold between two points of 
identification, between the multiplicities of „human‟ and „Alien‟. As 
Stephen Mulhall states: 
One cannot even regard Ripley‟s clone as human – as a member of 
the same species as Ripley herself ... she is, in fact, neither fully 
human nor fully alien, but rather a hybrid – a creature whose genetic 
base is constituted by a grafting of human and alien stock. 120.  
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Indeed, Stacey identifies her as a “transgenic clone: a clone whose original 
already combined the DNA of two different species – human and alien” 
(253). This refers to Ripley‟s previous becoming with the Alien in the 
previous film, Alien 3. The confusion between physical boundaries between 
the species was introduced in Alien 3 through the depiction of the Alien-dog 
assemblage shown in the quadruped Alien, and Ripley‟s „impregnation‟ 
with the Alien Queen. But this relation is expanded. Not only is the Alien 
dependent on the host‟s form and DNA in order to take form, but the Alien 
also alters the DNA of host. It is a becoming for both species, albeit a non-
consensual one for the non-Alien party. 
 
Anna Powell has described Alien Resurrection as a film that “operates a 
complex assemblage of woman becoming-monster in which the monster 
becomes-human” (Deleuze and Horror Cinema 74). She also writes of 
Ripley‟s becoming-alien, and notes how the camera works to accentuate this 
becoming (Figure 8): 
Her senses are preternaturally acute. On the run with the pirate gang, 
she bends on all fours and snuffs the air like a beast. As she hears an 
alien approach, the camera takes a 360 degree turn that emphasises 
her fluid movements and beast-like body language. Deleuze and 
Horror Cinema 75. 
 
This occurs shortly after the Clone Ripley realises they are nearing the 
Aliens‟ „nest.‟ She declares that she can “hear them”, and also that that she 
can sense that the Queen is in pain. The Clone Ripley is also shown to have 
an affinity with the pack, with the hive. As discussed earlier, the pack is 
given primacy in Deleuze and Guattari‟s conception of the becoming-
animal. This is because it allows, or gives opportunity for, multiple 
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exchanges and connections which in turn allow multiple becomings. It is a 
„space‟ to break down and diffuse individuated identity and subjectivity.  
 
This sequence is dislocated from the temporal and physical space of the rest 
of the film. After she falls to the floor in a bestial manner, the floor is ripped 
from under her. When she is shown writhing on the floor amidst a mass of 
throbbing alien viscera, it is difficult to locate her. The shot/reverse shot 
exchange marking Call and Purvis‟s (Leland Orser) view of her does not 
quite tally in terms of perspective. We do not know quite where she is in 
relation to the rest of the crew. This sequence is Deleuzoguattarian because 
it depicts the Clone Ripley‟s connection with the Deleuzoguattarian pack of 
the becoming-animal. Call and Purvis believe she is going to her death, but 
she lies there in calm and quiet. As Powell describes, “she wallows with 
luxuriant abandon in a sea of tentacles” (Deleuze and Horror Cinema 75). 
She eventually slips through the middle of the writhing multitude to join the 
Queen in the birthing chamber. This action itself signifies a becoming with 
the Alien species, as Powell identifies: “she sinks back into it by folding her 
arms with a rhythm and speed corresponding to the pulsing mass itself” 
(Deleuze and Horror Cinema 75). The Clone Ripley is connected to the 
pack not only in a molecular fashion, but because she corresponds to the 
flows and movements of that pack. She has entered into the “relation of 
movement and rest of the animal particles” (Deleuze and Guattari A 
Thousand Plateaus 274). 
  
Attention is drawn to the Oedipal animal, the animal type that she and the 
Aliens are not, in a conversation with Wren. Wren realises the benefits of 
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the kinds of becoming the Alien is able to undertake, and it is this capacity 
that the United Systems Military are wishing to capitalise from. He 
describes the Alien as “the animal itself ... wondrous ... potential 
unbelievable, once we‟ve tamed him.” The Clone Ripley responds by saying 
“roll over? Play dead? Heel? You can‟t teach it tricks.” The Clone Ripley 
here makes references to the commands and whims that the human bestows 
upon the Oedipal animal and realises that the Alien far from being this 
„kind‟ of animal. The molar man here – Wren – believes that he and his 
band of other molar men can be master of this creature. They adhere to the 
conception that “man is the subject: the point of view or ground from which 
all other beings or becomings are supposedly determined” (Colebrook Gilles 
Deleuze 139). They have already engineered one becoming between Ripley 
and the Alien, and wish to control all of their other potential becomings. 
They exhibit an arrogance that is synonymous with the belief of man as the 
centre of all creation and thought. It is, perhaps, the white, patriarchal, molar 
males that are vilified the most, representative of military and scientific 
power. Powell describes them as “the most monstrous beings on the ship 
despite their fully human genetic status” (Deleuze and Horror Cinema 74).  
 
The Clone Ripley is not, however, the only mutant or cyborg to be seen in 
Alien Resurrection. Many feminist writers such as Patricia Pisters, Rosi 
Braidotti and Patty Sotirin have written of Donna Haraway‟s theory of the 
cyborg and its relation to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari. Behind both theorists‟ work is a perceived need for a 
„postanthrocentrism‟ which aims to dislodge the „human‟ as the centre of all 
thought and integrate the subject more thoroughly with its environment. 
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This involves thinking more fluidly about how the subject interacts with 
others subjects, objects, animals, machines etc. Both Haraway‟s cyborg and 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s BwO and philosophy of becoming privilege 
interrelationality of this nature. The BwO and the cyborg are, according to 
Braidotti, “connection-making entities” (200).  
 
Where Deleuze‟s philosophy endeavours to challenge the “binary machine” 
(Dialogues), Haraway takes arms against certain “dualism machines” (477) 
perpetuated by Western culture. They are interested in exploring and 
promoting the space between binaries in order to destabilise those binaries. 
Sotirin identifies the cyborg as a threshold, that which is “an „in-between‟ 
human and machine, organic and inorganic, biological and technological, 
natural and unnatural, real and artificial” (101). It is a becoming-woman 
which aims to dissolve the fixity of the man standard by operating in 
conceptual spaces in-between. The cyborg for Sotirin is a very real 
phenomenon, as we are all now becoming „hybridized‟, „biomatic‟ and 
„technocorporeal‟ (101). As Haraway herself writes, “the boundary between 
science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion” (475). 
 
 
Haraway describes the cyborg as “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction” and notes how “contemporary science fiction is full of cyborgs – 
creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate worlds 
ambiguously natural and crafted” (475). She notes that her “cyborg myth is 
about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions” (478). This figure resonates 
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clearly with Deleuze and Guattari‟s philosophy of becoming in that it aims 
to dismantle and challenge molar aggregates and societal conventions. But 
Haraway also acknowledges that the territory that this may lead to is 
uncertain and potentially unsafe, leading to “dangerous possibilities” (478). 
 
Haraway identifies three areas of slippage between what Deleuze would 
term „molar‟ identities or multiplicities. The first of these resonates with 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s becoming-animal: 
By the late twentieth century in United States scientific culture, the 
boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached ... 
many people no longer feel the need for such a separation; indeed, 
many branches of feminist culture affirm the pleasure of connection 
of human and other living creatures. 477. 
 
Indeed, as Pisters comments, “the cyborg is situated on a molecular level, 
creating becomings, connections, and affinity groups (the cyborg chooses on 
the basis of affinity, not on the basis of identity and origin, which is anyway 
undermined in politics of becomings)” (119).   
 
The survivors of this film are, with one notable exception, all cyborgs to 
varying extents. Johner is the exception here: a „molar‟ white male. Johner 
is a cliché of masculine behaviours. His first encounter with the Clone 
Ripley involves him propositioning her for sex while she plays with a 
basketball. Indeed, he continually makes references of a sexual nature, for 
example, when he discovers that Call is an android he declares “can't 
believe I almost fucked it”. But Johner differs significantly from other 
examples of Man seen in the film. He does not wield institutional power in 
the same way as General Perez or Dr Wren. He is fairly lowly ranked in the 
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crew of the Betty also: the captain is Elgyn, and the second in command is a 
woman, Hillard, both of whom die in the early stages of the film. 
 
Vreiss is also cyborgal. He is paraplegic, and only shown using a 
customised electric wheelchair. To say he is wheelchair „bound‟ is 
inaccurate in a sense, as the wheelchair allows him to smuggle weaponry 
aboard the space station which will ultimate aid his survival. He is shown to 
have no feeling in his legs when Johner is sown dropping a knife which 
lodges into his thigh without him noticing. Where we see the Clone Ripley 
having become with the Alien to embark on a specific becoming-animal, 
Vreiss is in a process becoming-machine. He forms a different assemblage 
with his chair which significantly enhances his ability to survive. He is a 
clear Body without Organs – his disability requires him to look beyond what 
his body can do but what it can become through interaction with different 
technologies. Vreiss is at his most vulnerable when he is forced to abandon 
this connection-making machine as the company need to move underwater 
through a section of the Auriga that has been flooded.  
 
Call the android does have organic elements and like Ash and Burke before 
her can „pass‟ for being human. Call is gendered. She is an example of 
Haraway‟s second „leaky distinction‟ which is “between animal-human 
(organism) and machine” (477).  Call operates in-between a number of 
binaries or dualisms. The most obvious is organic/inorganic and 
human/machine. More subtly, however, Call destabilises the male/female 
binary. Although she does not have a „sex‟ as such, she is certainly 
gendered. But this gendering is complex. She is gendered as „female‟ but 
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does not strictly adhere to convention feminine behaviours and appearances. 
Her look is somewhat androgynous and she appears somewhat boyish 
(Figure 9). As Haraway writes, “cyborgs might consider more seriously the 
potential, fluid, sometimes aspect of sex and sexual embodiment. Gender 
might not be a global identity after all, even if it has profound historical 
breadth and depth” (490).  
 
Her own physical boundaries are compromised in the sequence where she 
plugs into the ship in order to communicate with it. She is shown to have a 
here she enters into a becoming-machine, forming a different assemblage 
with the ship. This occurs after she is shot in the abdomen by Wren and is 
subsequently revealed as an android.  She is able to „plug in‟ to the ship in 
order to control it by inserting a cable into a socket in her body disguised 
under a mole. By undertaking this procedure she creates a new circuit which 
enables her to increase her capacities to control the ship. As a figure she 
jams the binary logic of many molar aggregates. These are both physical in 
that her body challenges the organic/inorganic, human/machine binaries by 
containing qualities of both. Her connection with the ship also demonstrates 
a breaking down of being and object, as she is able to form a different 
assemblage with the vessel which alters the capacities of both entities. This 
„jamming‟ is also social in that she questions and challenges notions of 
gender and therefore the male/female binary is destabilised. 
 
The Alien Queen similarly is not what she once was, and conversely to the 
Clone Ripley, is becoming-human. One of the qualities that Dr Gediman 
identifies as Ripley having „passed‟ to the Queen is that the Queen now has 
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mammalian birthing processes and experiences pain when she give birth. 
This is hardly an innocent allusion to the „original sin‟ which continues 
religious themes of the series such as „resurrection‟ and the sacrifice shown 
at the conclusion of the previous instalment.  
 
As noted earlier, Powell describes this transformation as the Alien 
experiencing a „being-human‟. It would be unfair to suggest that the Alien 
Queen is now on a trajectory of moving towards the molar. Rather, the 
Queen is now presented as situated on a threshold. This again resonates with 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s becoming-animal because the intensities and 
capacities of the Alien Queen and the Clone Ripley have been cross-
contaminated. Their affinity occurs at the level of their potential, partially 
due to the alterations of their molecular makeup, but also because they share 
capacities. Elisabeth Hills has commented that one reason why much 
discourse has been produced that pertains to the relation between the Alien 
Queen and Ripley is because “they are similar throughout the series because 
of the actions they perform and what they do with their bodies” (46). As 
Deleuze and Guattari explain, becoming-animal “is a question of composing 
a body with the animal, a body without organs defined by zones of intensity 
or proximity” (274) and it is this zone of proximity, or threshold, that the 
Alien Queen and Clone Ripley share.  
 
Tamsin Lorraine, when discussing the becoming-dog theorised by Deleuze 
and Guattari reminds us that: 
Becoming-animal (or becoming-insect or becoming-plant) for a 
human being involves the cross-circulating of the two heterogenous 
series which constitutes a line of flight from the molar identities of 
each. Becoming-dog entails a becoming-human of the dog as well as 
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a becoming-dog of the human. What is „human‟ becomes 
deterittorialized and reterritorialized onto what is „dog,‟ and vice 
versa. Irigaray and Deleuze 183. 
 
 
Therefore the description of the Alien Queen being-human is perhaps 
inaccurate. The Alien Queen to the same extent as the Clone Ripley has 
entered into a becoming. The Alien Queen and the Clone Ripley share an 
affinity at a molecular level. Hills writes, albeit as an aside, that the unity 
between the Alien and Ripley, is “a theme which can be read through [Alien 
Resurrection], where the hybridization of Ripley‟s and the alien‟s DNA 
works to cancel the distinction between them altogether” (46). Indeed, as 
Sotirin remarks, “when we are „in-between‟, on the threshold, what keeps us 
distinct from this or that can become indiscernible or indistinct or 
imperceptible” (100).   
 
The new breed of Alien shown in Resurrection continues the mixture 
between the human and the Alien species. Unlike the drone Aliens before it 
and those hatched form eggs, the „child‟ Alien has white skin and is shown 
to have blue eyes, which have been described as “baby blue” (Constable 
„Becoming the Monster‟s Mother‟ 195). The birth scene for Constable 
functions as an “intersection point for both human and alien aspects” (195). 
This considered, the Alien child does not function as Other/enemy in the 
same fashion as the Aliens before it. That the Clone Ripley disposes of the 
Alien in such a fashion – a slow agonising death – is more problematic. 
Indeed, as Constable comments, the “traditional dispatch of the final 
monster cannot be regarded as a triumph” („Becoming the Monster‟s 
Mother‟ 196). She presumably kills the Alien because she believes it will 
endanger humanity‟s survival. Powell notes that this fusion complicates 
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emotional reactions to the final scene because “Ripley‟s awareness that she 
is the baby‟s „grandmother‟ produces ethical dilemmas” (74). However, it 
could equally be accounted for by her becoming-animal. Indeed, in 
Gediman‟s laboratory, the means of the Aliens‟ escapes is made possible by 
two Aliens killing another so that its blood will burn through the floor 
allowing their flight.  
 
Eaton‟s description of the disposal of the Alien child also resonates with the 
Deleuzian lexicon. He states, “using her non-human properties she sets in 
train a gruesome climax that – with its end-product of minced-up tissue 
fragments, blood and bone” (12). The Clone Ripley uses her own acidic 
blood to burn a small hole in one of the windows in the ship. The Alien 
child is sucked to the window, and is slowly sucked through the small hole 
whilst screaming in agony. The film cuts to the ship‟s exterior, where Alien 
blood, tissue, flesh and bone are slowly ripped out and disappear in 
fragments into space. The Clone Ripley watches on, albeit with some 
distress.  
 
Powell argues that Ripley does “remain an inspirational figure for Deleuzian 
becoming-woman” (Deleuze and Horror Cinema 77). This is because 
“when the ship finally lands on Earth, she is left with potential for future 
becomings” (75) and because she has “already adapted to becoming-alien 
and is ready for further transformations” (77). However, Powell also 
acknowledges that “we are no longer sure of her nature, her powers or her 
agenda” (75). We are therefore unclear as to what these becomings will 
mean for both her and the society that she will inevitably encounter. She has 
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already killed her „grandchild‟ and may continue on to further destructive 
transgressions. This perhaps demonstrates the potential dangers of the 
Deleuzoguattarian „mode‟: we, by definition, do not know what will become 
if we undertake the “journey of diminishment” (Flieger 39) towards 
becoming-imperceptible that Deleuze and Guattari advocate.  
 
Alien vs. Predator 
Writing before its release, Kaveney states “it remains to be seen what new 
variations screenwriters and directors will find to add to the subject matter 
and look created by the original movie” (From Alien to The Matrix 204). 
Alien vs. Predator is an interesting addition to this series that had been 
planned by Twentieth Century Fox since the early 1990s (Church Gibson 
38), as it utilises the deadly force of the Alien without the character of 
Ripley. The plot is somewhat more fantastical, as it pits the Alien against 
another cinematic alien monstrosity, the Predator of Predator (John 
McTiernan, 1987) and Predator 2 (Stephen Hopkins, 1990). AvP borrows 
considerably from the previous Alien films, most notably in its portrayal of 
an active female protagonist, Alexa Woods (Sanaa Lathan). Significantly, 
Alexa Wood is an African-American character rather than a white female as 
Ripley. However, it appears that Kaveney was somewhat optimistic in her 
estimation that something would be added to the „subject matter and look of 
the original movie‟: the use of the Alien is superficial at best, and cynical at 
worst.  
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The catalyst for the action is the discovery of an ancient pyramid 2,000 feet 
below the surface of the ice in Bouvetøya, Antarctica. In one of the film‟s 
many nods to the previous films, this pyramid is discovered by Weyland 
Industries, owned by Charles Bishop Weyland, played by Lance Henricksen 
of Aliens and Alien 3. Weyland employs a team of archaeologists, engineers 
and guides to investigate this pyramid, which his investigators claim has a 
combination of Aztec, Egyptian and Cambodian origins. It becomes 
apparent that this pyramid was built by the Predators for the purpose of 
hunting the „ultimate prey‟ - the Aliens. The Predators taught humanity how 
to build structures, and in return they demanded worship and a sacrifice 
every hundred years, namely several people to act as hosts for the Aliens in 
order for the hunt to begin. The ensuing fracas inside the pyramid sees the 
human characters divided by the pyramid, the rooms of which reconfigure 
creating a maze, a concept „borrowed‟ from the science fiction horror Cube 
(Vincenzo Natali, 1997) and, bar Alexa, the company is quickly eradicated 
by both the Predator and Alien species.   
 
Like the original crew of the Nostromo in Alien, there are only two female 
characters in the team: Alexa and Rousseau (Agatha de la Boulaye). 
Rousseau is somewhat androgynous and closely resembles Alien‟s Lambert, 
being waiflike and adorned with short spiky blonde hair (Figure 10). Her 
sexuality is also ambiguous. As the team is preparing to leave for the 
pyramid, Alexa sees her loading a hand pistol and enquires why Rousseau is 
taking it along. Rousseau says because it is the “same principle as a condom 
… I‟d rather have one and not need it than need it and not have one.” 
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Superficially this comment appears to attempt to confirm her 
heterosexuality in light of her androgynous appearance: that she needs a 
condom implies she indulges in heterosexual acts. However, her 
androgynous appearance and the possession of this „phallic‟ weapon can be 
interpreted as her being masculinised and thus may not require the condom 
as a passive recipient. Although the penis is distinct from the phallus, here 
the two become confused in her equation of guns with condoms.  
 
Significantly, Rousseau is the first to suffer from the Alien attack in the 
sacrificial chamber. After being told by Stafford (Colin Salmon) to remain 
in the chamber with Thomas (Sam Troughton) and a team, Thomas gives 
her a flirtatious, suggestive glance, which she receives with some 
annoyance. As the remainder of the group triggers the pyramid to 
reconfigure, the chamber is sealed, trapping Rousseau, Thomas and the team 
in the chamber, and a number of Alien eggs rise from the floor. The face-
huggers erupt from the eggs, and one leaps toward Rousseau, accentuated 
by the use of bullet-time cinematography. She is the only member of the 
group to be shown to be violated in this manner and similarly the only one 
to be shown as having the Alien erupt from her torso.  
 
If one accepts the psychosexual readings of the Alien proposed by many 
critics towards the original series of which Anderson would have been well 
aware, Rousseau is being punished for her sexual ambiguity in not 
conforming to traditional iconography of the feminine female, for 
„unfeminine‟ behaviours and for denying the male sexual gratification. 
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Rousseau, then, suffers a bizarre kind of date rape, in which Thomas‟s 
frustration is acted upon by the Alien species. This treatment of Rousseau 
recalls Graham‟s comment regarding Ripley‟s androgynous appearance in 
Alien 3, in that Ripley must die because of her “uncontrollable and 
unlocatable gender” (210) as she can neither “be situated as phallic 
protagonist nor as „feminine other‟” (211). Rousseau, similarly, is an image 
of the uncontrollable female that must be controlled.  
 
The critical reception to Alien vs. Predator has not been favourable. Joshua 
Tyler comments that, “Alien vs. Predator is not the worst movie of 2004, 
but it is the most blatant exploit of a franchise, and maybe that is worse” and 
Stacy Layne Wilson as “all façade and no foundation.” These comments 
recall the „constituent features of postmodern‟ presented in Jameson‟s 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism as, “a new depthlessness, which finds it 
prolongation both in contemporary “theory” and a whole new culture of the 
image or the simulacrum” (6). Alien vs. Predator, as the criticism above 
suggests, is symptomatic of this „new depthlessness‟. All previous 
instalments of the Alien series have built upon its precedents. Alien vs. 
Predator however does not, despite the new scenario and absence of Ripley, 
but merely draws from the convention of the previous films. This is seen, 
however, in Alien Resurrection, but Jeunet‟s film is also a parody in 
Jameson‟s terms. Anderson‟s Alien vs. Predator, however, is an example of 
pastiche. Alien vs. Predator tries to avoid this blank parody, but only 
foregrounds itself as such, in its continual referencing to the origin Alien 
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films. These references are not necessary, and not subtle, and only serve as 
an attempt to link the film further to the Alien franchise.  
 
The Alien body here has clearly become a commodity, mimicking the 
Company‟s and United System Military‟s attempts to „domesticate‟ the 
Alien for their own purposes. This is also clearly mirrored in a scene in 
which the Alien „Queen‟ awakes from its own frozen sleep: the moment it 
becomes animated it begins to lay, not freely as depicted in Aliens, as it is 
kept in chains. The „ovipositor‟ is positioned so the eggs land on a conveyor 
belt. This is a production line for monstrous life. Alien vs. Predator suggests 
this is exactly what the franchise itself has become. The film lacks a strong 
and memorable protagonist (Alexa Woods only survives because of help 
from one surviving Predator) and the skilled artful direction of the previous 
films. The Alien body here is used purely to evoke the horror of the 
previous texts, mimicking actions and events, another step in a chain of self-
referential signification that began with Aliens and is foregrounded in Alien 
Resurrection. 
   
Conclusions 
 
In a consideration of the representation of the body within these texts and its 
subsequent critical reception, it is evident that both are heavily mediated by 
larger critical trends and concerns. The emergence of the strong female 
protagonist Alien and its subsequent psychoanalytic interpretations are not 
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independent and isolated occurrences: both are the result of movements and 
shifts in ideological thought, manifested critically, socially and culturally. 
The issue of mothering in Aliens similarly is not innocent. Aliens contains 
conservative coding conducive with Reaganite politics within a 
conventional narrative that incorporates the then current trends of the action 
cinema, such as the „hard body‟ and invocations of Vietnam.  
 
The wealth of discourse produced in feminist criticism concerning the issue 
of mothering is the result of the academic climate, as E. Ann Kaplan notes, 
“the 1980s have seen an unprecedented amount of attention paid to the 
mother from a whole variety of perspectives, including feminist and 
theoretical ones” (5). As discussed above, Alien 3 similarly is dependent on 
its specific time of production for its iconography, and the criticism devoted 
to this text is indicative of dominant academic modes of thought. Alien 
Resurrection, is also dependent on context: Alien suggests a singular, 
globalised Company; in Alien Resurrection, we are told, this company has 
been “bought out by Wal-Mart”, currently the second largest company 
operating in the world, whose exploitation of humanity and society is well 
documented
6
. That Alien Resurrection is the most Deleuzoguattarian film of 
the series may also be indicative of the increased visibility of 
Deleuzoguattarian themes in popular culture. 
 
                                                          
6
 See, for example, Naomi Klein No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies. London: 
Flamingo, 2000. 
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These texts and this criticism are both the symptoms of larger material and 
social forces. Illuminating and furthering thought in specific areas, such as 
mothering in Aliens, leaves areas unexplored. Where the discussion of 
Aliens describes how the texts treat the issue of maternity and the cultural 
and political scenario that produced this representation, it does not enquire 
beyond its own immediate concerns. I do not deny that this is a valid and 
useful enquiry, only that it is more pertinent to readdress these texts with a 
consideration of the material origins of corresponding criticism. 
 
The occurrence of the discourse devoted to maternity is one example which 
supports Hills‟s argument that feminist film theory requires a new 
methodological approach to address the action heroine. I do not in any way 
want to suggest that these readings are now redundant, rather that they are 
guilty readings in Althusser‟s terms – they are as dependent on their period 
of production as the films themselves. But what is of concern is that these 
readings inevitably filter into a dialectic and thus all future readings have to 
in some way have recourse to them. Aliens is not necessarily an anti-
feminist film about mothering, but readings continue to make these links. 
For example, Gallardo C and Smith devote approximately a quarter of their 
book about Ripley discussing motherhood. What I argue is that the film and 
its criticism can be seen as a co-text to explore relations between culture and 
criticism and once done so, can allow alternative readings of these figures. 
Deleuze and Guattari offer one such approach, as the evolving and mutating 
characters of Ripley and the Alien lend themselves to a philosophy which 
constantly questions the bounds of human experience, desire and capability. 
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Chapter Two – Matriculating the Matrix Franchise: Popular 
Philosophy and Polysemy 
 
 
In her introduction to The Matrix Trilogy (2005), the first distinctly 
„academic‟ collection of essays to examine the Matrix franchise, Stacy 
Gillis rightly notes that “the films have had more material published on and 
about them since the release of the first film than any other film in the same 
length of time” (1). The Matrix (The Wachowski Brothers, 1999) and the 
franchise that followed it are certainly not alone as science fiction texts in 
capturing popular and academic attention. Even the briefest literature 
surveys devoted to the Alien saga, discussed previously, or Bladerunner will 
demonstrate the extent to which science fiction texts and franchises have 
initiated a wealth of discursive activity in both the popular and academic 
realm.  
 
What distinguishes the Matrix franchise as a topic for this study is the speed 
at which this “avalanche of studies” (Lutzka 113) has arisen. Since the 
release of the original film, a great number of popular philosophy 
anthologies have been published that explore both the original film and the 
ensuing franchise‟s narrative themes. These include William Irwin‟s The 
Matrix and Philosophy (2002) and More Matrix and Philosophy (2005) 
which, as the titles indicate, explore The Matrix‟s philosophical themes, and 
Garrett, Garrett and Seay‟s The Gospel Reloaded (2003) which concentrates 
on the film‟s use of religious metaphor7. These are demonstrative of a recent 
                                                          
7
 Further to these are Yeffeth‟s Taking the Red Pill: Science Philosophy and Religion in 
The Matrix (2003), Haber‟s Exploring the Matrix (2003), Condon‟s The Matrix Unlocked 
(2003), Faller‟s Beyond The Matrix (2004), Kapell and Doty‟s Jacking in to the Matrix 
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phenomenon that Thomas Wartenberg has described as “philosophers ... 
turning with increasing frequency to film as a way of doing philosophy” 
(270). Indeed, as Christopher Falzon has also noted, “a striking part of the 
Matrix phenomenon is the way in which it has excited interest in academia 
and amongst the broader public for its treatment of philosophical themes” 
(97).  
 
However, these treatments are problematic, because rather than offering an 
analysis of The Matrix‟s status as a cultural or filmic product, they tend to 
expand upon philosophies foregrounded in the film, or to draw out 
analogous relations between the narrative and existing philosophical 
metaphors and allegories. As will be discussed later, the films do much to 
encourage these readings, by “overtly, self-consciously alluding to or 
drawing on philosophical themes and positions” (Falzon 100). However, as 
Joshua Clover has noted, with this method “we give ourselves to 
understanding the Matrix, rather than The Matrix” (14). The Matrix 
franchise status as a cultural and/or philosophical work in itself is 
undermined by a body of writing that largely refuses to engage with the 
franchise in a serious manner.  
 
As Catherine Constable has discussed in detail in Adapting Philosophy 
(2009), this is an unsatisfactory treatment of the films from the standpoint of 
Film Studies. As she comments, “the majority treat the trilogy as a 
beginner‟s guide to philosophy” (1) and tend to discuss the film in two 
ways: either “positively, as useful examples that make the theories 
                                                                                                                                                   
Franchise (2004), and Lawrence‟s Like a Splinter in Your Mind: The Philosophy Behind 
the Matrix Trilogy (2005). 
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accessible, or negatively, as misinterpretations/distortions of the 
philosophical sources” (1) that they reference. These works largely dismiss 
the film in two important ways. Firstly, these commentaries take for granted 
their means of engaging with film as a visual medium and do not “bother to 
engage with the rich, image-literate, textual detail of the trilogy” (5). 
Secondly, these readings tend to fail to take into any account the wealth of 
writing in Film Studies or engage with the films specifically as filmic texts. 
As she notes, “there is almost no engagement with any works from Film 
Studies” (5). This is, she feels, demonstrative of a “lack of respect for the 
subject area” (5) and privileges philosophy as an academic discipline, 
keeping the “traditional hierarchies firmly intact” (12).  
 
It is clear that something unique has occurred here. This section aims to 
evaluate both the Matrix franchise and the discursive reaction to it as a 
distinct cultural phenomenon. As Sven Lutzka has noted, several other films 
dealing with a similar subject matter were released in the same period. He 
cites Pleasantville (Gary Ross, 1998) and The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 
1998) as examples, but these texts also include eXistenZ (David 
Cronenberg, 1999) and Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998), as films which “deal 
explicitly with [the] blurring of boundaries between the real and the unreal” 
(Lutzka 114).  Situating the Matrix franchise as an especially „self-aware‟ 
text that consciously aimed to produce a discursive reaction of this nature 
through creating a philosophical „metanarrative,‟ I shall demonstrate how 
this tactic of deliberate polysemy has been perpetuated  and complicated 
throughout the ensuing „intertextual‟ franchise.  
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Although all texts are, to a degree, polysemic, I argue that The Matrix 
differs from texts such as eXistenZ and Dark City because the Wachowski 
Brothers “deliberately spliced many philosophical and religious themes with 
futuristic science and technology” (Lutzka 114). Although texts such as 
Dark City and eXistenZ do raise philosophical issues such as the nature of 
reality and memory, the Matrix films go further in that they directly 
reference philosophical texts. The anthologies are symptomatic of the 
original film‟s invitation to interpretation, and as products in themselves, 
can form a „border‟ of fandom and platform from which to engage with the 
Matrix franchise. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the Matrix franchise will include the major 
narrative elements endorsed by the Wachowski Brothers and/or Warner 
Brothers from various different media groups. This includes the trilogy of 
films, (The Matrix, The Matrix: Reloaded and The Matrix: Revolutions), the 
computer game Enter the Matrix, the comic books The Matrix Comics and 
The Matrix Comics: Part Two and the collection of animated short films 
inspired by the original Matrix film, The Animatrix. The narrative of each or 
part of each of these additional elements of the franchise are interlinked, 
referencing one another, offering more information about the story world, 
explaining the origins of the Matrix, and to some degree The Matrix‟s 
aesthetic as a text. I will refer to the „technological metanarrative‟ that Dan 
North has identified in his article „Virtual Actors, Spectacle and Special 
Effects. This runs concurrently with the diegetic Matrix narrative in the 
form of director‟s commentaries and the „Follow the White Rabbit‟ function 
on the original The Matrix DVD release. I shall not be discussing elements 
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such as the Matrix soundtracks as these products do not contribute to the 
intertextual play that distinguishes the Matrix franchise for the purposes of 
this study in the same way.  
 
After exploring the intertextual play and the Matrix franchise‟s 
philosophical „project‟, I examine the ways in which the body is presented 
within this narrative scenario. It is my contention that the films are similarly 
complex in their representation of bodies. Drawing on the work of Foucault, 
I consider how these bodies are examples of „docile‟ bodies and their 
function within the systems of power shown in this society. In order to 
address the films‟ representations of gender and sexual difference, I offer a 
detailed case study of the character of Trinity. I argue that the representation 
of Trinity as an action heroine is compromised due to the films‟ larger 
project. Rather than offer a radical imagining of active femininity, the films 
offer a superficial image of woman. Although Martina Lipp and Stacy Gillis 
have both commented on how Trinity enacts the traditional function of 
„woman‟ within the Hollywood narrative, I argue that The Matrix and The 
Matrix: Reloaded at least use this function with some subversive intent. 
Trinity may function broadly as a love interest for the male hero of the 
films, but this is given a specific narrative function: without her love, there 
would be no One, and the One 8.0 would give way to the One 9.0.  
 
Ceci N‟est Pas Une Coulier: Polysemy and The Matrix 
 
A mise-en-scene analysis of The Matrix reveals that every visual 
sign that can be deciphered by the audience – titles of books, tattoos 
and the like – is charged with allegorical, metaphorical, or 
metonymical layers of meaning. 
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Sven Lutzka, „Simulacra, Simulation and The Matrix‟, 116. 
 
It is useful in beginning to explore the impetus behind the popular 
philosophy anthologies devoted to The Matrix to consider the scene that 
introduces the protagonist Neo (Keanu Reeves) to the viewer. The film 
immediately establishes him as a loner, slumped over his desk amongst a 
mass of computer hardware, having fallen asleep running an internet search 
for the elusive Morpheus (Laurence Fishburne). He wakes from his slumber 
and witnesses his computer „behaving‟ in a manner he (presumably) has not 
programmed it to in that it displays the text “wake up Neo ... knock knock”. 
He is then interrupted in his confusion by a knocking at his door. The film 
then cuts to the exterior of his apartment from the point of view of Choi 
(Marc Gray), his guest, with the number 101 clearly visible on Neo‟s front 
door, which is situated on the left of the frame (Figure 11). This is, of 
course, binary code, but also has further mythic value. The allusion to 
George Orwell‟s Nineteen Eighty-Four and the horrors associated with its 
own Room 101 is hardly subtle, and instantly signals to the informed viewer 
that, within this diegetic world, something is amiss.  
 
Room 101 is the room of horrors in George Orwell‟s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
in which victims, mostly „thought-criminals‟, are subjected to their worst 
fears as a form of torture. In the case of its protagonist, Winston Smith, this 
is to have his face gnawed by rats. However, Room 101 as a concept has 
mutated from Orwell‟s original intent, and now largely acts as a theoretical 
space in which to banish one‟s pet hates forever more. This is demonstrated 
by the BBC‟s comedy chat show Room 101 that has been running since 
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1994 and numerous internet sites that provide web space for posting one‟s 
own grievances. Other examples of the use of Room 101 in culture are the 
inclusion of a Room 101 in the MI6 headquarters of Alan Moore‟s The 
League of Extraordinary Gentlemen: The Black Dossier and the British 
television programme Big Brother. 
 
O‟Brian, Winston‟s primary torturer in Nineteen Eighty-Four, explains to 
Winston when answering the question as to what is contained within Room 
101 that: 
 
The thing that is in Room 101 is the worst thing in the world ... [this] 
varies from individual to individual. It may be burial alive, or death 
by fire, or by drowning ... there are cases where it is some quite 
trivial thing, not even fatal. (296) 
 
Room 101 as a concept is in itself terrifying because in this scenario State 
control must have attained the ability to ascertain an individual‟s own 
personal nightmare against their will by reading their thoughts. That this 
knowledge should then be utilised against a victim in order to make them 
comply entirely to the State‟s wishes is equally as horrific. As O‟Brian 
explains: 
 
Pain is not always enough. There are occasions when a human being 
will stand out against pain, even to the point of death. But for 
everyone there is something unendurable – something that cannot be 
contemplated ... [these] form a pressure that you cannot withstand. 
(297-8) 
 
However, although there are analogous relations between the characters of 
Neo and Winston, the inclusion of the figure 101 on Neo‟s door is 
problematic. Both are subjects of totalitarian societies; both are „rebels‟. Yet 
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both of their rebellions, as we learn in the latter stages of both narratives, are 
anticipated and encouraged by the system of which they are part. As the 
One is revealed in The Matrix: Reloaded to be a computer program 
designed by the machines, specifically by the Architect (Helmut Bakaitis), 
Winston is deceived by Carrington the shopkeeper, and led to his ultimate 
demise by O‟Brian‟s lies regarding the Brotherhood.  
 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the number on Neo‟s door remains 
problematic as it anticipates some prior knowledge of the concept of Room 
101 for its effect yet it is not directly comparable. Neo‟s apartment is not a 
torture chamber in the sense that Nineteen Eighty-Four‟s Room 101 is a 
torture chamber. Though his physical positioning in a pod in the Matrix or 
indeed the conditions of machines ruling over humanity may be an 
unendurable for Neo, these spaces do not function in the same way. 
However, the occurrence does indicate what Paul Condon refers to as an 
“attempt to reinforce the thematic similarities” (157) between the two texts. 
 
An understanding of this mutation is provided by John Ellis‟s analysis of 
literary adaptation. He states that, “the adaptation trades upon the memory 
of the novel, a memory that can derive from actual reading, or, as is more 
likely with a classic of literature, a generally circulated cultural memory” 
(3). For the allusion to function in the manner intended, it is necessarily 
reliant upon the memory of Room 101 and how this has come to function in 
popular culture; and not necessarily upon the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four 
itself. For this to be usefully employed the viewer must merely be aware of 
Room 101 as a concept rather than its function in Orwell‟s novel. The 
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widespread use of Room 101 in popular culture implies that as a concept it 
exists more in „generally circulated cultural memory‟ than as a direct 
reference to the novel. Its inclusion in The Matrix certainly further adds to 
this mutation, distancing Room 101 from its original context and meaning.  
 
This occurrence is closely followed by a similar moment that has attracted 
multifarious observations from a variety of commentators (Lee, Constable, 
Merrin, Felluga, Gordon) though its connotations are not as instantly 
recognisable to the „average‟ viewer. As Neo reaches for the illegally 
obtained software that Choi has come to collect, he picks up a copy of Jean 
Baudrillard‟s Simulacra and Simulation which has been hollowed out to 
accommodate the illicit material (Figure 12). As Dino Felluga rightly notes, 
Simulacra and Simulation is a work that “had has a major influence in 
contemporary understandings of the age in which we live” (85) which he 
acknowledges as largely being referred to as „postmodern.‟  
 
The very appearance of the book itself is worthy of analysis, as also noted 
by Lutzka (120). Firstly, the text itself, in most published editions, is one 
hundred and sixty four pages long, meaning that it is approximately a 
centimetre and a half thick. In The Matrix, however, the work appears to be 
several inches thick and bound in leather. Neo opens the book at the chapter 
„On Nihilism‟ which in actual copies occupies the final six pages. In this 
copy, however, it is approximately a quarter of the way through the tome. 
The book in The Matrix corresponds more to stereotype or a generally 
circulated belief of what a great work of philosophy should look like i.e. 
leather bound and lengthy. In tandem with the fact that the book has been 
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hollowed out, that Baudrillard‟s proclamation that “the critical stage is 
empty” (163) has given way to literal emptiness, the text‟s inclusion 
functions in an appropriately paradoxical fashion. The text that claims that 
we live in a world of simulation, where “the real is no longer what it was” 
and “there is a plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality” (6) 
becomes an image, a simulation itself. As we learn later, this has particular 
significance as this room does not exist in the way Neo believes it to – it is 
part of the „neural interactive simulation‟ of the Matrix.  
 
This alteration of the appearance of Simulacra and Simulation may well be 
one of the first film‟s many “self-conscious references to the erosion of 
boundaries between reality and virtuality” (Wolmark 83). The nature and 
appearance of Simulacra and Simulation may have changed to suit a more 
apt appearance for a work of philosophy, but this is the very point: “objects 
shine in a sort of hyperresemblance ... they no longer resemble anything, 
except the empty figure of resemblance, the empty form of representation” 
(Simulacra and Simulation 45). As William Merrin has rightly commented, 
“Baudrillard‟s inclusion is ... an acknowledgement that his theory of 
simulation is, in some way, central to the film” (Paragraph 1). I will return 
to Baudrillard‟s theory further on in this chapter. 
 
Foreshadowing the remainder of the narrative, the script then runs: 
 
Choi: Halleluiah. You‟re my saviour man, my own personal Jesus 
Christ. 
 Neo: You get caught using that... 
 Choi: Yeah, I know. This never happened. You don‟t exist. 
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 Neo: Right. 
 Choi: Something wrong, man? You look a little whiter than usual. 
Neo: My computer, it ... you ever have that feeling where you‟re not 
quite sure if you‟re awake or still dreaming? 
Choi: Mmm, all the time. It‟s called Mescaline. It‟s the only way to 
fly. Hey, it just sounds to me like you need to unplug, man. 
 
It is here that the first allusions to a structural relation between Neo and 
Jesus Christ appear. For the first time viewer, the use of popular parlance 
and hyperbole that Neo is Choi‟s „own personal Jesus Christ‟ does not 
instantly signal that Neo will eventually become the saviour of humanity. 
Similarly, needing to „unplug‟ does not immediately imply that someone‟s 
distress is caused by an inability to accept the world around them is as „real‟ 
because they are „jacked in‟ to a „neural interactive simulation‟, but rather 
that one needs to relax; in Neo‟s case this is to turn off, or unplug, his 
computer. To the second time viewer this text is open to new insights, which 
implies that the text anticipates repeated viewing. 
 
Thus within the first two minutes of Neo‟s time on screen, the foundations 
for an unprecedented level of discursive activity concerning a singular 
science fiction film are handed to the potential critic. As Slavoj Žižek has 
notoriously asked: 
 
Isn‟t The Matrix one of those films which function as a kind of 
Rorschach test ... setting in motion the universalized process of 
recognition, like the proverbial painting of God which seems always 
to stare directly at you, from wherever you look at it – practically 
every orientation seems to recognize itself in it? (240-1) 
 
 
The narrative of the trilogy follows the „path‟ of Neo from his inert life 
inside the Matrix (where the above scene takes place) to his Christ-like self-
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sacrifice to ensure the survival of humanity at the conclusion of The Matrix: 
Revolutions. After his awakening from the Matrix approximately halfway 
through the original film, he is told by Morpheus that he is „The One‟ – the 
prophesised saviour of humanity from imprisonment and cyber-slavery by a 
collective of Artificially Intelligent machines. These machines keep the 
human race alive in order to utilise their body heat as energy to fuel their 
own continued existence. As Morpheus conveniently explains, being born 
and existing in the Matrix equates to being “born into bondage, born into a 
prison that you cannot smell or taste or touch”.  
 
This idea of a master ruling class exploiting an underclass for capital, i.e. 
the exchange between what is rewarded to the underclass and what is taken 
creates a surplus for the ruling class, is familiar to those with even the 
slightest knowledge of Marxist political theory and thus invites another 
mode of interpretation. Similarly, this last quote from Morpheus evokes a 
central tenet of Michel Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish, a work that charts 
the „birth of the prison‟. He argues that liberalisation did not enable or 
follow changes in the penal system, but rather the manner of enacting power 
over the body morphed into more diffused systems within surveillance 
societies, which he describes as „microphysics of power‟. 
 
The Matrix is a computer programme which operates with the purpose of 
controlling these imprisoned human minds, preventing them from revolt by 
immersing them in a “neural-interactive simulation ... a computer generated 
dream world” into which the mind is, literally, plugged. This process gives 
the illusion of this simulation being the „real world‟, and, more importantly, 
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is predicated on the illusion of freedom and autonomy. Whilst the mind is 
plugged into this system via a socket in the back of the head, the body floats 
inertly in an incubation pod, kept alive by being fed intravenously through a 
number of black tubes (Figure 13). During his monologue where he 
introduces the Matrix construct programme to Neo, Morpheus proceeds to 
ask a number of rhetorical questions long considered by philosophers: 
 
 
What is real? How do you define real? If you‟re talking about what 
you can feel, what you can smell, what you can taste and see, then 
real is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain.  
 
 
Indubitably, the invention of the Matrix as a concept provides the 
opportunity to rework allegories firmly within the Western philosophical 
tradition, namely Plato‟s „Simile of the Cave‟, Descartes‟ malicious demon 
and „deception hypothesis‟, and Jonathan Dancy‟s brain in a vat, all of 
which are radicalised for the digital age. The narrative scenario, for 
Wartenberg, provides an example of the “least problematic and most 
straightforward way in which film and philosophy can intersect,” this being 
“when a film illustrates a philosophic claim or theory” (270). 
 
The process by which Neo discovers the truth about the Matrix occurs 
shortly after he meets Morpheus and takes the red pill. He is told that they 
have begun a tracing programme. For Falzon, moments such as these 
suggest a “further way in which film may invoke or engage with 
philosophical themes” (99). “The Matrix,” he argues, “is full of this sort of 
deliberate allusion” and this “brings certain philosophical themes to the 
fore” (99). This is because the film disorientates the viewer, firstly by 
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showing Neo‟s body taking on the physical attributes of the mirror, and 
secondly, by zooming down Neo‟s throat and abruptly cutting to Neo‟s pod, 
where his body is shown plugged into to the Matrix machine. Here, the film 
takes the viewer on the same journey as Neo; the viewer has their 
perceptions of the diegetic world shattered as well, which may well lead to 
reflexive thought on the nature of our own reality. 
 
The correlation between the scenario of the Matrix and the scenarios 
explored by Plato, Descartes and Dancy is the basis of much writing in the 
popular philosophy books. Matt Lawrence, for example, describes the 
relation of the Matrix and Plato‟s „Simile‟ as “one of the most striking 
philosophical parallels” (4) found in the original Matrix films. Similarly, 
Charles L. Griswold Jr. describes the allusion to the allegory as 
“unmistakable” (128). Plato describes the cave in The Republic, in a 
dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, as follows: 
 
An underground chamber ... with a long entrance open to the 
daylight and as wide as the cave. In this chamber are men who have 
been prisoners there since they were children, their legs and necks 
being so fastened that they can only look straight ahead ... someway 
off ... a fire is burning, and between the fire and the prisoners and 
above them runs a road, in front of which a curtain-wall has been 
built, like the screen at puppet shows. (256) 
 
Seeing only the shadows of men and animals projected on to the screen, the 
men in the cave then would “assume that the shadows they saw were the 
real things” (257) and that if a figure on the outside spoke “that the voice 
belonged to the shadow passing before them” (257). Having no alternative 
manner of experiencing the world, they assume the shadows and 
appearances they see to be „real‟. When one of the prisoners is released 
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from his bondage and forced into the outside world, he sees the world as it 
„really‟ is and how he and the other prisoners have been deceived. 
Speculating on how the other prisoners would react if the freed man were to 
return and tell the others of their misconception, Socrates muses: 
 
Wouldn‟t he be likely to make a fool of himself? And they would 
say that his visit to the upper world had ruined his sight, and that the 
ascent was not worth even attempting. And if anyone tried to release 
them and lead them up, they would kill him if they could lay hands 
on him. (259) 
 
 
The scenario of the body being held in the Matrix and deceived by the 
images provided by the „neural interactive simulation‟ is analogous to the 
bodies of the prisoners in the cave deceived by the shadows projected onto 
the curtain-wall. There are, however, some significant points of difference. 
Neo already has some awareness of his situation, as he is aware of the 
existence of a Matrix and is searching for answers, but is unaware of what it 
actually is. The prisoners in the cave are oblivious to their own situation, 
and presented as being reluctant to believe the truth even when it is 
presented to them. Neo is, however, similarly reluctant to believe the „truth‟ 
after experiencing the construct programme, and vomits. For Wartenberg 
this indicates that “Neo is not convinced that the world that he believes to be 
real is anything but that” (277). However, unlike the Matrix, we know little 
of why these men are being held in the cave and to what purpose, and even 
if their misconception of reality was an intentional undertaking on the part 
of the jailer. That we know anything of the real world is, however, one 
element of the Matrix scenario that has been criticised as it does provide a 
grounding for notions of the „real‟. 
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Plato‟s use of „The Simile of the Cave‟, although clearly engaging with 
ideas of perception and reality, is part of the larger project of The Republic. 
Plato has often been attributed with pioneering the fascist state by modern 
philosophers such as Karl Popper (Pappas 195). This is because Plato 
envisions a society that is not governed democratically, but by an elite 
ruling class, informed by the Forms. The „Simile‟ is also used to argue the 
case for the „Philosopher Ruler‟: the prisoner who escapes is derided for 
seeing the truth. However, in Plato‟s republic, “the philosophers‟ knowledge 
of the Form of the Good licenses their complete domination over the other 
citizens‟ lives” (Pappas 196). The rebels can be seen as being analogous to 
the Philosopher Rulers: they possess knowledge about the truth which 
allows them to manipulate the Matrix and have „domination‟ over the other 
citizens that are still part of the system.  
 
The simile of the cave is not the only philosophical allegory that is 
comparable to the scenario of the Matrix. Falzon comments, “in the film 
there are various allusions to Descartes‟ arguments in the first chapter of 
Meditations, designed to call into question what we think we know on the 
basis of experience” (99). René Descartes‟s sceptical arguments laid out in 
his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) are also comparable to the 
process which Neo undertakes and his initial meetings with Morpheus. 
Descartes undergoes a process of doubting all that he had previously beheld 
as truths, stating that he had “suitably freed [his] mind” (196) to do so. This 
moment is certainly echoed in the script of The Matrix shortly before Neo 
undertakes the „jump sequence‟ where he is challenged to „free his mind‟ 
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from the pervasiveness of the Matrix in order to jump across a street from 
the top of one tall building to another.  
 
Descartes acknowledges that all that he has previously beheld as true he has 
“learned either from the senses or through the senses” (197). However, he 
states “these senses I have sometimes found to be deceptive; and it is only 
prudent never to place complete confidence in that which we have even 
once been deceived” (197). Again this is echoed in the script of The Matrix 
when Morpheus is demonstrating the construct programme to Neo, and 
when he explains that “if real is what you can feel, smell, taste and see, then 
'real' is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain”. 
 
That Neo fails in the jump sequence is also reminiscent of the process that 
Descartes presents in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes notes 
his problems in breaking out of his established ways of thinking and 
believing in the world, making it “impossible for him to maintain his 
skeptical attitude” (Wartenberg 275). As Descartes explains: 
 
For long-established customary opinions perpetually recur in 
thought, long and familiar  usage having given them the right to 
occupy my mind, even amongst my will, and to be masters of my 
belief. (200) 
 
 
It is this problem that leads Descartes into proposing that there is some other 
being that is controlling him and his perceptions. This being is “not a true 
God” but rather “some malignant genius” who is “exceedingly powerful and 
cunning” and “has devoted all his powers in the deceiving of me” (201). 
This allows Descartes to “suppose that the sky, the earth, colours, shapes, 
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sounds and all external things are illusions and impostures of which this evil 
genius has availed himself for the abuse of my credulity” (201).  
 
The correlations between Descartes‟ text and the script of The Matrix 
continue shortly after Neo has taken the red pill when Morpheus asks him 
the “quasi-Cartesian puzzle” (Wartenberg 277):  
 
Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real? 
What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How would you 
know the difference between the dream world and the real world? 
 
 
Descartes similarly addresses the nature of dreaming. Although he states 
that his experience of being at the time of writing seem more “clear” and 
“distinct” (198) he acknowledges that he must “remind (himself) that on 
many occasions” that he was “deceived by similar illusions” (198). Again, 
the correlations with the scenario of the Matrix are clear, but here the evil 
genius has been “replaced by a diabolical machine intelligence” (Falzon 
100). 
 
Jonathan Dancy, in his Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (1985) 
describes a sceptical dilemma which is more directly comparable to the 
Matrix scenario: 
 
You do not know that you are not a brain, suspended in a vat full of 
liquid in a laboratory, and wired to a computer which is feeding you 
your current experiences under the control of some ingenious 
technician scientist (benevolent or malevolent according to taste). 
For if you were such a brain, then, provided that the scientist is 
successful, nothing in your experience could possibly reveal that you 
were. (10) 
 
 
Green 136 
 
Dancy, like Plato and Descartes again argues that as you do not have any 
other experience of being other than that which you experience, you cannot 
be certain. It is clear, then, that the Matrix scenario is indebted to debates 
that have dominated Western philosophy since its beginnings.  
 
It is understandable then, only from a brief overview of the central narrative 
and philosophical themes, why the Matrix films have attracted such a great 
deal of critical attention. Foremost is the inclusion of Baudrillard‟s 
Simulacra and Simulation as a prop, which has invited a plethora of 
postmodern readings and it has begun to function as the “chief interpretive 
grid” (114) for the Matrix films. Although it is important to recognise its 
inclusion at the level of the Wachowski Brother‟s intent for the film, it does 
not necessarily follow that the film should be considered an example of 
postmodern cinema or that it engages with Baudrillard in a significant way. 
What is more interesting about Simulacra and Simulation‟s appearance is 
that the Wachowskis seem to be willingly lending the film to such a reading. 
As I have demonstrated, the film opens up as many questions about reading 
and interpretation as it does about metaphysics and epistemology. Although 
there is validity in interpreting The Matrix in the terms of Baudrillard‟s 
theoretical framework, there are clearly other readings and ways of reading 
available. 
 
A rarely discussed moment in The Matrix which is overlooked by most 
critics discussing the postmodern themes and influences, specifically those 
concerning themselves with the relation of Baudrillardian theory to the film, 
occurs as Neo is waiting to see the Oracle (Gloria Foster). In her „waiting 
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room‟ there sit a number of other „potentials‟ – characters that presumably 
are also waiting to be told whether or not they are „The One‟ – one of whom 
is a boy bending a spoon (Figure 14), seemingly with the power of his mind, 
though at this stage we know he is merely manipulating the code of the 
Matrix. He and Neo begin to talk: 
 
Spoon Boy: Do not try and bend the spoon. That‟s impossible. 
Instead only try to realize the truth. 
Neo: What truth? 
Spoon Boy: There is no spoon. 
Neo: There is no spoon? 
Spoon Boy: Then you‟ll see that it is not the spoon that bends, it is 
only yourself.  
 
The aptly named Spoon Boy (Rowan Witt) is, on one level, referring to the 
collection of code feeding into Neo‟s „jacked in‟ brain that is giving him the 
illusion of a spoon. However, and importantly for theorists of the 
postmodern, this can serve as a reminder to the audience: this is a film, this 
is not a spoon. All that is seen is the effect of light beamed through celluloid 
onto a blank screen, or the controlled variation of pixilation on a television 
set, depending on the medium in which the film is consumed. 
 
However, this moment cannot only be said to be understood purely as one 
of the film‟s many self-referential or metafictional moments, and in this 
moment the theory of Baudrillard perhaps becomes its most useful. This is 
due to the technology involved in producing this scene, namely Computer 
Generated Imaging (CGI). The spoon is, at least in part, a computer 
generated image, as it appears to bend according to each character‟s wishes. 
Therefore, there is no spoon on a number of levels. There is no spoon inside 
the fictional space of the Matrix, as, as Morpheus explains at length, it is a 
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computer generated dream world. There is no spoon in front of us when we 
watch The Matrix as it is, similarly, a celluloid dream world. There is also 
no spoon being held by the embodied entity we know as Keanu Reeves on a 
film set, as it is merely a computer generated spoon, created by computer 
designers. 
 
There is one level, however, on which this spoon exists when considering 
Baudrillardian theory specifically. The „spoon‟ mentioned above 
corresponds roughly to Baudrillard‟s four „phases of the image‟: 
 
 It is the reflection of a profound reality; 
 It masks and denatures a profound reality; 
 It masks the absence of a profound reality; 
It has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure 
simulacrum. (6) 
 
The first phase corresponds to the simple representation of a spoon, which is 
not present in this scenario. The second phase is embroiled in myth or 
“maleficence” (6) for which the narrative purpose of this spoon adequately 
accounts. The choice of the spoon is certainly not arbitrary. Any object 
could have been used in this scene, but it would not have had the same 
significance if the Wachowski Brothers had chosen an alternative object, for 
example a spanner. This is a reference to the phenomenon of „spoon-
bending‟, the belief in the ability of individuals to utilise paranormal and 
psychic powers in order to manipulate physical objects, popularised by 
magicians such as Uri Geller. There are those who believe that this activity 
is unexplainable by science and opposing those who see it as simply a magic 
trick. Regardless, this image and use of the spoon in The Matrix is certainly 
referring to the phenomenon of „spoon-bending‟ and thus associates the 
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spoon with cultural qualities it does not naturally have. Therefore we see the 
masking and denaturing of „reality‟. 
 
The CGI technology utilised in the creation of the image of the spoon 
corresponds to point three. There is no spoon here, only the image; in 
Baudrillard‟s words, “it plays at being an appearance” (6). The spoon then 
„exists‟ as point four: there is no denying that there is some kind of spoon: 
we have the experience of what we recognise and accept (though here with 
some question) as being a spoon, the article itself packed with myth and 
meaning, with a tenuous link to any corresponding „reality‟, but becoming 
real in its own manner “of complete simulation” (6).  
 
That this moment has drawn so little critical attention is surprising, as it is 
arguably more relevant to Baudrillardian theory that other more extensively 
discussed points of the film and generalised discussions of the analogous 
relationship between the experience of the Matrix and of „Western society‟ 
more generally. To my knowledge, only one critic, Michael Sexson, has 
drawn attention to this moment. In „The Déjà Vu Glitch in the Matrix 
Trilogy‟, he equates this episode with Magritte‟s painting „Ceci N‟est Pas 
une Pipe‟ from the collection entitled The Treachery of Images (1928-9) 
(Figure 15). Sexson rightly comments that Magritte‟s purpose is to remind 
us that the painting is not a pipe, but a representation of a pipe, and a 
“simulacrum” (119). Sexson, however, does not elaborate on this 
relationship or expand on its relation to the postmodern, but rather uses it to 
draw attention to the filmic product, The Matrix rather than the Matrix. 
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Reasoning for this may well be that Simulacra‟s inclusion serves as an 
invitation to interpretation that the critic may or may not choose to accept. 
 
An alternative manner of interpreting this film is as representative of an 
underlying Buddhist perspective. Commentators (Ford, Brannigan) have 
noted how Spoon Boy, appearing with a shaven head and wearing a toga, 
bears an aesthetic resemblance to a Buddhist monk. When he declares that 
“there is no spoon” he may well be offering Neo a lesson in Buddhist 
thought rather than merely exposing the constructed diegetic and extra-
diegetic nature of the object. Both Ford and Brannigan‟s essays do, 
however, serve more as basic introductions to Buddhism as interpretations 
of the filmic product of The Matrix.  
 
The franchise continues in this vein. The video game Enter the Matrix 
makes direct reference to philosophers such as David Hume, Søren 
Kierkegaard, Baudrillard and Friedrich Nietzsche, to name but a few. A 
story in the second volume of the Matrix comics is entitled „I Kant‟, 
undoubtedly with reference to the eighteenth century German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant. However, what is more important about the ever-growing 
franchise for this study is the element of intertextuality that permeates the 
individual products.  
 
This complexity stems from the narrative chronology. The Matrix does little 
to explain the story world‟s origins. This is explored in two of the animated 
short films, „The Second Renaissance: Part One‟ (Mahiro Maeda, 2003) and 
„The Second Renaissance: Part Two‟ (Mahiro Maeda, 2003), that form part 
Green 141 
 
of The Animatrix, which was released subsequently and shortly after The 
Matrix: Reloaded in 2003. Also included in The Animatrix is „Final Flight 
of the Osiris‟ (Andy Jones, 2003) which features the character Jue (Pamela 
Adlon) posting details of the machines‟ attack on Zion inside the Matrix that 
will feature as the catalyst for the narrative of both The Matrix: Reloaded 
and The Matrix: Revolutions. Chronologically, then, this narrative event 
takes places between The Matrix and its first sequel The Matrix: Reloaded. 
This is similar to the short „Kid‟s Story‟ which shows the Kid (Clayton 
Watson) escaping the Matrix and mentions Neo as the boy‟s saviour. This 
therefore takes place after the narrative of The Matrix, but since the Kid 
appears in the early stages of The Matrix: Reloaded, this event takes place 
between the first two films.  
 
However, the retrieval of the information in „Final Flight of the Osiris‟ is 
not shown in The Matrix: Reloaded. This is a task to be undertaken in the 
video game Enter the Matrix. In a detailed analysis of the Enter the Matrix 
video game, Krug and Frenk note how the game “contains one hour of full-
motion; actual cinematic footage” that was “never shown in cinemas and 
produced on the set of Reloaded” (76). This appears in the game as short 
scenes after the successful completion of certain tasks. After the data posted 
in „Final Flight of the Osiris‟ has been successfully retrieved during the 
game-play, Enter the Matrix then skips to one of these scenes. In this scene, 
the captains of the Zion hovercrafts are assembled awaiting the arrival of 
Morpheus. The scene ends when his arrival is announced, which is the point 
at which the narrative of The Matrix: Reloaded begins.  
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Enter the Matrix was released on the same day as the cinematic release of 
The Matrix: Reloaded, and it is these two texts which are the most 
intertwined, both in terms of the narrative chronology and „hypertextually‟ 
as the user can jump between the two objects to illuminate the narrative. As 
Krug and Frenk note, it is the franchise‟s “most interactive manifestation” 
(74). Not only do you play as secondary characters from The Matrix: 
Reloaded (as Niobe or Ghost), but you have to play events/sequences that 
occur off-screen in The Matrix: Reloaded. The best example of this 
interaction is during the chase scene on the freeway where Morpheus falls 
from a moving truck and is caught on the bonnet of Niobe‟s vehicle. In 
Enter the Matrix, one of the tasks is to navigate the freeway in this vehicle 
to arrive in time to rescue Morpheus at a specific point. Failure to do so 
means that one has failed the task and one must start again in order to 
progress.  
 
Krug and Frenk note how this is one occasion where the interactivity of 
Enter the Matrix, and indeed its status as a videogame in its own right, is 
relegated to providing a supporting narrative for The Matrix: Reloaded. As 
they state, “the limited level of interactivity provided by the game takes two 
familiar forms: advancing the plot line and providing visual gratification” 
(81). This is one of the moments in the game where you do not have a 
choice as to which character you play as: because it has to connect with the 
filmic product and the viewer cannot choose which character rescues 
Morpheus, this game sequence has to be played as Niobe. Thus players have 
to “interact „correctly‟ in key passages of the game” or they will not 
“advance any further ... or they will die” (81). Although Enter the Matrix 
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was presented as being an “integral part of the movie franchise” and not just 
a “movie tie-in” (74), its use of cinematic footage and continual deference to 
the narrative of The Matrix: Reloaded relegates its status to “just one more 
part of the Matrix-as-product, an all-encompassing franchising innovation” 
(92). Deborah Carr‟s article „The Rules of the Game, the Burden of 
Narrative‟ (2005) also argues that the “manner in which Enter the Matrix 
has been drafted into the story arc of The Matrix cycle is detrimental to its 
ability to function as a game” (46). Krug and Frenk similarly note how “the 
film still claims supremacy” (75).  
 
But Aylish Wood acknowledges, these elements of the franchise can stand 
alone as independent products and make narrative sense with or without 
each other. She then notes that these elements, or connections, remain 
possibilities. They may not be taken up, or used. It is perfectly possible that 
fans of The Matrix stop there as it is stands alone as a complete narrative, 
and do not wish even to watch the sequels. Similarly, film fans may not 
want to, or have the means to, indulge in playing the computer game. They 
may not want to read or have any interest in the concept of the Matrix 
outside of the texts or the elements of the franchise. The Matrix films are 
especially playful texts in gathering a discursive response which has aided 
the production of the popular philosophy anthologies, which I suggest, are 
consumed in a similar manner to the products of the franchise. They offer 
another avenue of investigation into the story world, and function as what 
Cornel Sandvoss would term a „border‟ of fandom. He argues that: 
 
The object of fandom always consists of a textual hybrid, a meta- or 
super-text composed of many textual episodes whose boundaries are 
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defined by the fan him or herself. The reader does not ... beat the text 
into a shape which will serve his or her own purposes but cuts his or 
her own text out of all available signs and information. (131-2) 
 
 
Fans may choose which ever elements of a franchise to consume – in the 
case of the Matrix this could be the films, or the films and the 
documentaries. The wealth of popular literature devoted to the Matrix is 
also indicative of the many ways in which the films are consumed. For some 
it is the special effects that make the film interesting, for others the 
philosophical issues that it raises, and for others it may merely be the 
presence of Keanu Reeves. Dan North for example has identified a 
„technological metanarrative‟ highlighting the “apparatus behind (the film‟s) 
production” (50). As he notes in respect of this: 
 
More than most film cycles, the Matrix trilogy has fostered a 
network of discursive articles, behind-the-scenes footage, fan fiction, 
crew interviews and on-set photographs all clustered around the 
mainframe of an official website ... and profusely scattered across 
various DVD releases. (50) 
 
 
These anthologies function as another border for the philosophical fan 
faction highlighting a philosophical metanarrative akin to the technological 
metanarrative discussed by North. It even manifests itself in similar ways, in 
particular through DVD special features such as „Follow the White Rabbit‟, 
the DVD commentary by Cornel West and Ken Wilbur and internet 
discussion. This is a faction that is encouraged not only by the original film 
and elements of the franchise in its use of discursive hooks such as the 
ambiguous spoon, but also by Warner Brothers in that they have devoted a 
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section of whatisthematrix.com to philosophical debates which continues to 
be expanded. 
 
The notion of polysemy is crucial to understanding the Matrix franchise and 
the discursive responses to it. Cornel Sandvoss, in arguing for fan texts as 
„mirrors‟ of consumption, introduces the idea of a polysemic text. He 
defines this as a text which allows for multifarious meanings and uses in the 
realm of fandom. He argues that polysemy in certain cases descends into 
„neutrosemy‟, in that a text can carry so many divergent readings in acting 
as a self-reflective space for fan activity that it carries “no inherent 
meaning” (126) Here the individual constructs meaning to which the subject 
is integral, meaning that theoretically, a text as a fan text can assume any 
reading dependent on the individual approaching the text.  
 
Sandvoss‟s methodological approach to fan studies, by viewing fan texts as 
utilising „borders‟ which vary from person to person and faction to faction, 
and viewing the polysemic nature of the fan text as them constituting 
„mirrors of consumption‟, allows a consideration of the discursive response 
to the franchise. In recalling Žižek‟s comment that “practically every 
orientation seems to recognize itself in (The Matrix)” (241), which is 
evinced by the number of divergent readings available, The Matrix assumes 
a similar position to that of a fan text. Whereas, for Sandvoss, the fan text 
operates as a mirror of consumption, The Matrix functions as a mirror of 
interpretation, which offers multiple interpretive invitations to be accepted 
or declined by scholars and fans alike. Matthew Hills has noted how there is 
great similarity between fan and academic attitudes towards cultural 
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hierarchy in texts, and Sandvoss has identified how these often intersect, 
using the example of the notion of cult: 
 
It comes as no surprise that the notion of cult has enjoyed popularity 
with academics and scholars who are under particular pressure to 
legitimize their own consumption patterns in relation to educational 
capital. (41) 
 
 
Although the definition of cult is not exact, it is clear that what elevates a 
given text to the status of cult is reaction to it rather than some specific 
quality within the text. Mendik and Harper argue that: 
 
The cult film draws on a (hard) core of audience interest and 
involvement which is not just the result of random, directionless 
entertainment seeking, but rather a combination of intense physical 
and emotional involvement ... the effect it produces is not merely an 
affectionate attachment to the text, but a ritualistic form of near 
obsession. (7) 
 
 
In consideration of this notion of cult, The Matrix self-consciously attempts 
to locate itself firmly in the cultural consciousness by creating a core of 
audience interest which will remain due to its polysemic nature. The 
franchise continued to expand until July 2009 when The Matrix Online, a 
„Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game‟ (MMORPG) ceased to 
function after Sony Entertainment stopped supporting it. Previously it was 
updated with new missions every six weeks. Although this is a speculation, 
The Matrix Online was probably as intertextual as the other elements of the 
franchise. Popular philosophy anthologies have continued to be released 
regularly. Not only does this „cult‟ activity give a study of the franchise 
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academic legitimacy, but this in turn strengthens fan enthusiasm for the 
franchise. 
 
Both Wartenberg and Falzon argue that the film engages the viewer in the 
active act of philosophising. Falzon argues that “the film does not merely 
allude to a philosophical theme; it actually engages in philosophising, 
because it puts its viewers in a position where they are confronted with the 
unsettling question: how do you know you are not in a similar situation?” 
(101). Wartenberg similarly argues that the many self-reflexive moments of 
the film encourage the viewer to engage philosophically. The sequence that 
begins when Neo takes the red pill and arrests after beginning to replicate 
the malleable mirror and ends with his awakening in the real world, is 
important for Wartenberg. He argues that the original film:  
 
Actually provides its viewers with a visual experience that is 
analogous to Neo‟s, an experience in which the world that was taken 
to be real ... begins to exhibit irregularities that suggest perceptual 
experience is not an accurate guide to the nature of reality. (278) 
 
 
According to Wartenberg is The Matrix therefore a film that “genuinely 
philosophises” (281) and encourages the viewer to do the same. Catherine 
Constable has, however, noted that “the contention that The Matrix causes 
its audience to philosophise really needs to be backed up by the appropriate 
empirical research” (32).  
 
Although Constable has written that Sven Lutzka‟s article pursues a “well-
worn line of argument” that “conforms to the dominant tradition” (18), I feel 
his work is of great use when addressing the phenomenon of the Matrix 
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franchise and the critical reaction to it. Putting aside his comments that 
specifically pertain to the relation of the original film to the theory of 
Baudrillard, Lutzka proposes that the original film should at least be read in 
terms of Frederic Jameson‟s notion of „pastiche‟ as it exists as “another 
meta-interpretative foil (that) lurks beneath the surface of the movie (114). 
He explains that the “advantage of this approach lies in the fact that it 
allows for an overall interpretation of the film encompassing the henceforth 
unrelated aspects” (114).  Lutzka argues that the film does not engage in any 
profound way with any of the texts or philosophies that it references and 
therefore it is not only the references to Baudrillard that suffers this 
„depthlessness‟.  
 
The Body in the Matrix 
 
Mary Ann Doane has noted that science fiction is a “genre specific to the 
era of rapid technological development” and therefore “frequently envisages 
a new, revised body as a direct outcome of the advance of science” 
(„Technophilia‟ 163).  The Matrix scenario presents us with characters that 
have „double bodies‟ – that is, they have a digital avatar in the space of the 
Matrix and a physical body outside of the Matrix in Zion. Although a 
„neural interactive simulation‟ akin to the Matrix does not (yet) exist in our 
society, it is clear that the Matrix scenario engages with debates regarding 
the body in cyberspace which have arisen since the advent of Virtual Reality 
and the internet.  
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The representation of the body in the Matrix trilogy is another example of 
the films‟ complexities and ambivalences. In the early stages of Reloaded, 
there is a clear celebration of embodiment, shown in the „Zion Rave‟ scene - 
a scene which is entitled „Celebrating Humanity‟ on the DVD release. After 
the crews‟ return to Zion, the Council calls a gathering of the citizens of 
Zion to inform them that the city will be shortly be under attack from 
thousands of sentinel droids that are set to destroy the city and thus the 
remainder of humanity. After Morpheus has delivered his speech, a dance 
ensues which Bahng has described as an “orgiastic rave” (173). Trinity 
(Carrie Ann Moss) arrives scantily clad and searching for Neo, and they 
return to their room to „make love‟. Their sexual act is intercut and 
juxtaposed with the dancing, which involves provocative, mostly gyrating 
dancing of a sexual nature. The scene climaxes (as does Trinity) with a 
repetition of the vision that has been plaguing Neo and which opened the 
film: that of Trinity‟s death in the Matrix. This celebration, of the multiple 
pleasures of the body, its physicality and functions ends bathetically with 
the realisation that this body, unlike the bodies of the machines above, will 
inevitably cease to function. 
 
This scene has been discussed in detail by Rainer Emig who describes the 
love scene as “not very explicit” and notes how the couple appears “almost 
as if they were presented to us on an alter” and engage in “carefully 
choreographed caresses” (200). That “their sexuality also differs from the 
rest of Zion in that it remains a private affair” (Bahng 177) serves to 
privilege their union. That this scene is so obviously contrasted to the 
dancing in the cavern is criticised by Aimee Bahng because Neo and Trinity 
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typify “the stock, heterosexual resolutions and unimaginative formulations 
of race and gender that plague the Matrix films” (170). In noting that “the 
rave sequence is riddled with extended, slow shots of barefoot stomping, 
mud between the toes, and anklets jingling to the beat of the drums” (173), 
Bahng equates this scene to “the colonialist myth” which Cornel West has 
described as representing black people as “closer to nature (removed from 
intelligence and control) and more prone to be guided by base pleasures and 
biological impulses” (126-7). That Neo and Trinity‟s love scene is so clearly 
set apart and „carefully choreographed‟ separates them from „base 
pleasures‟ of the crowd. It is thoroughly heteronormative and white. 
 
Bahng notes that the real world of Zion differs greatly to the space of the 
Matrix as it is overwhelmingly white: “while hemp-clad, black bodies 
predominantly inhabit Zion, bodies within the Matrix are almost always 
white and urban” (171). That the dance scene is “comprised mostly of 
golden- and brown- toned bodies”  alongside “the playing of drums, the 
temple carved out of nature itself, and the slow-motion dreadlocks” (173), 
Bahng associates the scene with Rastafari movements.  
 
The body in the Matrix also contrasts to the body in the rave scene, 
particularly the body involved in scenes using the bullet-time effect. Clover 
notes that The Matrix did not offer the first demonstration of the bullet time 
technique, rather this was undertaken by advertisements for The Gap and 
Smirnoff Vodka (17). The innovation in The Matrix was to combine this 
technology with the technique of wire-fighting seen regularly in Eastern 
Asian cinema, particularly Hong Kong Kung Fu films. The result is a body 
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that can produce seemingly impossible physical movements as time is 
slowed for the character, allowing them to „dodge bullets‟. This 
combination of technique and technology complicates the trilogy‟s attitude 
to embodiment: in the Zion Rave scene described above it is indubitably 
attempting to project a positive imagining of the body and its faculties. The 
love scene between Trinity and Neo is, in comparison to other examples of 
science fiction cinema, fairly explicit and lengthy, and is shot, as is the 
dancing, in sensuous colours and tones and utilises slow motion, a technique 
classical associated with the fetishisation of the body/image. 
 
However, as spectators there is visual pleasure in the bullet time/wire-
fighting technique. Delight is taken in viewing the body exceed its natural 
capacities and it begins to function as pure spectacle. Clover has argued that 
the function of this special effect differs in The Matrix as the importance in 
understanding the occurrence of this spectacle is inextricably linked to an 
understanding of the narrative: 
 
The plot designs to render such moments as not being amazing 
absurdities; we are not asked to suspend our disbelief so much as to 
understand the terms by which these episodes are believable. (18) 
 
 
Bullet time, Clover argues, demands a different way of viewing than the 
average special effect; it differs greatly in purpose and meaning than, for 
example, a pyrotechnic explosion, as seen in the destruction of the 
Nostromo at the conclusion of Alien. The narrative of The Matrix demands 
these kinds of effects, and may well, as Clover later suggests, foreground 
the spectacle and reveal it as such. Bullet time is situated in a peculiar 
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position here as it indicates in the narrative that it is spectacle, that a 
character shown in bullet time is bending the rules of the Matrix. As Clover 
notes, “within the matrix everything else is a special effect” (66). 
 
A Foucauldian reading of the body as the „site and locus of power‟ as 
articulated in Discipline and Punish is useful in beginning to understand 
these bodies. Looking at the inert bodies plugged into the Matrix they 
appear to be situated between Foucault‟s imaging of the „docile‟ body and 
slavery. The analogies to slavery are clear: the body is appropriated within 
the machinery of the Matrix and exploited for their productive qualities. 
However, it is not enough to accept that this is simply a form of slavery 
because the correlation to docility is strong in this representation.  
 
Foucault claims that “the classical age discovered the body as object and 
target of power” (136) and that this created social systems where control is 
exercised throughout all social institutions including “monasteries, armies, 
workshops” (137). This power, he argues, is held directly over the body, 
manipulating its state as the State “obtained holds upon it at the level of 
mechanism itself” (137) as a “subtle coercion” to achieve “an uninterrupted, 
constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its 
result” (137).  
 
Foucault begins his description of the docile body by describing the body of 
the soldier. He describes this body as one which bears multiple signs, 
namely strength through a muscular physique and, in some cases, the scars 
of combat. This body is one that “can be made; out of a formless clay” 
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(136). This body is then forced to adopt certain disciplines and routines 
pertaining to the body, such as military drills and training in the use of 
weaponry. This body is that which is “manipulated, shaped, trained, which 
obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces” (136). It is a 
docile body that “may be subjected, used, transformed and improved (136). 
This, according to Foucault, is the working of the „disciplines‟, a self-
regulatory ordering of power relations.  
 
A correlation to the „jacked in‟ bodies of the Matrix is clear from this 
description. Apart from the bodies of the rebels, the human bodies are 
„subjected, used, transformed, and improved‟ by the machines who have 
captured them, and have adapted them by inserting alien technologies to 
store their body heat and plug their minds into the Matrix. They are kept 
„docile‟ within this system, unaware that this „subtle coercion‟ is working 
over their bodies due to the pervasiveness of the „neural interactive 
simulation.‟ Foucault also notes that “the body can become a useful force 
only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body” (26) and this 
imagining is an extreme of both qualities. The machines subject the human 
bodies to this system of control because within it they are useful in that they 
provide the machines with the energy they need to function. These bodies 
are completely subjected, at least physically. The Matrix does not offer an 
image of slavery as such, as the subjects are not aware of their captivity; 
they are not aware of the system of which they are part and believe 
themselves to have free will.  
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This is how Foucault‟s notion of docility, and indeed his model of power 
relations, functions. The subject is not aware of its subjection. The subjects 
who form part of the Matrix believe they are leading a life of variety and 
choice, but in fact are a part of a determined system that dominates their 
existence so that their bodies may be used by those in power with the 
minimal amount of resistance. This is acknowledged in the script of The 
Matrix when Morpheus explains that: 
 
The Matrix is a system, Neo. That system is our enemy. But when 
you‟re inside you look around. What do you see? Business people, 
teachers, lawyers, carpenters ... you have to understand that most of 
these people are not ready to be unplugged. And many of them are 
so inert, so hopelessly dependent on the system that they will fight to 
protect it. 
 
 
Similarly, Foucault argues that the body in Western society is used and 
disciplined without the subject being truly aware of how these 
„microphysics‟ of power are exercised over it. The representation of the 
body in the Matrix puts perfect efficiency at the centre of its vision of the 
docile body. Many pains are taken in the creation of the state of docility in 
the natural human subject as it has to be trained. In the case of the soldier, 
this involves many years of military training, an investment of time and 
money. In the case of the body in the Matrix, it only requires a plug in the 
back of the head.  
 
The notion of docility, and Foucault‟s ideas of power more generally, can 
account for the contradictory imaginings of bodies – the inert „docile‟ 
bodies plugged into the Matrix, the spectacular bodies within the 
programme of the Matrix, and the bodies in The Matrix –as continually 
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caught in a number of disparate power relations. The first example, outlined 
above, is clear. The spectacular bodies are slightly more complex, and for an 
understanding of these, a useful character to examine is Cypher (Joe 
Pantaliano) who betrays the rebels and is killed by Tank (Marcus Chong). It 
becomes apparent that Cypher is a traitor, so disillusioned with the real 
world and „nostalgic‟ for the simulation of the Matrix that he strikes up a 
deal with the Agents to get himself plugged back in to the Matrix. This 
character is generally discussed in arguments about the morality of living 
within a simulation - again another oft discussed moral philosophical issue 
(Griswold, Blackford). 
 
Most see Cypher as simply a hedonist, but within a Foucauldian framework 
his character becomes more complex, and perhaps more informed, than the 
other crew members. The film does, however, encourage the viewer to 
consider him as a hedonist. Neo catches him drinking alcohol to numb his 
brain cells, and a major attraction of him returning to the Matrix is the 
sensation of good living: whilst chewing on a piece of steak, he declares that 
“ignorance is bliss”. When attempting to explain the reasoning behind his 
treachery, Cypher asks Trinity whether she considers her life outside of the 
Matrix to be „free‟. He does not, declaring that “all I do is what [Morpheus] 
tells me to do.” It is perhaps fairer to Cypher, to see him as simply 
exchanging one set of power relations for another.  
 
Within the system of the Matrix, the bullet time technique becomes 
emblematic of resistance or control. Only those characters who have freed 
themselves from the Matrix, those who have sufficiently freed their minds, 
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can manipulate the Matrix in this way. As Christina Lee has commented, 
“the awesome power of the heroes resides in their acts of invention and 
transcendence of the parameters of the impossible. Fantasies give way to 
potentialities” (564). This effect or action differs when enacted by the 
rebels: for them it is an act of delinquency, of transgressing and 
manipulating the rules. For the Agents, to move through time and space in 
this manner is a natural right, they can do it as they have the correct 
programming, and they are in charge of the Matrix. Parallels may be drawn 
to Foucault‟s own discussion of delinquency, particularly when one reaches 
the concluding stages of The Matrix: Reloaded. After Neo has met with the 
Architect, the programme that designed the Matrix, the Architect explains to 
him that the rebel movement and the Zion council are greatly mistaken as to 
Neo‟s importance. He is in fact the eighth „One‟ and part of the system of 
control. This is perhaps indicative of one of the major criticisms levied 
against Foucault‟s thesis in Discipline and Punish, in that his theories of 
power relations are totalitarian and he offers no alternative to the systems 
that he proposes are in action. His critics, as David Couzens Hoy has stated, 
“believe that [Foucault] fails insofar as he has no social alternatives to offer 
and moral or political standards in which to base his angry charge that 
modern society is becoming more and more like a prison” (13).  
 
This is also explored in „The King of the Never Return‟, a graphic story that 
forms part of The Matrix Comics: Volume Two. This piece focuses on a 
rogue group of „free‟ rebels who have broken away from the Zion 
collective, and utilise the Matrix for „thrill seeking‟. They place themselves 
at risk from the Agents in a number of their own programmes and scenarios, 
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such as robbing banks and Spaghetti Westerns. As one character explains 
they “used to just sit around ... waiting for orders from our superiors, 
supposed to be grateful for being freed from the Matrix‟s system ... 
Grateful? Yeah right ... Wondered when the time would come where we 
could truly be free again” (49). This both affirms and denies Foucault‟s 
notion of the microphysics of power in that the characters acknowledge that 
they have passed from one system of control to another; from being a unit in 
the Matrix to being a citizen of Zion. However, Foucault would challenge 
the notion of being „truly free‟. 
 
Foucault proposes the double body of the delinquent, in that the physical 
body remains the offender, but upon this body the penal system ascribes the 
level of delinquency. He describes at length the reasons for recidivism, in 
that once the prisoner becomes part of the system, controls are put in place 
that keep the body within the system. On a superficial level it seems that re-
offending prisoners indicate the failure of the prison system, but Foucault 
claims that this „failing‟ is in fact the functioning of the prison, as it 
produces the delinquent as an „object of knowledge‟.  
 
The bodies in The Matrix are also part of a system called Hollywood. 
Arguing from a Foucauldian perspective, Donna Haraway‟s „A Cyborg 
Manifesto‟ is a poignant example of criticism to use when discussing the 
limitations of the Matrix franchise‟s representations. Haraway explores the 
possibilities of a “creature in a post gender world” (425) arguing that the 
definition of human, with developments in technology, has become as the 
animal/human, human/machine dichotomies that have become increasingly 
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blurred. The characters and bodies in the Matrix films are offered an 
opportunity to challenge the continued reproduction and unfavourable 
myths and ideologies that this film industry is oft to circulate specifically 
concerning gender.  
 
For the sake of continuity, very little apart from costuming separates the 
appearance of the avatars in the Matrix and their corresponding bodies in 
the real world. The appearance of an individual inside the space of the 
Matrix is accounted for by the concept of Residual Self Image. Morpheus 
explains this to be the “mental projection of your digital self” though the use 
in contemporary psychology is not as literal and refers more to how one sees 
oneself socially and/or culturally. Although a body within the Matrix will 
never have seen itself (as Morpheus explains when Neo asks why his eyes 
hurt, it is because he has never used them before), the mind projects the 
(mostly accurate) image of the body into the Matrix. It is extraordinarily 
difficult to explain this phenomenon in certain terms. We could understand 
these bodies in Lacanian terms of misrecognition in the mirror stage but it is 
easier, and more useful, to understand these bodies in terms of Hollywood. 
A version of The Matrix could be possible where the character of Neo, 
either in or out of the Matrix, is overweight, or disfigured, black, or even a 
woman. These are arbitrary examples to highlight how such an imagining is 
theoretically possible within the terms of the narrative, despite the 
corresponding bodies being less easily identifiable for the audience. 
However, the films exist within a system where experimentation of this kind 
is rarely encouraged. Leading men have to adhere to the popular consensus 
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as to what is desirable in a movie with the target audience of the Matrix 
films. 
 
It must be remembered, however, how greatly the physique of Neo/Keanu 
differs from so many of his science fiction/action hero counterparts. 
Christina Lee notes how the very inclusion of virtual reality and the 
„technologised body‟ have “particular implications for the imagining of the 
action hero” (564). Neo‟s body is vastly different in appearance than the 
typical action hero of American film. In fact, Keanu Reeves‟s body is 
completely different in build than it appeared in Speed (Jan de Bont, 1994). 
In Speed his body is considerably more muscular and corresponds more to 
the hard/spectacular bodies that have become associated with the action 
genre, particularly since the 1980s (Tasker Spectacular Bodies). 
 
Considering Haraway‟s manifesto, the Matrix films are disappointing in 
their representation of bodies. As she states, her work is “an argument for 
pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their 
construction” (476, original emphasis). The Matrix films seem oblivious to 
this responsibility. Continuing in their ambivalent mode, they are films that 
do go some way to blurring boundaries in certain areas but then ultimately 
reinstate them. In terms of gender, the character of Trinity is a prime 
example. Although the physical resemblance between Trinity and Neo is 
often remarked upon (Lipp), a further examination of their characterisation 
and roles within both the Matrix and the Matrix films exposes the analogous 
relation between them as problematic. But this is not to say that the Matrix 
films do not go some way to overturning myths about sexual difference and 
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the body. As Lee notes (564), the very details of the narrative scenario allow 
for a different kind of body to be displayed in the action genre. Neo‟s 
physique is not muscular and toned, his muscles are atrophied as he has 
never used them before.  
 
Trinity 
 
Mary Ann Doane states that “when technology intersects with the body in 
the realm of representation, the question of sexual difference is inevitably 
involved” (163). This case study explores the nature of sexual difference 
and argues that Trinity is a character, as are the Matrix films themselves, 
which anticipates a critical reaction. As has been discussed, The Matrix and 
the following franchise have proved to be texts that intentionally straddled 
the popular and academic realms of discourse through their use of discursive 
hooks as props. Thus a vigorous investigation of the central female figure 
that engages with gender and/or feminist issues/theory was practically 
inevitable when considering the pervasiveness and importance of these 
forms of analysis. There are two „aspects‟ of Trinity that I wish to explore: 
firstly, her involvement in the plot of the film trilogy and franchise, and 
secondly her appearance both in the Matrix and Zion.  
 
This case study aims to fully explore the „double body‟ of Trinity. She is not 
only seen in the Matrix as an “ass kicking, leather-wearing cyberpunk” 
(Gillis „Cyber Noir: Cyberspace, (Post)Feminism and the Femme Fatale‟ 
74), but also in the real world of Zion where she is, for the most part, clad in 
more utilitarian clothing and fulfils many different roles in the narrative. 
Green 161 
 
Some critics, such as Sarah Street, have seemingly treated the contrast 
between her roles in and outside of the Matrix with some derision, and 
described her role as akin to a “handmaiden” (94). Inside the Matrix she can 
accomplish such feats as single-handedly disabling a squadron of 
policemen, whereas outside of the Matrix, Trinity appears subservient to 
Neo, taking him food, facilitating his actions, and dying doing so. A 
thorough study of her character is necessary not only to discuss the 
complexities and contradictions in her representation, but also to address 
why most critical attention paid to Trinity pertains mostly to her digital 
avatar in the Matrix and not her body in Zion.  
 
Trinity‟s complexity, I argue, is rooted within the complexity of the filmic 
texts discussed previously. As I have demonstrated, the Matrix franchise 
comprises several elements which are especially and deliberately playful in 
encouraging multifarious ways of reading. The character of Trinity is not 
separate from this. Trinity is a character that wants to be read as powerful, 
subversive and progressive. She appears first dressed in skin-tight PVC 
which immediately aligns her with subversive and „underground‟ practices, 
which is consolidated in her first meeting with Neo in an underground fetish 
club. There is, however, something more significant containing her. As 
Stacy Gillis comments, “as her function is to support Neo both in and out of 
the Matrix, Trinity‟s meaning is ultimately contained by the inscrutable 
category and function of woman” („Cyber Noir: Cyberspace, 
(Post)Feminism and the Femme Fatale‟ 74). Martina Lipp has similarly 
commented that “Trinity might be important for the plot, but she will never 
be the chosen one” (18).  
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There are three major points regarding Trinity‟s role in the narrative I wish 
to discuss. After the first half of the original film, Morpheus is captured 
within the Matrix and held by the Agents trying to „hack‟ his brain for the 
coordinates of Zion. This is the catalyst for the remainder of the film‟s 
action as it now becomes necessary for Neo, Trinity and the remaining crew 
of the Nebuchadnezzar to rescue him. Armed with an arsenal, they re-enter 
the Matrix. In The Matrix: Reloaded, after Neo discovers that „The One‟ is a 
computer programme and thus part of the system of the Machines‟ control, 
the Architect gives Neo the choice of rescuing Trinity from death inside the 
Matrix or restarting the programme and rebuilding Zion with a handful of 
chosen subjects. He opts to save Trinity, and resurrects her after she is shot 
in the heart by an Agent. In The Matrix: Revolutions, Trinity rescues Neo 
from the train station where he has been exiled and assists him in reaching 
the Machine City. After Neo is blinded by Smith (who inhabits the body of 
Bane), Trinity pilots Niobe‟s hovercraft which eventually crashes. Trinity 
dies after being penetrated by multiple objects. 
 
The immediate impact of Trinity is remarkable. After she is described as 
being just „one little girl‟ by a policeman in charge of a SWAT unit that is 
attempting to arrest her, she is shown to defy time and gravity and escape 
the would-be captors. This introduction encourages an amount of subversion 
in her characterisation, as indeed does her physical appearance. Critical 
reactions to Trinity have, obviously, varied. Gillis, in her essay „Cyber Noir: 
Cyberspace, (Post)Feminism and the Femme Fatale‟ (2005), sees Trinity as 
a re-imagining of the film noir figure. Martina Lipp describes Trinity‟s 
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“hypersexualisation” (21) and implies that her appearance corresponds to 
the notion of masquerade as theorised by Joan Rivière in her „Womanliness 
as Masquerade‟. Here she has to “hide her position of power behind an 
exaggerated femininity, thus reaffirming her status as a woman by 
constructing her as sexual spectacle” (21). Sarah Street describes the 
tightness of her tailoring as being “suggestive of fetishistic pleasure through 
constriction” (96).  
 
However, far much more critical attention has been paid to the character of 
Trinity in the Matrix. Her „body‟ in the Matrix is extraordinary: not only is 
it bound in tight PVC, but it can defy the law of gravity and move through 
space and time in a manner only emulated by few other characters in the 
Matrix films. This criticism does not pertain to Trinity‟s body outside of the 
Matrix, her material body in Zion. Trinity, like the rest of the „pod-borns‟ 
has, in a sense, a double body – that of her actual material body and her 
digital avatar inside the space of the Matrix. It is this material body that 
critics seem reluctant to address to the same degree. Street pays her aesthetic 
appearance some attention, though this is only discussed as a point to 
contrast to Trinity‟s digital avatar. Street notes in The Matrix that: 
 
Trinity‟s clothes are ordinary and her hair is longer and softer than 
we have seen in the Matrix and she is cast in the role of handmaiden, 
quietly serving Neo his food and saving him at the end by declaring 
her love for him. This is in stark contrast to her black, shiny, body-
hugging cat-suits and short, slicked-back androgynous haircut. (94) 
 
 
Trinity‟s „real‟ body is considerably less „spectacular‟ than her digital body, 
but this does not mean that it should not be remarked upon. Street, writing 
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in 2001 and therefore before the release of the sequels, also notes that the 
digital Trinity is shown considerably more than the material Trinity, and 
therefore one can perhaps expect more detailed analyses of the digital body. 
However, towards the end of the series of films, the digital Trinity is seen 
less as the action becomes increasingly set outside of the Matrix. Therefore 
it is not solely the matter of screen time as to why this body has remained 
under-explored.  
 
It also does not logically follow that the reason why the digital Trinity has 
had more critical attention is due to efforts put into her costuming, which is 
an element of her character that is frequently discussed (Street, Gillis, 
Church Gibson). As much time would have been spent on designing her 
costume for the real world scenes by costume designer Kym Barrett. In the 
feature length documentary The Matrix: Revisited (Josh Oreck, 2001), she 
describes her role as “to take the script and to show people who the 
characters are through what they wear and why they wear them in the 
environment in which they‟re placed”. The costumes in the real world are 
for some reason deemed unremarkable by critics. The standard clothes the 
rebels wear are not as visually „interesting‟ or intricate as those inside the 
Matrix. They are standard within in the space of the Matrix. Trinity‟s 
uniform in the real world does not cling to her flesh, it is not revealing, 
provocative or otherwise, and it neither accentuates nor negates her 
femininity.  
 
Her appearance at the Zion Rave scene is the only occasion where Trinity in 
the real world is shown to be wearing something other than her Lieutenant‟s 
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uniform. The film cuts from the mass of writhing bodies to a less crowded 
hallway, where Neo is seen conversing with several others. He spots Trinity 
emerging alone from a corridor, wearing pale, brown, skimpy clothing that 
reveals much of her torso (Figure 16). After embracing and kissing, she tells 
Neo to follow her and they return to their room. It is here that the love scene 
discussed earlier takes place. This is one moment where Trinity‟s character 
ceases to be subversive and resorts to the traditional function of woman in 
narrative film. Within the diegetic space, she appears purely for the gaze of 
Neo. He is the only character to notice her arrival which is intercut with a 
close-up of him gazing in her direction, implying that her function here is to 
satisfy his gaze. The couple then retreat, with no other character having 
acknowledged her arrival.  
 
The lack of attention paid to Trinity‟s body is reminiscent of another 
collection of screen women that have until recently suffered a similar 
critical neglect. These women are found in film noirs, as the counterpart to 
the femme fatale. The term film noir is ambiguous, and as a critical concept 
has drawn lots of attention from critics trying, or being unable, to define it. 
One identifying factor of the film noir is often thought to be the presence of 
a femme fatale, again, another ambiguous term that on closer examination 
seems to blanket a set of exciting, provocative and critically interesting 
screen women. As noted earlier, Sylvia Harvey has identified two prevailing 
female character types in film noir and describes them as “the exciting, 
childless whores, or the boring potentially childbearing sweethearts” (38). 
The character of the femme fatale, I would argue, cannot be used as a stable 
point of identification for film noir as a genre, but the concept of the femme 
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fatale and her associations to noir are clear and exist (if only) in the history 
of criticism devoted to noir. Gillis states that “one way of understanding 
Trinity is as a simulation” (81) as she is a Baudrillardian reflection of the 
“profound reality of the femme fatale” („Cyber Noir: Cyberspace, 
(Post)Feminism and the Femme Fatale‟ 81, original emphasis). However, as 
recent criticism surrounding the femme fatale has explored, the character of 
the supposed femme fatale has always been contradictory. The only 
„profound reality‟ that the femme fatale refers to is as a critical concept.  
 
Using Trinity to discuss the problematic nature of the femme fatale is 
perhaps more beneficial to exposing the inherent problems on categorisation 
of this sort. Trinity‟s double body represents both of the archetypes that 
Harvey refers to. Trinity‟s avatar and indeed character in the Matrix 
corresponds more to the „exciting childless whore‟ than the „childbearing 
sweetheart‟ to which Harvey refers. In the real world of The Matrix at least, 
her character seems to assume this latter role. But as the trilogy unfolds her 
two roles begin to merge. 
 
„A Detective Story‟ (Shinichiro Watanabe, 2003), the ten minute animated 
short film that comprises part of The Animatrix, strengthens Trinity‟s 
affinity to the film noir tradition that Gillis foregrounds. Utilising primarily 
black and white animation and frequently picturing contrast akin to 
chiaroscuro, an aesthetic technique found frequently in film noir, the 
animation is clearly drawing influence from the noir canon (Figure 17). 
With long sweeping shots of busy cityscapes, and other typical noir tropes 
of retrospective, unplaced voice-overs, smoke and a moody jazz soundtrack, 
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the story follows the experience of Private Investigator Mr. Ash (James 
Arnold Taylor) as he is commissioned to track down the allusive Trinity, 
here voiced by Carrie Anne Moss, the actress who also plays her on screen.  
 
„A Detective Story‟ is the only short on The Animatrix to feature one of the 
major characters from the film trilogy. There are certain correlations 
between the aesthetic and the style of The Matrix as they both utilise these 
classical tropes from the film noir. In terms of gender, there are also 
correlations. Ash makes the same mistake as Neo in assuming that Trinity is 
male. If one of the characteristics of noir is the strong and sexual dangerous 
woman exemplified in the femme fatale, Trinity again occupies a complex 
space. Clearly her persona in this short is linked to that in the film. To 
continue Gillis‟s analysis, Trinity‟s position in relation to this character 
archetype is complex. In a sense Trinity is the unobtainable woman of the 
1940s film noir. She is also the one to kill Ash as he is turning into an agent. 
This is clearly not the same characterisation of Phyllis Dietrichson (Barbara 
Stanwyck) of Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944), for example, who 
eventually shoots her former lover Walter Neff (Fred MacMurray). 
 
Like The Matrix, „Detective‟ confuses the dichotomy of feminine 
archetypes that is characteristic of film noir. The role of the good woman 
here is taken by Dinah, Ash‟s cat, who plays the part of the faithful 
secretary seen in classic noirs such as The Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 
1941) where Sam Spade (Humphrey Bogart) is continually supported by 
Effie Perine (Lee Patrick) in contrast to the femme fatale, Bridgid 
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O‟Shaughnessy (Mary Astor). The cat assumes the role to the extent that it 
tosses Ash‟s hat to him as he leaves in a rush. As the role of good woman 
has been usurped by a feline imposter, the role of good and bad woman falls 
to Trinity. 
 
The majority of the short film centres on Ash‟s search for Trinity. He is 
shown in smoky bars, talking to „undesirables‟ on street corners, driving 
through the city space and interacting in primitive forms of internet cafés 
(under the pseudonym White Pawn), all typical activities for the hardboiled 
Private Investigator. After solving a complex riddle which references Lewis 
Carroll‟s Through the Looking Glass (1872), Ash meets Trinity aboard a 
train. Instantly the other passengers in adjoining carriages become Agents 
and he realises he has in fact been used as a pawn in order for the Agents to 
find Trinity. Ash is left to die as Trinity escapes. This does not correspond 
to the typical ending for the femme fatale – as she is considered a dangerous 
force of female power and sexuality, the femme fatale is contained and 
destined to die (Phyllis in Double Indemnity) or to be incarcerated (Bridgid 
in The Maltese Falcon). 
 
A major absence from critical writing on film noir is that devoted to these 
supposedly „boring‟ women. The femme fatales seem to demand more 
attention, but it does not follow that these other women are unworthy of 
attention and remain weak in the femmes‟ wake. If Trinity follows in the 
film noir tradition, it follows that the reason why her material body has been 
given so much less attention than her avatar can be linked to similar reasons. 
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The assumption seems to be that we have seen the real Trinity in film many 
times. Her body has significantly less critical currency than her avatar. 
 
A more complete reading can be provided if we approach Trinity through 
the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari as Elisabeth Hills suggests in 
relation to the character of Ripley discussed earlier. Within the narrative, her 
digital avatar is only provided through the interaction of her body/mind with 
the machinery used to „jack in‟. As much of the philosophical writing 
devoted to the franchise has argued that the film re-imagines Platonic and 
Cartesian ideas of the mind and body, it may be useful to discard this 
dualism that the film arguably encourages, and employ Deleuzoguattarian 
ideas of Becoming and the Body without Organs. This gives opportunity to 
see Trinity as a whole and distinct entity that forms different assemblages 
with different technologies or machines as it is demanded of her by the 
narrative.  
 
Gillis has also noted the potential benefits of Deleuzoguattarian theories of 
the body for addressing the subject‟s interaction with cyberspace in her 
essay „Neither Cyborg Nor Goddess‟ (2005). Because the essay explores 
“how cyberfeminism‟s transgressive potential is limited by the specificities 
of embodied online experience” („Neither Cyborg Nor Goddess‟ 168-9), it is 
of great use when examining the character of Trinity. Trinity herself seems 
to suffer this problem: whatever radical potential she has in the Matrix is 
explored in criticism, but is this problematised by her comparatively 
„limited‟ role in Zion. As Gillis notes, Deleuze and Guattari‟s “reading of 
the notion of assemblage holds that meaning, like all other bodies, is only 
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temporarily stratified, and fragile in its construction out of multiplicitous 
lines of becoming” (176-7, original emphasis). This means that Trinity 
functions in an interestingly paradoxical manner. Gillis notes how 
cyberfeminism, as a “movement which celebrates the potential for moving 
beyond the confines of the (gendered) body ... remains remarkably 
concerned with the corporeal” (169). However, criticism devoted to Trinity 
remains remarkably unconcerned with her corporeality.  
 
J. Macgregor Wise describes the assemblage as “a concept dealing with the 
play of contingency and structure, organization and change” (77). He 
continues to explain that: 
 
The concept of the assemblage shows us how institutions, 
organizations, bodies, practices and habits make and unmake each 
other, intersecting and transforming: creating territories and then 
unmaking them, deterritorializing, opening lines of flight as a 
possibility. (86) 
 
Trinity‟s becoming-machine is most clearly seen in her interaction with the 
technology that allows her to jack in to the Matrix. One moment from the 
first film demonstrates this strongly. After Trinity and Neo resolve to rescue 
Morpheus from the grasp of the Agents, they find themselves on a rooftop 
with no way of escape. Trinity spots a helicopter, and calls Tank to get him 
to upload the knowledge required to fly the helicopter to her knowledge 
bank. She is then able to control the machine. It is the interaction with the 
technology that allows her to control the situation.  
 
As Patty Sotirin comments regarding Deleuzoguattarian philosophy, it is 
“concerned with what a body can do when we think in terms of becomings 
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... rather than essential forms, predetermined subjects, structured functions 
or transcendent values” (101). If we start to view Trinity from this 
perspective, her material body becomes part of the critical agenda. As 
Deleuze and Guattari view the self as “only a threshold, a door, a becoming 
between two multiplicities” (A Thousand Plateaus 249), Trinity‟s body 
becomes the locus of experimentation of its limits, a BwO. Although Trinity 
is arguably presented as a „handmaiden‟ and corresponding to more 
„feminine‟ roles, she is also envisaged as a subject with multiple 
capabilities.  
 
The BwO is also demonstrated by the development of her abilities in the 
real world as depicted on screen. In the original The Matrix, there is a more 
distinct juxtaposition between her capabilities in and out of the Matrix, 
largely because the majority of the action scenes are set inside the Matrix. 
As previously noted, as the film series continues, more of the action 
becomes set in the real world. After Neo and Trinity have made the decision 
to go to the Machine City in The Matrix: Revolutions they attempt to leave 
in Niobe‟s ship upon which Bane (Ian Bliss), now carrying the Smith virus, 
has stowed away. When they experience a loss of power during take-off, 
Trinity goes to see why and is attacked by Bane, who holds a scalpel against 
her throat. Trinity manages to overcome Bane, exerting a considerable 
physical force. Although she eventually is overcome after Bane smashes her 
head against a wall, we here see the strongest merging of her personae, 
where her becomings have directly worked over her physical body. 
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Trinity‟s very death in The Matrix: Revolutions also underscores her 
position as woman in the narrative. After the hovercraft she is piloting 
crashes, the film cuts to a close-up of her head lying on the floor. After 
some conversation with Neo, he realises that something is amiss, and the 
film then cuts to a medium shot revealing that Trinity‟s body has been 
penetrated several times by power cables (Figure 18). The scene mimics the 
concluding scene of The Matrix, where Trinity‟s declaration of love and 
eventual kiss saves Neo from dying in the Matrix, only here Neo kisses 
Trinity and she slips into death. Martina Lipp has offered an alternative 
reading of this scene, stating that it “could also be interpreted as the glorious 
end on the battlefield associated with male heroic warriors” (29). Although 
Trinity‟s death is indeed reminiscent of the noble hero‟s death in many 
action films, being allowed the time and space to speak her final words of 
farewell and love, I would argue that this is diminished by the death of Neo 
shortly afterwards.  
 
At the conclusion of Neo‟s epic battle with Smith, the film cuts from the 
battle arena to Neo being held aloft by cables. Light pours from his eyes and 
ears as he lets out a final cry, and the film cuts back to the arena where the 
Smiths also exude light and disappear. We then cut to an overhead shot, 
where the machine is holding Neo in a Jesus Christ pose, which then cuts to 
a medium shot of him being gently, and respectfully, lowered to the ground 
as the cables connecting him to the Matrix disconnect and retreat. After 
showing Zion‟s reaction to the machines‟ ceasefire, the film cuts back to the 
Machine City to show the machine carrying Neo‟s body, which is glowing, 
to an alternative place. Issacs and Trost have suggested this is symbolic of 
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the ascent into Heaven (74). Although there is no indication of what is to be 
done to Neo‟s body, it is clear that something is being done – his body is in 
some way being attended to. Trinity‟s body, as far as we know, remains 
penetrated by and entangled within the wreckage of the hovercraft.  
 
When addressing the question of representation of the body with 
technology, it should be remembered that all action in the films is set 
against the backdrop of the machinery of the Matrix. The naming of the 
Matrix is hardly neutral. As the Oxford English Dictionary states, the word 
„matrix‟ was synonymous with „womb‟, „source‟ and „origin‟. It also cites 
one definition as “the womb, the uterus of a mammal” (www.oed.com).  
That the machinery of the Matrix is synonymous with the womb and that the 
machines have appropriated the maternal function is made clear in the 
sequence where Neo awakens in his pod in the Matrix. Indeed, this 
sequence is entitled „Slimy Rebirth‟ on the DVD release. The film cuts from 
Neo screaming as he begins to replicate the mirror, to a mass of black tubes 
amidst a tank of pink liquid (Figure 19). Neo‟s bare arms and torso are 
scarcely visible amongst this assemblage. The film cuts to an overhead shot 
of the tank, where Neo is shown to raise up one of his arms to be constricted 
by a gelatinous membrane. As Neo breaks through this membrane, we then 
cut to a medium shot showing Neo removing a long tube from his throat. In 
this shot we can clearly see a number of black tubes penetrating his arms 
and body. Neo is also shown to be completely bald, with no head or body 
hair. He reaches to the back of his head and notes the plug that allows him 
to be jacked in to the Matrix. He looks around him to see thousands of other 
pods all containing inert human bodies.  
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He is spotted by one of the machines who grabs him and unscrews the 
connection at the back of his head. The black tubes begin to pop off his 
body, and an opening is shown to appear at the bottom of his pod. In what 
Cynthia Freeland has described as a “birth parody” (208) the camera follows 
him as he slips through the opening aided by the slimy liquid, until the film 
cuts to a hole in a wall from which he emerges and falls into a body of water 
below. He sees lights above him and begins to lose consciousness. He is 
rescued by the rebels and is shown on board the hovercraft wrapped in a 
blanket, still covered in the slime.  
 
The womb-like nature of the Matrix pods is further accentuated during 
Morpheus‟s explanatory speech with Neo. When he is explaining that the 
human bodies are kept alive in these pods specifically so they can be used a 
source of energy, the film cuts to an image of a foetus feeding inside a 
smaller pod. Morpheus explains “there are fields Neo, endless fields, where 
human beings are no longer born, but grown”. As he explains to Neo that 
the machines liquefy the dead bodies in order to feed the living, the film 
cuts to an image of a young baby inside a pod suckling on a feeding tube. 
 
This is a grotesque imagining of the appropriation of the reproductive 
function. As Mary Ann Doane has commented, the association of 
technology with femininity is a common trope of the science fiction cinema. 
Discussing early science fiction works such as Metropolis (Fritz Lang, 
1926), she recognises that fears towards the technological are often 
projected onto the figure of woman. In the case of Metropolis, this is seen in 
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the evil robot Maria, juxtaposed with her good, angelic human self. She 
continues to argue that the relation between technology and the feminine has 
become more complex as “questions of the maternal and technology are 
more deeply imbricated” (168). This is because “technologies of 
reproduction seem to (have) become a more immediate possibility” (168). 
This has resulted in the relation between technology and the feminine 
becoming “less localized” (169). Rather than this being demonstrated in 
figures such as demonic androids where the threat is immediately perceived 
and located, the representation becomes more complex. Echoing Creed‟s 
analysis of the parthenogenetic mother, Doane refers to the Alien describing 
the narrative as: 
 
The story is longer one of transgression and conflict with the father 
but the struggle with and against what seems to become an 
overwhelming extension of the maternal, now assuming monstrous 
proportions. (169) 
 
 
We are faced with a similar imagining of the maternal in The Matrix. The 
technology of the Matrix, like the archaic mother identified in the Alien 
films, forms a “vast backdrop for the enactment of all the events” (Creed 
The Monstrous-Feminine 17).  If the Mother is synonymous with the 
Matrix, it is presented as a system to be escaped, that can be aligned with 
Kristevan notions of the abject: “the state of abjecting or rejecting what is 
other to oneself – thereby creating the borders of an always tenuous „I‟” 
(McAfee 45). This is confirmed when Trinity declares to Neo that “the 
Matrix cannot tell you who you are”. The subject in the Matrix must leave 
in order to „know itself‟.  
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Conclusions 
 
As we have seen the Matrix films are clear examples of cinema that engage 
with philosophy and theories of the postmodern. Not only does the Matrix 
scenario contemporise epistemological debates that have taken place over a 
number of millennia, but The Matrix makes numerous references to other 
texts to accentuate thematic similarities. This has led to a huge amount of 
critical and theoretical discourse surrounding the films. However, although 
many writings have explored the films in light of their philosophical themes 
and their philosophical project, few writings have concentrated on 
examining how the films themselves function as texts. It is my contention 
that the philosophical themes, metafictional moments and intertextual play 
of the franchise have enabled this text to acquire „cult‟ status. It has 
established itself within the canon of science fiction cinema specifically by 
overtly engaging with philosophical texts such as Simulacra in addition to 
referencing literary texts such as Nineteen Eighty-Four and Alice in 
Wonderland.  
 
However, in this scenario, gender and raced bodies are treated 
conservatively. This is not to say that the films do not offer some 
commentary and critique of gender roles or subvert dominant codes of 
representing the body. As we have seen, the body of Neo contrasts greatly to 
the muscular, spectacular bodies which are traditionally associated with the 
action genre. As Wolmark acknowledges, this is provided by the Matrix 
scenario itself. As the majority of the action and fight scenes take place 
within the space of the Matrix, the body does not need muscles as a sign of 
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strength as has Reeves‟s body in action films such as Speed. However, 
within the bounds of the narrative the white male body is given primacy. 
 
There are problems with the representation and the reception of the body of 
Trinity. Reference to Deleuze and Guattari‟s theories of the body can aid a 
reading of Trinity that incorporates her material body. However, a reading 
of Trinity as a BwO may ultimately fail because of the limits of her 
representation in Zion. Sotirin describes the BwO as a “body that is not 
organized in accord with biological functions, organic forms, or cultural-
historical values. Rather a BwO deconstructs these seemingly inviolable 
arrangements” (101). Her material body is organised in a conservative 
manner. Whereas, as Wolmark notes, within the space of the Matrix 
“definitions of gender identity are treated with a certain amount of ironic 
playfulness” (84), the representations of gender in Zion remain, for the most 
part, heteronormative. Whereas Trinity is presented as being “at odds with 
traditional constructions of femininity” (Wolmark 84) in the Matrix, she is 
shown to conform to them in the „real world‟. She acts as a safe spectacle 
to-be-looked-at in feminine dress at the beginning of the rave scene, she 
assumes the stock, passive position during her sexual liaison with Neo, her 
„transgressions‟ and appropriations of power are neutralised by death, akin 
to the fate of the femme fatale.  
 
That this complexity surrounds both the figure of woman and the 
representation of the feminine in these texts, I argue, is inherently linked to 
the franchise‟s playfulness as a text. As we have seen, the Matrix franchise 
is one that explicitly engages with signs and themes that are included to 
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bolster its claim as an „intellectual action movie‟. It is clear that the 
representation of Trinity is linked to this imperative. She draws from 
discourse concerning the femme fatale and the cyberpunk movement. On 
one level she is as much a sign, a referent to other cultural phenomena as the 
„101‟ that adorns Neo‟s door. We have also seen how the backdrop of the 
archaic mother links the films to canonical texts in the science fiction genre. 
The Matrix scenario contemporises the archaic and abject mother explored 
Alien and Aliens, and therefore links the films thematically with these texts. 
But this is also problematic, because as Creed has argued, “the concept of 
the parthenogenetic, archaic mother adds another dimension to the maternal 
figure and presents us with a new of understanding how patriarchal ideology 
works to deny the „difference‟ of woman in her cinematic representation” 
(The Monstrous-Feminine 20). Although, as I have demonstrated, there is 
room for reading otherwise, it is my contention that the representation of 
woman and the feminine is largely explainable in terms of Jameson‟s 
pastiche. The body of Trinity and the archaic mother are absorbed into the 
metafictional, intertextual, and philosophical play that signifies the Matrix 
franchise‟s larger project.  
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Chapter Three – Becoming-Bat and Becoming-Cat: Differences in the 
Representation of Becoming-Animal in the Male- and Female-
Embodied Subject in the Batman Series  
 
 
 
By examining the characters of Batman and Catwoman, this chapter 
endeavours to demonstrate a significant difference in the representation of 
the male and female-embodied subject in the Batman franchise. I argue that 
the Batman and Catwoman have evolved into figures that readily lend 
themselves to interpretation using the notions of the Body without Organs 
and „becoming-animal‟ proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, I also 
argue that there are significant differences between the representations of 
this becoming. Whilst the Batman has ultimately continued to a human 
character whose abilities are expanded by the use of advanced technology, 
chemistry and weaponry, Catwoman‟s transformation is supernatural and 
absolute. The Batman remains the alter-ego of the philanthropic Bruce 
Wayne, whereas the female characters of Selena Kyle in Batman Returns 
and Patience Phillips in Catwoman encounter an entirely new mode of 
molecular being when they become Catwoman.  
 
I explore Batman‟s subjectivity and identity and how this has changed 
because, as Uricchio and Pearson have noted, “the Dark Knight‟s identity 
has fluctuated over time and across media as multiple authors and fan 
communities competed over his definition” (183). Although I do refer to 
Tim Burton‟s Batman and Batman Returns, my argument centres on the Joel 
Schumacher films Batman Forever and Batman and Robin, and the 
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Christopher Nolan films Batman Begins and The Dark Knight as they offer 
two very distinct imaginings of the character. 
 
I pay particular attention to the Schumacher films for two reasons. Firstly, 
this is because they have been received almost entirely negatively by both 
the fan base and in academic writing. This has led to a lack of critical 
consideration. It is my contention that Batman Forever and Batman and 
Robin are heavily indebted to the socio-cultural moment in which they were 
produced, in which Queer concerns were prominent in academic and 
cultural discourse. This leads to the second reason, as I explore how critical 
discourse, namely psychiatrist Frederic Wertham‟s Seduction of the 
Innocent, has influenced the representation of the Batman. With reference to 
Will Brooker‟s Batman Unmasked, I explore how Wertham‟s discussion of 
his young male patients‟ sexual fantasies involving the Batman helped to 
circulate Queer readings of the character in popular discourse.  
 
It is in the Nolan films that the correlation to Deleuzoguattarian theory 
becomes its most clear. Because Nolan essentially „rebooted‟ the franchise 
with Batman Begins, he explores in detail the origins of the character and 
how and why Wayne chooses to embark on his crusade. The processes that 
Wayne undertakes are shown in detail. Although Burton and Schumacher 
both referred to the Batman origin story, neither director actually depicted 
his „transformation‟. Nolan spends much of Batman Begins showing Wayne 
developing his fighting skills and consulting with scientist Lucius Fox 
regarding combat equipment. I begin my analysis of these films with a 
discussion of Thomas Nagel‟s „What is it Like to be a Bat?‟ in order to 
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introduce ideas of Being, as I believe Nolan‟s Batman films specifically 
address the nature of Batman‟s subjectivity. This then leads to a 
consideration of the process that Wayne undertakes in becoming the 
Batman, which I argue is akin to Deleuze and Guattari‟s notion of 
becoming-animal, in this case, a becoming-bat. 
 
My analysis of Catwoman centres on Batman Returns and Catwoman. After 
demonstrating Bruce Wayne‟s becoming-bat, I explore the stages of 
becoming-cat that these films present. As Lori Brown has noted, becoming-
animal “is not a linking together of two distinct points” (264) but “results in 
the disappearance of these two discernable points, (and the) freeing from 
fixed form” (264 original emphasis). I argue that Catwoman is subject to 
this becoming-animal in a significantly different manner to the Batman. 
Although she does undergo a transition, she has become-animal at a 
molecular level and therefore, in a sense, continues to adhere to a fixed 
form. However, the Deleuzoguattarian frame remains relevant because this 
becoming in both films allows her to undergo further becomings and eschew 
certain societal codes imposed upon her. 
 
I argue that Pitof‟s and Burton‟s Catwoman are subject to this restriction for 
differing reasons. In relation to Burton‟s imagining of Catwoman, I have 
recourse to Priscilla Walton‟s argument that his depiction is dependent on 
„backlash‟ politics. However, rather than accepting Kyle‟s representation as 
a result of backlash politics or as further evidence for the backlash thesis, I 
argue that Kyle ultimately critiques the cultural phenomenon of the 
„backlash‟. My discussion of Pitof‟s Catwoman explores how the 
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representation of the Phillips/Catwoman characters corresponds to 
postfeminist discourse. Here I refer to Christina Lucia Stasia and her 
discussion of the postfeminist action film. I argue that the Deleuzoguattarian 
„frame‟ is still useful when considering the characterisation of Catwoman. 
The transition that she undergoes allows her to resist many of the societal 
codes and ways of being-perceptible that Deleuze and Guattari aim to resist 
with their philosophy of becoming. However, I also argue that the male 
body of Wayne/Batman has retained a privileged position which is open to 
the same kinds of experimentation and opportunity without the same risks 
that accompany the philosophy of becoming for the female-embodied 
subject. 
 
The Seduction of the Innocent and the „Gay Batman‟ 
 
 
 
It is common in scholarship and criticism that explores Batman to have 
recourse to psychiatrist Wertham‟s Seduction of the Innocent. Wertham‟s 
text is an exploration of the effects of comic books, specifically the violence 
and sexual imagery within them, on children and adolescents. The text 
largely pertains to horror and crime comics, and Wertham‟s major 
arguments are based on the belief that the mass media, namely comic books, 
television and movies, could incite children and teenagers to “imitate 
criminal acts” (Gilbert 9). Seduction of the Innocent proved an especially 
popular text, providing the “source material for a national crusade against 
violence in the media” (Gilbert 92) as Wertham “spoke to already existing 
fears about the effects of mass media on children” (9). It was the comic 
book in particular, however, that attracted the majority of Wertham‟s ire, 
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which James Gilbert attributes to the “special character of these 
publications” (97). Whereas films, television and radio were aimed at 
general audiences, the comic was aimed at a specifically young audience, 
and was, prior to the publication of Seduction of the Innocent and the 
subsequent enforcement of the Comics Code in 1954, subject to less 
regulation and censorship than these other mediums.    
 
But Seduction of the Innocent is also the text “which brought to light the 
„gay readings‟ of the [Batman] character which had previously been hidden” 
(Brooker 101). The discussion of Batman in Seduction of the Innocent 
appears over just four pages of the book, in which Wertham recounts the 
homosexual fantasies of a number of his young gay patients that involve the 
Batman and/or Robin.  His identification of the homoeroticism present 
between the residents of Wayne Manor remains one of his most famous 
pronouncements which, Brooker argues, has had a profound effect on the 
development of the character and series (161), not only in that it led to the 
„reheterosexualisation‟ (Medhurst 32) of the character in the immediate 
aftermath, but also that it helped to circulate these Queer readings in the 
cultural consciousness.  
 
Brooker notes that even despite the relatively small presence of Batman 
within Seduction of the Innocent, the discussion has been “narrowed down 
... to a single much-quoted paragraph” (101) which is as follows: 
 
Sometimes Batman ends up in bed injured and young Robin is 
shown sitting next to him. At home they lead an idyllic life. They are 
Bruce Wayne and „Dick‟ Grayson. Bruce Wayne is described as a 
“socialite” and the official relationship is that Dick is Bruce‟s ward. 
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They live in sumptuous quarters, with beautiful flowers in large 
vases, and have a butler, Alfred. Batman is sometimes shown in a 
dressing gown ... It is like a wish dream of two homosexuals living 
together. Sometimes they are shown on a couch, Bruce reclining and 
Dick sitting next to him, jacket off, collar open, and his hand on his 
friend‟s arm. (190) 
 
 
 
Wertham‟s discussion of homoeroticism in the Batman comics has been met 
with an almost universal disdain, though there is a certain paradox in this 
negative reaction. As Brooker notes, Wertham has been accused of 
homophobia from critics writing from a Queer perspective, and derided by 
the (largely homophobic) fan base for daring to suggest that Batman could 
be identified as a homosexual.   
 
Andy Medhurst, in his article „Batman, Deviance and Camp‟ (1991), takes 
particular objection to Wertham‟s comments, describing them as 
symptomatic of his “homophobia” and “bigotry” (26), and comments that 
his ideas, particularly concerning the „origins‟ of homosexuality, were 
“crazed” (27). In particular, Medhurst lambasts Wertham for suggesting that 
male homosexuality resulted from a “disdain for girls” (Wertham 188). 
Medhurst reads Wertham as implying that homosexuality is intrinsically 
linked to misogyny, and states that “the implications of this are 
breathtaking” (25). Brooker is, however, much more sympathetic to 
Wertham and takes a far more objective stance when discussing Seduction 
of the Innocent. Brooker is intent on contextualising Wertham and 
emphasises the cultural climate in which Seduction of the Innocent was 
published. The accusation of audacity that Medhurst throws at Wertham 
occurs as Medhurst “neglects to recognise” that this way of thinking about 
homosexuality was “a product of its time, and a mild echo of the official 
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government line” (Brooker 122). Gilbert also recognises that in general 
“Wertham‟s personal politics were nothing if not hostile to the conservative 
agenda of many of his ardent admirers” (106). 
 
But Brooker also highlights a worrying contradiction in the work of 
Medhurst, which is similarly present in Johnson‟s „Holy Homophobia!‟. 
Medhurst, and Johnson to a lesser extent, seems to champion privileged 
points of view for reading and discussing the homoerotic subtext of Batman 
texts. Both similarly criticise Wertham for his analysis in the paragraph 
quoted above. Medhurst responds to Wertham‟s reading of the homoerotic 
subtext as follows:  
 
To avoid being thought queer by Wertham, Bruce and Dick should 
have done the following: never show concern if the other is hurt, live 
in a shack, only have ugly flowers in small vases, call the butler 
„Chip‟ or „Joe‟ ... never share a couch ... and never, ever, wear a 
dressing gown. (151) 
 
 
Echoing Medhurst, Johnson, deriding Wertham, comments that, “obviously, 
they must be fags: otherwise they‟d have a butler named „Butch‟, live in 
cramped quarters littered with beer-cans, wouldn‟t show concern for one 
another‟s injuries or be caught dead in a dressing gown” (original 
emphasis). Nikki Sullivan also recognises this contradiction. She notes that 
Wertham highlights what “we might think of as queer moments or queer 
signifiers” but that “as much as Werther‟s [sic] politics are opposed to 
Johnson‟s, her task could be described similarly” (194). Although 
Wertham‟s expression of the Queer signifiers is perhaps clumsy, it remains 
that he is responding to his patients‟ homoerotic/homosexual fantasies 
surrounding the Wayne household and repeats these fantasies fairly 
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objectively. It is unusual that when Wertham reads a homoerotic subtext 
abounding in Wayne Manor that it is classified as homophobic „finger-
pointing‟. However, others, namely Medhurst, Johnson and the interviewees 
freely comment upon it without such censure. As Brooker notes, “for 
Wertham‟s patient to pick up signs of gayness from a Batman comic is 
„rather moving‟; for Wertham to perform the same reading himself earns 
him the moniker „Doctor Doom‟” (126-7).  
 
Brooker and Medhurst agree that perhaps without Wertham‟s comments 
regarding the relationship between the Batman and Robin, the character may 
well have evolved entirely differently. Although Brooker disagrees, 
Medhurst believes the camp aesthetic of the ABC series to be a partial 
reaction to Wertham‟s discussion of the Queer subtext. But Brooker does 
agree that “attempting to deny and censor the „gay Batman‟ only made this 
interpretation more visible; accepting it, and drawing it into the mainstream 
portrayal of the hero as one facet of his cultural persona” (169). Indeed, the 
popularity of Seduction itself ensured that these Queer readings circulated 
further in culture.  
 
Adrian Brody aims to dismiss discussion of the homoerotic subtext in 
Batman and Robin narratives as to him “Dr. Wertham seems all wrong” 
(176). To Brody, the “issue of Batman is not one of sexual orientation” 
because “there is a lack of sexual interest” which is “sublimated into his 
rage and crime fighting” (176). However, Brody seems completely 
oblivious to the concepts of repression and displacement. But it is not a 
question of Wertham being right or wrong regarding the sexuality of the 
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Batman, as this is indeed in many ways a pointless dispute. Wertham, as 
Brody recognises, relates a “number of clinical anecdotes” (176) about his 
male patients who legitimately see the Batman as an object of homoerotic 
contemplation. As Brooker notes, it “seems hardly surprising that the boys 
interviewed by Wertham, their own lives dominated by the very real fear of 
discovery and its consequences, should have found some appeal and even 
solace in Batman‟s fantasy world” (138). Brody suggests that the inclusion 
of the Robin character, whom he describes as “colourful” (176), was 
undertaken to “brighten up the gloomy dark Batman (or to) serve as a source 
of identification for young adolescents” (176). Robin was most probably not 
specifically or consciously intended by Batman‟s creators to be a source of 
homoerotic identification for young men, and the intent behind his creation 
does not deny the fact that young men did utilise him in this manner. 
Although the comics may not encourage these readings, they do clearly 
facilitate them, and this is a fact that Wertham brought to light. 
 
I do not, however, wish to dwell on arguments regarding the sexuality of 
Batman and Robin, or indeed whether or not Wertham‟s text is homophobic. 
I would agree with Brooker when he describes Wertham‟s views as naive 
and „of their time‟, but disagree with Medhurst that Wertham was 
instigating a „witch-hunt‟. Indeed, the comments were a small part of a 
larger project which was “more concerned with violence than 
homosexuality” (Gilbert 93). Wertham, as Brooker also comments, executes 
a “measured concern” as he “understands that in a climate where 
homosexuality is a great taboo, gay fantasies might be a source of worry for 
young men” (112). Brooker also comments that: 
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Some forty-five years since Seduction of the Innocent, it seems that 
Batman‟s producers may also be in the process of accepting that an 
edge of homoeroticism is integral to Batman‟s relationship with his 
sidekick, just as an element of camp is invoked, for many readers, by 
his costume alone. The reading identified by Wertham has been 
circulating for almost five decades now, and Batman himself has 
only been around for six. (170) 
 
 
What is of importance to this study is the effect that Wertham‟s discussion 
has had on the development of the character of Batman and his subsequent 
representation in film. It is my contention that Wertham‟s identification and 
widespread dissemination of the homoerotic subtexts that may have been 
read in Batman literature of that time has influenced the aesthetic and 
themes of subsequent Batman media. This is particularly clear in the ABC 
television series, which, as we shall see, in turn influenced the Joel 
Schumacher films.  
 
 
Schumacher‟s Batman 
 
 
 
The process of „reheterosexualisation‟ that Medhurst identifies is evident in 
Tim Burton‟s Batman, the first of his two films featuring the eponymous 
character. As Medhurst notes, “if one wants to take Batman as a Real Man, 
the biggest stumbling block has always been Robin” (32). Philip Orr has 
argued that Burton chose to “drop the anoedipal sexual identity of the „Dark 
Knight‟” (179). Orr acknowledges the process of reheterosexualisation 
described by Medhurst and notes that this may be a “simple appeal to a 
popular audience‟s conventional notions of romance” (179). Batman 
appears without his sidekick in the film and, contrary to previous 
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imaginings of the Bruce Wayne/Batman character as a chaste individual, 
Batman features a romantic interest for him in the form of Vicki Vale, a 
photojournalist. This, Brooker notes, is “clearly antithetical to the Bat-
Bible‟s ruling that Batman is celibate” (290) and thus stands out as 
deliberate ploy to dispel the homoeroticism that has permeated Batman 
discourse since Wertham‟s Seduction of the Innocent and the ABC series. 
 
However, Joel Schumacher‟s imagining of the character is vastly different 
to that of Burton. He returned to the camp, colourful style of the ABC 
series, incorporating “elements of the 1960s TV Batman” (Brooker 178). He 
also reintroduced Dick Grayson/Robin as a supporting character. 
Schumacher makes numerous, at times rather crass, references to the show 
throughout the film. These are sometimes visual, for example Dick 
Grayson/Robin is first shown performing as part of a trapeze act, „The 
Flying Graysons‟, who are all wearing similar red, green and yellow 
costumes to that sported by Burt Ward‟s Robin in the series (Figure 20). 
They also appear in the script: when Batman and Robin attempt to rescue 
Batman/Wayne‟s romantic interest Chase Meridian (Nicole Kidman) from 
the Riddler (Jim Carrey) and Two-Face (Tommy Lee Jones), Robin declares 
“holy rusted metal Batman!” as he steps onto the off-shore fortress. When 
Batman reacts with confusion, Robin explains that they are stood on some 
holey, rusted metal. This is indeed included with the intention to raise a 
laugh, as it makes reference to the somewhat absurd practice of Burt Ward‟s 
Robin to repeatedly declare “holy ...” at every available opportunity. To 
Brooker, this indicates that “this facet of the character may be gaining a 
degree of acceptance” (178). 
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Brooker argues that Wertham‟s reading of the homoerotic undertones of the 
Dynamic Duo‟s adventures has been “taken up again by gay audiences in a 
less condemnatory social context, and in turn has been incorporated by the 
producers of mainstream Batman films” (103). This is nowhere so evident 
than in Schumacher‟s two films, which Brooker notes have “played a major 
part in incorporating the „gay Batman‟ reading into official – that is Warner 
Brothers-sanctioned – portrayals of the character” (166). 
 
Although it is perhaps misleading to say that Val Kilmer‟s body is 
specifically more eroticised than Michael Keaton‟s, it is definitely more 
exposed, which itself can encourage erotic contemplation. Schumacher 
opens Batman Forever by showing Wayne changing into the Batman 
costume. Schumacher shows this in a fragmented manner akin to the model 
of fetishisation identified by Mulvey in „Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema‟. He mainly uses medium shots that quickly zoom in to close-ups of 
various parts of Wayne‟s anatomy. Although this may not work in the same 
way psychically, it remains the case that Schumacher is using a cinematic 
code traditionally associated with filming the female body and putting it to 
work on the male body. That this attention is paid to his buttocks and crotch 
is reminiscent of Wertham‟s comments regarding the display of the 
“muscular male supertype, whose primary sex characteristics are usually 
well-emphasised” (188). He sees this figure as the “object of homoerotic 
sexual curiosity and stimulation” (188) and challenges Christina Lucia 
Stasia‟s assertion that “the male action hero is objectified, but the camera 
focuses on his muscles, not on his groin” (243).  
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Schumacher‟s villains in Batman Forever, the Riddler and Two-Face, also 
return to the high camp of the series, but here function as „bad camp‟ which, 
as Johnson argues, draws attention “away from the homoerotic electricity 
between the heroes” and works to “keep queerness and villainy aligned”. 
Roz Kaveney has also identified a “weird homoeroticism” between the two 
villains as a “progressively more sequined Carrey entwines himself around 
his partner in crime” (Superheroes! 245). It is his status as villain which 
excuses him, as Johnson (1995) explains, “prancing around in a diamond 
tiara and skin-tight green unitard exclaiming „spank me!‟”. 
 
Freya Johnson, in her article „Holy Homosexuality Batman!‟ (1995), also 
berates Wertham, calling The Seduction of the Innocent a “hilariously 
paranoiac document of homophobic panic”. Johnson asks how Schumacher 
managed to “get away with turning loose so many queer signifiers” that they 
“float freely about in Warner Brothers‟ biggest asset?” Considering the 
considerable efforts made by Warner Brothers and Tim Burton to the 
contrary, the return to the camp aesthetic associated with Batman seems 
unusual in itself. Schumacher, she suggests, „gets away‟ with returning to 
the camp aesthetic by “turning the queer subtext hidden beneath the surface 
of many Batman representations into an overtly queer supratext that goes 
right over the head of the mainstream viewing audience”. The film is so 
steeped in Queer signification that it “would be inaccurate to call it a 
subtext”. Johnson pays particular attention to Dick Grayson/Robin‟s (Chris 
O‟Donnell) appearance (Figure 21): “with his earring, haircut and leather 
jacket Chris O‟Donnell looks like he‟s just come straight from an ACT UP 
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meeting”. The signifiers of his costuming have led other commentators to 
deduce similar readings. Matthew Sweet commented too that he looked 
“like Wayne Manor‟s resident catamite”. Although both Johnson and Sweet 
are responding to a stereotype of homosexual masculinity, they are united in 
assuming that the character may purposely function in this way.  
 
The film does, however, employ a romantic interest for Wayne, in the form 
of Dr. Chase Meridian, a criminal psychologist employed by the Gotham 
Police Department because she is an expert in „dual personalities‟. She has 
been described by Roz Kaveney as a “vapid heroine” and “mildly depraved” 
as she displays a sexual interest in the Batman as a fetish (Superheroes! 
245). Her role in the film is largely perfunctory: she first appears when she 
is introduced by Commissioner Gordon to Batman as he arrives at a bank 
that Two-Face is trying to rob. However, she is only seen in a professional 
setting once more, when Bruce Wayne visits her after he receives the second 
of Nygma/The Riddler‟s riddles. It is the latter meeting where Wayne asks 
her to accompany him on a date to the circus, and she is henceforth only 
seen in scenes as Wayne‟s romantic partner or when she is held captive by 
the Riddler and Two-Face.  
 
The relationship between Wayne and Meridian is largely sterile. Unlike the 
relationship between Catwoman/Kyle and Batman/Wayne in Returns, there 
is little chemistry between Meridian and Batman/Wayne. Johnson raises two 
important points with regard to the use of Val Kilmer‟s body: 
 
Val Kilmer‟s body is exposed and eroticized only in the scenes with 
O‟Donnell (as he wanders out of the shower bare-chested in [a] 
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towel, is treated for injuries, or puts on the new bat-suit while the 
image of his butt-cleavage fills the screen). During the scenes with 
Nicole Kidman he remains fully clothed as the camera coyly pans 
down only as far as the top of his chest at most: her body entirely 
escapes the emblematic „male gaze‟ of cinema and her breasts or 
legs never once fill the screen. 
 
 
There is clearly a great difference in the imagining of Wayne‟s relationship 
with Alfred in Burton‟s films and Schumacher‟s films. As Johnson notes, 
Wayne is shown semi-naked with Alfred tending to his wounded torso 
(Figure 22). In Burton‟s films, Wayne is shown to treat his own injuries, for 
example, after an altercation with Catwoman in Batman Returns, he is sat 
alone, and shown to contact Alfred only for some antiseptic.  
 
Schumacher, like Burton before him, also chose to include sections of the 
Batman‟s origin story in a light exploration of his psychology. Wayne 
repeatedly flashes back to the day of his parents‟ funeral. Schumacher 
zooms in to a close-up of Wayne and cuts to a collection of photographs of 
the Wayne family. He then cuts to a flashback of the Wayne family in an 
alleyway in Gotham. Schumacher does not show Thomas (Michael 
Scranton) and Martha Wayne (Eileen Seeley) actually being shot, but cuts 
between fragments of images that imply their demise. After a shadowy man 
is shown backlit through smoke, we cut to the young Bruce Wayne (Ramsey 
Ellis) walking through a chapel surveying his parents‟ coffins. In contrast to 
Burton‟s flashbacks, this appears to be more dream-like. Wayne is awoken 
from a trance by Alfred. Wayne is clearly befuddled, drawing comparison 
between his own experience and that of Grayson, in declaring “it‟s 
happening again ... Two-Face killed his parents”. 
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Wayne explains to Meridian that he does not clearly remember the attack on 
his parents, but what he does remember comes in “dreams and flashes” that 
are now coming to him when he is awake. She explains to him that he is 
describing “repressed memories ... images of a forgotten pain that‟s trying 
to resurface”. Her populist Freudian theorising of the mind overtly links 
Batman‟s origin story to psychoanalytic theories of the repressed. That this 
appears in conjunction with the death of his parents also links this to the 
Oedipus complex, and perhaps the „forgotten pain‟ of castration. However, 
the Queer „supratext‟ suggests that it is something else that is repressed, 
namely Wayne‟s potential desire for Robin.  
 
Roz Kaveney notes that, “it is such a cliché of discussions of superhero 
films that Batman and Robin represents some kind of nadir, certainly for 
that franchise, and arguably for that genre” (245). This is certainly true, with 
critics such as Kim Newman claiming that it is “notable only for putting an 
end to the 1990s wave of the superhero franchise” („Cape Fear‟ 20). 
Admittedly, the film was both a commercial and critical failure, drawing 
particular ire from the fan base (Brooker 294-307). This being the case, 
however, Kaveney searches for “arguments for its rehabilitation” as there is 
“floridity to its badness that makes it ... sheerly enjoyable” (246). But I 
argue that Batman and Robin is not without its graces and moments of 
complexity which lend it to critical analysis, not purely for its „badness‟ but 
for its progressive acknowledgment of Queer desire and how this has been 
incorporated into mainstream film.  
 
Green 195 
 
There are moments which have been overlooked almost entirely that make 
Batman and Robin not only critically interesting, but also transgressive and 
progressive. Through various means such as visual techniques, his mise-en-
scene, and intertextual references, Schumacher anticipates and encourages a 
number of differing viewing positions and desires. He is clearly engaging in 
Queer discourse, offering the male body both as erotic object and spectacle 
through fragmented, fetishised display. It would be inaccurate to claim that 
this was purely for the gratification of a gay male audience. 
 
If Johnson had correctly identified a Queer „supratext‟ in Batman Forever, it 
was intensified in Batman and Robin with Schumacher even more overtly 
engaging in Queer. Like Forever, it also utilises the camp aesthetic of the 
ABC series. Kaveney, however, does not view this as a successful tactic, 
stating that “Batman and Robin tries to recapture the campy archness of the 
1960s television show, but has a catchpenny nastiness that deprives it of the 
innocence that went with that camp” (246).  
 
Schumacher opens the film in a similar manner to Batman Forever by 
showing Wayne and Grayson dressing in response to a distress call from 
Commissioner Gordon. Schumacher uses the same technique that he uses in 
Batman Forever, zooming in from medium shots to close-ups of various 
parts of their anatomies. However, here far more attention is encouraged to 
be paid to both Batman‟s and Robin‟s buttocks and crotches, with the 
camera settling on both areas for longer amounts of time than in the 
previous film. The Batman and Robin costumes are eroticised/fetishised to 
an even greater degree in this later film. Schumacher, inspired by Ancient 
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Greek sculptures of the male form, chose to adorn the Batman and Robin 
body armour with nipples (Figure 23) which further adds to the 
sexualisation of the costume and thus the Batman.  
 
As noted earlier, Medhurst has claimed that the inclusion of Batwoman and 
Batgirl in the 1950s comics had been the result of the disavowal of 
homoerotic content due to Wertham‟s project („Batman, Deviance and 
Camp‟ 28). Batman and Robin features three female characters that seem to 
seek to simultaneously assert and undermine the two protagonists‟ 
heterosexuality. These take the form of three love interests: Julie Madison 
(Elle MacPherson), who is romantically linked to Wayne; Barbara 
Wilson/Batgirl (Alicia Silverstone), in whom Grayson is shown to have a 
passing interest; and the villainess Pamela Isley/Poison Ivy (Uma Thurman). 
Both characters are not shown, akin to Chase Meridian before them, in any 
real depth. As Newman notes, Madison was introduced in the DC comic 
books as Batman‟s first love interest and fiancée and describes 
MacPherson‟s performance as “unmemorable” („Cape Fear‟ 20). 
 
The Madison character in particular has very little function in the narrative 
and remains, ultimately, completely passive. Despite their sometimes 
problematic presentation, Vicki Vale and Chase Meridian are at least 
supposed to be both professional women and respected in their fields, and 
have a role in the narrative trajectory of each film. Although both characters 
are eventually captured and used to lure Batman to potential peril, there is at 
least some purpose to their presence in the story. Selena Kyle is also a 
professional, albeit a somewhat inept one in the early stages of the film. Her 
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alter-ego Catwoman commands a significant amount of screen time and is 
an incredibly powerful and memorable character. Madison‟s role is, 
however, entirely superficial. She appears only three times in the film: on 
Wayne‟s arm at two functions and once when they are having dinner. 
During this dinner they have the following conversation: 
 
 
Madison:  Bruce ... we‟ve been going out for over a year now, 
and, okay, here goes ... I want to spend the rest of my 
life with you. 
Wayne: Julie, I‟m not the marrying kind. There are things 
about me that you wouldn‟t understand. 
Madison: I know you‟re a dedicated bachelor. I know you‟ve 
had your wild nights. 
Wayne: „Wild‟ doesn‟t ... doesn‟t quite cover it. 
 
 
 
Throughout the exchange, Wayne appears wholly uncomfortable, staring at 
the table rather than making eye contact and clearing his throat in order to 
interrupt. Wayne is not presented as having any real interest in Madison 
other than to have her appear with him in public and does not show her any 
affection or declare any real romantic intentions towards her. 
 
There is ample room during this exchange for a Queer reading. Madison 
appears to function, both diegetically and extra-diegetically, as a tool purely 
to affirm Wayne‟s heterosexuality and deny any homosexual connotations 
previously associated with the characters. As Brooker has noted in fan 
reactions, readings of the Batman‟s rumoured homosexuality are often 
solely dismissed on “dating women” (241). This is a complex scenario 
which is not solely explained by a reading of Madison as a character that is 
included to disavow queer readings. I would argue that her superficiality as 
a romantic interest deliberately encourages a Queer reading in this case. The 
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romantic interests provided for Wayne/Batman in the previous films have 
all been a part of the narrative, albeit a passive part. Madison, in 
comparison, is presented as superfluous, which brings into question 
Wayne‟s and Schumacher‟s intention towards her. It is clear that Wayne 
does not want to commit to Madison. Although this may be explained by his 
commitment to the Batman figure and fighting crime on the streets of 
Gotham, there may well be another reason, namely his homosexuality, as to 
why he is „not the marrying kind.‟ The things about him that she would not 
understand could be read as his homosexual desires, his desire even for 
Robin. His protestations are also suggestive; we wonder exactly what he has 
been getting up to when he says that „wild doesn‟t quite cover it‟. However, 
the script clearly also gives opportunity for the viewer to choose a more 
„legitimate‟ interpretation. The reference to „wild nights‟ associates Wayne 
with wildlife, which may consequently lead the viewer to consider this as a 
reference to the animalistic, and thus his dual role as the Batman. 
 
There is, I think, a certain playfulness in Schumacher‟s inclusion of 
Madison as a character and his decision not to cast her specifically as 
Wayne‟s fiancée. She is offered on a superficial level as a character to 
disavow the homoeroticism that abounds in both the Wayne household and 
Schumacher‟s own filmic representation of Batman‟s world. There is 
perhaps an element of wanting to be recognised as „protesting too much‟. 
Schumacher is clearly engaging with the camp and Queer associations that 
Batman has accrued throughout his history, and there is an extent to which 
these unconvincing relationships can contribute to a Queer reading. Brooker 
has also recognised this possibility when discussing the emergence of 
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Batwoman and Batgirl as heterosexual romances in the post-Code comics: 
“the Dynamic Duo had simply been obliged to become more straight-acting, 
but the genuine romance would still have been intact and obvious, for those 
who wished to see it” (156).  
 
Poison Ivy also functions similarly to characters that Medhurst notes in the 
ABC series and the 1966 film as posing the „threat of heterosexuality‟. The 
film features Catwoman (Lee Meriweather) in disguise as Kitka, the object 
of Bruce Wayne‟s affections. Medhurst describes this as the “threat of 
heterosexuality” which causes “all manner of problems” (31) for the 
Dynamic Duo. In Batman: The Movie, Catwoman is working alongside the 
Penguin, the Riddler and the Joker as part of a criminal syndicate attempting 
to take over the world. In order to do so they plan to lure Batman into a trap 
by kidnapping Bruce Wayne, unaware of his dual identity.  
 
As a character, Ivy is also greatly indebted to the Selena Kyle/Catwoman 
character of Batman Returns, but remains a “thin retread of the mousiness 
and demented sexiness of Michelle Pfeiffer‟s Catwoman” (Kaveney 
Superheroes! 246). Their origins are similar: they are both murdered by 
their male superiors after discovering their dastardly plans and are 
resurrected. In Isley‟s case, she discovers her boss, Jason Woodrue (John 
Glover), is using the venoms that she is formulating to furnish plants with 
their own natural defences in order to create a serum which when 
administered to a human, creates the „ultimate soldier‟. Instead of being 
resurrected by cats as in the case of Kyle, Isley is brought back because of 
the venoms in the soil where she fell. Similarly to Kyle, she becomes more 
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sexually alluring and confident as Isley, with Woodrue attempting to seduce 
her. 
 
It is both Batman‟s and Robin‟s infatuation with Ivy, caused not by their 
natural desires but by her drugging them with her „pheromone dust‟, that is 
the cause of much of the action in the latter part of the film. However, 
Poison Ivy represents a considerably stronger „threat of heterosexuality‟ 
than Kitka. The two characters become rivals for her affections, nearly 
causing them to part company.  Indeed, the effects of this drug are shown to 
affect Wayne in her absence during the exchange with Madison above as he 
begins to hallucinate kissing Ivy instead of Madison. This also serves to 
undermine his relationship with Madison even further. Poison Ivy marks the 
threat of heterosexuality in multiple ways. Not only does she cause tension 
between the duo, but her sexual allure is, literally, deadly. As a result of her 
accident she has a poisonous kiss, which she uses initially uses to dispose of 
Woodrue (mimicking the scene in Returns where Catwoman/Kyle kills 
Shreck) and in attempting to kill Robin.  
 
Ivy eventually targets the duo, and attends „The Flower Ball‟ - the charity 
auction of the Wayne diamonds that is being used as bate to lure Freeze. 
There are direct comparisons to be made between Ivy‟s appearance here and 
Marlene Dietrich‟s performance of „Hot Voodoo‟ in Blonde Venus (Josef 
von Sternberg, 1932), and indeed the two scenes as a whole. Both scenes 
use a jazz soundtrack with screeching horns, and feature several similar 
aspects in their mise-en-scene. The Flower Ball sequence begins by 
focussing on a troupe of male tribal dancers, who although considerably 
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more dynamic, bear a striking resemblance to the female dancers from the 
Hot Voodoo sequence. This is an interesting point of departure as it is now 
the male body that is on display as spectacle. It is the female body that has 
traditionally been wrongly associated with spectacle, often being displayed 
in sequences that do not forward narrative progression. This is an obvious 
subversion for a film which is so clearly and playfully engaging with Queer 
discourse surrounding the Batman and his sidekick.  
 
The female dancers in Venus dance around a gorilla which is eventually 
revealed to be Dietrich in a costume. The gorilla takes centre stage and 
begins to remove the costume, beginning with the hands and followed by 
the head (Figure 24). Dietrich then puts on a blonde wig and proceeds to 
remove the remainder of the costume. This reveals a mass of jewellery and a 
dress adorned with sequins and feathers. She then gives a rather static 
performance of „Hot Voodoo‟, with arms akimbo before the gaze of Nick 
Townsend (Cary Grant). 
 
As the auctioneers open bidding in the Flower Ball sequence of Batman and 
Robin, a gorilla moves to a prominent place in the mise-en-scene. The music 
changes tempo and the room of people turns to observe. In a manner 
directly mirroring Dietrich in Blonde Venus, we see Ivy remove the 
costume, beginning with the hands of the suit and followed by the head 
(Figure 25). As she removes the head, Schumacher cuts to Batman and 
Robin gazing up her, mirroring von Sternberg‟s cut to Townsend/Grant. 
This manoeuvre, I suggest, is not an innocent one when considering the 
mirroring Schumacher has included throughout the scene.  
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In Blonde Venus, Dietrich is the subject of the gaze of Cary Grant. 
Schumacher places Batman and Robin literally in a similar position to Grant 
in the Flower Ball sequence, gazing at the gorilla-suited Ivy, and with Ivy 
directly corresponding to Dietrich. One then is encouraged to align Batman 
and Robin with Townsend/Grant. After all, rumours surrounding the 
Dynamic Duo‟s sexuality have also persisted for the last half-century. It is 
clear that this scene is heavily referencing Venus and that Schumacher is 
aligning Dietrich with Ivy and Grant with Batman and Robin. This is, 
however, a far more obscure reference than many of Schumacher‟s other 
allusions. Medhurst recognises these as being as wide ranging as Nosferatu 
(1922) and Rebel Without a Cause (1955) to The Lost World: Jurassic Park 
(1997), which was Batman and Robin‟s “main marketplace rival” („Batman 
and Robin‟ 40) in the summer of 1997. It is unlikely the pre-teen audience – 
one large section of the projected audience – would be able to recognise or 
understand this sequence to be referencing von Sternberg‟s film.   
 
Batgirl/Barbara Pennyworth is also initially presented as an erotic object. 
Her first appearance in the film presents her as such. She is ringing on the 
doorbell at Wayne Manor and an ailing Alfred fails to attend to it. Barbara 
becomes frustrated at waiting and climbs up to see if there is a key kept on 
the doorframe. Grayson goes to answer the door in Alfred‟s place, and 
opens it to be greeted by the sight of her bare legs. He cocks his head up, 
perhaps looking up her short, black pleated skirt, and says “please be 
looking for me”. However, after opening relations between the two to 
provide space for a romantic coupling, Schumacher chooses not to pursue a 
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romance between the pair. Again, this is a relationship that may 
simultaneously both confirm and deny homoerotic readings. 
 
Schumacher deliberately seems to be acknowledging Wertham‟s comments 
regarding the Wayne household. To refer to Wertham‟s often quoted 
passage again, Schumacher seems to utilise his description of the 
homosexual „wish dream‟, particularly in this film, though this is not to say 
that Forever does not engage with the text. One scene in this film shows 
Batman wearing a long, dark grey dressing gown. The gown has not only 
been a point of interest to Wertham, but has also been noted by Johnson and 
Medhurst. Although it is clearly ridiculous to equate gown-wearing with 
homosexuality, Schumacher may well be referencing the infamous 
paragraph from Wertham‟s Seduction of the Innocent. This scene shows 
Robin trying to leave Wayne Manor in response to Poison Ivy‟s Robin „call‟ 
– she has seduced Commissioner Gordon and switched the Bat signal to a 
Robin signal. During their exchange Wayne makes some of the most 
suggestive comments of the film regarding their „partnership‟. The mise-en-
scene of Wayne Manor also celebrates the male form, and there are statues 
of naked male torsos scattered randomly in the background in scenes 
featuring the mansion (Figure 26). 
 
What is it like to be Batman? 
 
 
 
In 1974 Thomas Nagel published his article „What is it Like to be a Bat?‟ 
The article is essentially a rebuttal of reductivist philosophies of the mind 
that tended to overlook consciousness and oversimplify the mind/body 
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relation. Nagel argues that there is no escaping „experience‟: our position as 
human beings and the physical construction of our own minds and bodies 
leads us to have a specific kind of experience which restricts our potential 
comprehension of alternative ways of being and kinds of subjectivity. He 
demonstrates this in his study using the bat as an example of a creature 
which, as a mammal, has certain biological links to humanity but, in other 
senses, is entirely “alien” (438). 
 
Nagel uses the bat for empirical reasons, as opposed to mythic reasons, as 
he is not trying to relate his discussion to any wider cultural referents. He is 
not interested in the bat which has “long been a symbol of superstition and 
folklore” (Brody 174). He recognises that “conscious experience is a 
widespread phenomenon” that “no doubt occurs in countless forms totally 
unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the 
universe” (436). His formulation of subjectivity itself, then, is dependent on 
this idea of the uniqueness of consciousness: “fundamentally an organism 
has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to 
be that organism – something it is like for the organism” (436). As David 
Pugmire explains, “Nagel offers to explain this condition of being host to 
conscious experience as the organism‟s having a point of view on the world, 
a point of view which is its own and nothing else‟s” (207).  
 
However, the bat is not an entirely arbitrary choice of creature, although 
Nagel‟s argument pertains to all forms of consciousness. He explains that he 
chose “bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far 
down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is 
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any experience there at all” (438). Nagel is particularly interested in using 
the experience of the bat as an example because he considers the scientific 
evidence that human scientists had amassed regarding the physicality of the 
bat‟s experience and perception to be considerably different from our own: 
 
We know that most bats ... perceive the external world primarily by 
sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from object within 
range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. 
Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the 
subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to 
make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and 
texture comparable to those we make by vision. (438) 
 
 
 
One of the specificities of bats‟ experience for Nagel‟s argument is indeed 
bat sonar, which he describes as being “not similar in its operation to any 
sense we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectivity like 
anything we can experience or imagine” (438, my emphasis). 
 
Nagel remains resolute that human consciousness is a barrier that prevents 
the subject from truly understanding the consciousness of another species, 
stating that “our own experience provides the basic material for our 
imagination, whose range is therefore limited” (439). Nothing can be done 
to alter this: 
 
 
It will not help to try and imagine that one has webbing on one‟s 
arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching 
insects in one‟s mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives 
the surrounding world by a system of reflected and high-frequency 
sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by 
one‟s feet in an attic. (439) 
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For Nagel, this behaviour would reveal nothing to the human subject other 
than what it is like for the human subject to behave in a similar manner to 
the bat. It is the question of what the state of being a bat is like that is the 
issue in Nagel‟s article. Behaving like a bat in this manner does not in any 
way alter the “fundamental structure” (439) that Nagel considers to 
determine the nature of our conscious experience, and therefore our 
subjectivity. 
 
David Pugmire does not disagree with Nagel‟s central thesis, but critiques 
Nagel‟s imagining of subjectivity and point-of-view. Quoting Rosie Wilkes, 
who would “deny what is like to be me, or human, or female” (Wilkes 240), 
Pugmire asserts that if, as Nagel claims, all experience is subjective, then 
one cannot truly know what it is like to be anything in itself. We cannot 
know what it is like to be human as opposed to a bat, precisely because we 
do not know what it is like to be a bat. We do not know the specificities of 
our own being.  
 
It is necessary for me here to defend the Batman, as represented in film, as a 
figure of philosophical interest. The Batman surely adheres to Nagel‟s 
description of the human subject behaving like a bat. For example, during 
one scene in Burton‟s Batman, the protagonist (Michael Keaton) is shown to 
be hanging upside down in his bedroom with his arms crossed across his 
chest (Figure 27). During this scene Wayne‟s romantic partner, Vicki Vale 
(Kim Basinger), is shown to wake up, which implies that like the bat he 
leads a nocturnal existence. All of the films show the Batman using a black 
cape which has the appearance of wings. However, as will be discussed 
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later, the cape has begun to be used as wings in Batman Begins and The 
Dark Knight. These actions do not lead us in any way to believe the figure 
has any alternate experience other than that of a human behaving as a bat. 
 
The character of Batman has had a long and complex history throughout a 
variety of popular media. Naturally, the character has evolved since its 
beginnings as a comic book character seventy years ago. What is of import 
for this study is how the filmic representation of the Batman has shifted 
throughout the Warner Brothers franchise. As we shall see, the figure has 
undergone several changes. I argue that as the technologies of both film-
making and the diegetic world of the Batman have evolved, Wayne‟s 
interaction with technology as the Batman has become more complex. 
Nolan‟s films imagine the character of Wayne/Batman considerably 
differently to both Burton‟s and Schumacher‟s visions. As we shall see, 
Batman evolves from a character that behaves like a bat to one that, through 
his use of technology seen in the later films, is more adequately described as 
being in a state of becoming. 
 
Nagel‟s arguments regarding subjectivity are firmly rooted in the Western 
ontological tradition. As the very title of his article implies, his concern is 
Being and how we can experience this being, and what we can experience 
of this being. The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze offers a radically different 
view which would have ontology be creative rather than a matter of 
discovery. Whereas Todd May explains that, as a study of „being‟, 
“traditional ontology would like to match its concepts to what there is” (20), 
Deleuze is concerned with what can become, and what we have the potential 
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to do. What Nagel succeeds in doing in his article is to give some basis to 
the idea that “there is something it is like to be a particular thing” (Brown 
31). It is this idea that there is something that it is like to be a bat which is 
distinct from human perception and experience that roots the discussion of 
Nolan‟s Batman. Nolan has, I argue, delivered a presentation of the 
character which challenges these notions of being.  
 
Nolan‟s Batman 
 
Mark Fisher has stated that “Nolan‟s revisiting of Batman is not a re-
invention but a reclaiming of the myth, a grand synthesis that draws on the 
whole history of the character”. Although Fisher is correct in surmising that 
Nolan‟s Batman is greatly indebted to previous incarnations of the 
character, both thematically and to a lesser extent aesthetically, he is 
incorrect in claiming that Nolan‟s visualisation „draws from the whole 
history‟. Nolan quite explicitly does not engage with the camp Batman 
exemplified in the ABC series and the Schumacher films discussed above. 
This is largely due to the perceived failures of Batman and Robin, which the 
“studio itself realized it had taken the camp too far” (Duffy). But there is 
also less room provided for Queer readings as Batman again has undergone 
„reheterosexualisation‟.  
 
In his two Batman films to date, Christopher Nolan clearly presents us with 
a Body without Organs (BwO). This BwO is, like the Batman, not fixed and 
static, but as Deleuze and Guattari explain, “You never reach the Body 
without Organs, you can‟t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” 
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(A Thousand Plateaus 150). This body is not constrained by what it does, it 
not reducible to the organs that it has and what functions they fulfil. Rather 
what is of interest to Deleuze and Guattari is what the body has potential to 
do. The BwO is not whole and complete, it is a collection of independent 
parts that interact with things in the world around it to create new 
connections and „assemblages‟. 
 
Both Claire Colebrook and Todd May use as an example the machinic 
connection between the human body and the bicycle. Colebrook notes how 
the bicycle as an object is without “end or intention” and that “it only works 
when it is connected with another „machine‟ such as the human body” 
(Gilles Deleuze 56). May continues, “the bicycle-body is another machine, 
formed from another set of connections: foot-to-pedal, hand-to-handlebar, 
rear-end-to-seat” (123). But it is also a BwO that is formed as the human 
body is transformed into a cyclist. Here the body experiences different 
strains on its parts, different speeds of movement and intensities as it travels 
through space in a different manner. It is in a state of becoming- something 
other than itself. The BwO is begun in this case by Wayne‟s becoming-
animal, which Patricia Pisters acknowledges as being a “way of creating a 
Body without Organs” (144) Becoming initiates the BwO: “it is already 
underway the moment the body has had enough of organs and wants to 
slough them off” (A Thousand Plateaus 150).  
 
I do not wish to imply the identity of Bruce Wayne is in any way less or 
more constructed than that of the Batman. Nolan‟s films create a much 
harsher juxtaposition between the public persona of Bruce Wayne and the 
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character of the Batman than the previous filmic incarnations. Wayne in the 
latter part of Batman Begins and The Dark Knight is portrayed as having a 
very particular public identity. He acts as a spoilt, arrogant and vapid 
playboy. This is exemplified in his birthday party scene in Batman Begins 
where he insults his guests, accusing them of being freeloaders only there 
for the free champagne, in order to get them to leave because the Manor is 
under attack by the League of Shadows. But Wayne here, the white Western 
man, the majoritarian identity “par excellence” (A Thousand Plateaus 291) 
is a performance. There is a third character also, that which is not Bruce 
Wayne and that which is not Batman, and it is this character that has begun 
the path of becoming-bat, eschewing the majoritarian identity for a life of 
potentials and becomings. 
 
Christopher Nolan‟s first Batman film for Warner Brothers „rebooted‟ the 
franchise after the perceived failures of Schumacher‟s Batman and Robin. 
Nolan‟s Batman Begins is considered by some reviewers to be a far more 
intelligent effort than the two films preceding it. This is somewhat 
supported by the publication of Mark D. White and Robert Arp‟s Batman 
and Philosophy (2008), a popular philosophy anthology akin to, and indeed 
part of the same series as, the Irwin Matrix anthologies discussed earlier. 
The front cover of the anthology is clearly referring to the promotional 
material for Nolan‟s film, using a close-up image of Batman‟s cowl in front 
of a sunset behind dark grey clouds. As the title suggests, the film returns to 
the character‟s very beginnings, retelling the origin story once again.  
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As Julian Darius (2005) has explored, Batman Begins is heavily indebted to 
the Batman of the Miller comic books. Indeed, after the critical failure that 
was Batman and Robin, Warner Brothers had considered making an 
adaptation solely of Frank Miller and David Mazzucchelli‟s Batman: Year 
One. Batman: Year One was released in four parts as part of DC‟s Batman 
title in 1987. As the title suggests, it explores the beginning of Wayne‟s 
career as Batman. Batman: Year One begins with an image of the young 
Bruce Wayne knelt on the floor between the bodies of his parents. His 
mother is lying on her back, with blood pouring from a gunshot wound in 
her chest. His father is lying face down in a pool of blood. The composition 
of this is echoed in Batman Begins, as we see the same configuration in the 
alleyway after Thomas and Martha Wayne are killed outside the theatre. 
There are other similarities, in that Lieutenant Gordon (Gary Oldman) is 
made to look extremely similar to his counterpart in the graphic novel.  
 
Nolan‟s films were not the first to be heavily influenced by the comic 
books, either aesthetically or thematically. As Brooker acknowledges, the 
“graphic novels The Dark Knight Returns and The Killing Joke influenced 
... [Burton‟s] Batman in both tone and some of its detail” (175). The comic 
books throughout the 1980s were considerably darker in tone and aesthetics, 
and it is this, rather than the high camp of the Adam West years, that bore 
influence on Burton, and indeed Warner Brothers‟ decision to produce a 
Batman film. These included The Dark Knight Returns, Year One, The 
Killing Joke (1988) and Arkham Asylum (1989). Indeed, Eileen Meehan 
throughout her article „“Holy Commodity Fetish, Batman!”‟ (1991) argues 
that Warner Brothers, after acquiring DC Comics in 1969, used the comic 
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book medium to test the potential for a darker imagining of the Batman than 
seen in the ABC series. As the titles released in the early to mid-1980s were 
a critical and commercial success, Warner Brothers commissioned Burton to 
produce a more macabre vision of the character, in line with the graphic 
novels.  
 
 
Unlike the previous films, Batman Begins concentrates more on the 
character of Bruce Wayne and the formation of his Batman alter ego. As 
with Nolan‟s previous film Memento (2000) and following film The 
Prestige (2006), Batman Begins utilises a number of flashbacks and shifts 
between various moments in the narrative trajectory. “Nolan‟s stamp,” 
states Edward Lawrenson, “is detectable throughout” largely because the 
film has a “kaleidoscopic ordering of scenes” in the first third of the film. It 
opens with a dream sequence/flashback to Wayne‟s childhood, with Wayne 
as a young boy (Gus Lewis), playing around the Wayne estate with an 
equally young Rachel Dawes (Emma Lockhart). Wayne, attempting to hide 
from Dawes, climbs on to some planks that are blocking up a well, which 
collapse under him. In a moment drawn from a similar flashback in Miller‟s 
The Dark Knight Returns, he falls to the bottom of the well, revealing a 
cave. The camera focuses into the darkness from Wayne‟s point of view. 
The soundtrack of squeaking suggests there is something in the darkness, 
and we know this to be bats. The young Wayne is surrounded by vast 
numbers of the animals, and he begins to fight them off. This is the 
beginning of Wayne‟s becoming-bat, though he is yet to embrace these new 
relations as positive: the film then cuts to the present day of the narrative, 
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where the adult Wayne wakes in a Chinese prison. This locates the previous 
sequence as a nightmare, suggesting that this experience is vital to the 
formation of both the Batman and the adult Wayne.  
 
Wayne‟s physical abilities are demonstrated within the first three minutes of 
the film. In the prison a gang of inmates intend to kill him, and they become 
embroiled in a brawl. Wayne disposes of a ringleader with relative ease. He 
shows remarkable resilience to their battering, and eventually overcomes the 
remainder. In a different scene, after Wayne‟s flight from the temple where 
he receives ninja training from R‟as Al Ghul (Liam Neeson), he returns to 
Gotham and Wayne Manor. Whilst he is sat in the drawing room, as in the 
original comic strip, a single bat enters. Wayne then revisits the site of his 
childhood trauma. He climbs down the well and enters through the mouth of 
the cave, when we again hear the squeaking of the bats. He holds up his 
light to find his way, which attracts the colony of bats. Thousands of the 
creatures begin to fly and circulate around him. He then stands, legs and 
arms spread (Figure 28) with the bats surrounding him. Here again we see 
the becoming-bat of Bruce Wayne, one of the many becomings- of the 
Batman that we will see in Nolan‟s film. 
 
Mark Fisher has referred to this moment as “Nolan‟s rendering of Batman‟s 
primal scene.” That it occurs away from Wayne Manor is, he argues, 
significant as it “takes place outside the family home and beyond the realm 
of the Oedipal” and he notes the involvement “not with a single bat but with 
a whole (Deleuzian) pack”. But Fisher argues that Nolan has made the 
origin story “both more Oedipal and more anti-Oedipal than it appeared in 
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Detective Comics”. Although he recognises that there is a 
“Deleuzoguattarian resonance” as the very name „Batman‟ suggests that 
Wayne is becoming-animal, Fisher notes that there is just as strong a 
significance to Freudian psychoanalysis, noting Freud‟s cases of „Ratman‟ 
and „Wolfman‟ in particular. Despite the Deleuzoguattarian themes that are 
evident in Batman Begins, Fisher argues that Batman “remains a thoroughly 
Oedipal figure” that “re-binds the becoming-animal with the Oedipal”. This 
is due to the revelation that Bruce‟s fear of bats that resulted from his 
experience in the well was partly responsible for the death of his parents. In 
a variation of the origin story, the Waynes leave a theatre performance early 
as Bruce is frightened by the bat-like characters on stage. He later expresses 
to Alfred his belief that their death was his fault.  
 
Fisher notes how Batman Begins is populated with fathers and father-like 
figures – there is Thomas Wayne, the butler Alfred, and R‟as Al Ghul. With 
the untimely demise of Wayne Senior, Fisher argues that the Oedipal 
complex did not have chance to come to a resolution in Bruce Wayne. 
According to Fisher, the re-emergence of Al Ghul and the League of 
Shadows allows Wayne to resolve this complex, as he leaves Al Ghul to die 
in the final scenes. However, Fisher acknowledges that Wayne‟s 
transformation into Batman is an example of becoming-animal, in this case, 
becoming-bat. Becoming-animal is a philosophical concept that Deleuze 
and Guattari propose as being one manner in which binary human identities 
can be challenged and transformed. They state in A Thousand Plateaus that 
the “human being does not „really‟ become an animal” (238): becoming-
animal is a concept. Here, Wayne is not literally becoming a bat, he will not 
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be any closer to experiencing the sonic world of the bat described by Nagel. 
“Becoming,” they state, “is a verb with a consistency all of its own; it does 
not reduce to, or lead back to, „appearing‟, „being‟, „equalling‟, or 
„producing‟” (239). Wayne‟s willingness to adapt and experiment is vital to 
his success as Batman, as he develops new strengths and relationships with 
technology. 
 
In their formulation of becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari note the 
importance of the pack, for multiplicity: “every animal is fundamentally a 
band, a pack. That it has pack modes, rather than characteristics” (239). It is 
not a single bat that has affected Wayne in Nolan‟s Begins, unlike the 
original comic strip and Schumacher‟s Forever, it is the colony. It is the 
collective of bats living beneath Wayne Manor that has seemingly had such 
import to the formation of the Batman. As Deleuze and Guattari state, “we 
do not become-animal without a fascination for the pack, for multiplicity” 
(239-40). 
 
Much more is made of Wayne‟s transition into a man capable of the 
Batman‟s physical feats than in any of the previous films, and indeed the 
1939 comic strip. This can lend the film to a Foucauldian reading, as we see 
him training and building his body for combat. But this body is not only a 
disciplined body, it is also a Body without Organs. The body of the Batman 
is presented by Nolan as being constantly susceptible to potentialities. 
 
Nolan‟s second film The Dark Knight continues from the point that Batman 
Begins ended: with Gordon passing Batman a joker playing card. This is the 
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„calling card‟ of the main villain of The Dark Knight, the Joker. Nolan here 
has no need to return to the Batman origin story, the narrative is very much 
a logical continuation and result of the events in Batman Begins. The BwO 
is extended even further here, as Wayne interacts with new technologies that 
alter his perception and, in doing so, increase his capabilities.  
 
The Dark Knight includes one of Batman‟s most notorious adversaries, also 
seen in Burton‟s Batman, the Joker. Uricchio and Pearson explain that “both 
the Batman and the Joker have their origins in cruel twists of fate” (198). In 
most narratives concerning the Joker, his origins involve falling into a vat of 
chemical waste.  Whereas Wayne chooses to live a life fighting crime after 
witnessing the murder of his parents, the Joker responded to his trauma by 
“dedicating himself to bizarre absurdist crime” (Uricchio and Pearson 198). 
As Brooker has noted, the origin of Burton‟s Joker is “similar to that given 
in The Killing Joke” (289). Ron Novy describes the Joker in Joke as: 
 
An unremarkable chemical engineer [who] has quit his job and 
failed at  his dream of being a stand up comedian; he loses his 
pregnant wife in a fluke accident, is forced into a bungled robbery of 
his former employer, and plummets into a tank of noxious waste 
while fleeing from the police. It is a baptism from which he emerges 
the Joker: green hair, pallid skin, and insane. (175) 
 
 
However, the Joker in The Dark Knight is a more menacing character than 
in Burton‟s Batman: he terrorises without a motive other than to cause 
chaos. In great contrast to Nolan‟s lengthy exploration of Batman‟s 
beginnings in his first film, and the origin story given in Burton‟s Batman 
and Alan Moore‟s The Killing Joke, the Joker in The Dark Knight is not 
given an origin story. Indeed, the very need for an origin story (in Burton‟s 
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Batman this is given in the narrative) is mocked by the Joker as he torments 
his victims. He explains first to Rachel Dawes (Maggie Gyllenhaal) that his 
facial scars were inflicted upon him by his drunken father, because he 
showed distress at his mother‟s death, whom his father had murdered. He 
then explains to Gambol (Michael Jai White) that they were self-inflicted as 
an act of love toward his wife, who was purposefully disfigured by a loan 
shark. The wife then became repulsed by him and rejected him. As Alfred 
Pennyworth explains to Wayne, “some men aren‟t looking for anything 
logical. They can‟t be bought, bullied, reasoned or negotiated with. Some 
men just want to watch the world burn” and this is part of the Joker‟s 
menace. Uricchio and Pearson acknowledged in the early 1990s, “today, an 
increasingly out-of-control Joker is a raging madman” (1991), and it is clear 
that representations of this character have continued on this trajectory.  
 
Prior to the finale, Batman unveils to Lucius Fox (Morgan Freeman) the 
technology he will use to locate the Joker. Wayne has, as Fox explains, 
transformed every mobile phone in the city of Gotham into a microphone 
and a “high frequency generator receiver”. This allows Batman to “image 
all of Gotham”. This technology is based upon that which we have seen in 
one of the preceding scenes and works on the same principal as bat sonar. 
As Fox explains to Wayne, it creates this image by emitting a “high-
frequency pulse for mapping an environment and records a response time”.   
 
The action of the final sequence surrounds two ferryboats leaving the island 
of Gotham. The Joker previously has warned the citizens of Gotham that the 
city will be under his control by nightfall and says anyone wanting to leave 
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may do so, but warns them that some of the bridges and subways are rigged 
with explosives. The Gotham police then close off these exits, leaving the 
waterways as the only remaining safe option. However, once on board the 
ferries, the Joker announces over the radio that two boats are also rigged, 
and that each one has the detonator for the opposite vessel. If one is not 
destroyed by midnight, the Joker will destroy both vessels. 
 
This explanation and action is interspersed by cuts to Fox at the screens of 
the sonar machine. From the information received through this device he is 
able to give Batman the location of the Joker. Batman then relays this 
location to Gordon. As Batman glides into the building, he swoops onto one 
of the clowns, whom Gordon presumes are the kidnappers. Two white 
covers fall to cover his eyes, and we cut to more of the imaging that appears 
on the screens of the sonar machine (Figure 29). The Batman is shown to 
interact with this technology in a significantly different manner to Fox. Fox 
is kept at a distance from the machine, moving and repositioning his entire 
physical body from screen to screen in order to digest the information it 
gives him (Figure 30). However, the Batman is shown to work with the 
technology, in that it actively replaces his „normal‟ sight. One particular 
example of this juxtaposition occurs when Fox is relaying the position of the 
Joker‟s various henchmen and Gordon‟s SWAT teams. At this stage we are 
given full screen shots of the sonar imaging inter-cut with the real events 
occurring in the building, rather than the images seen on the screens. As Fox 
relays to Batman that one team of thugs is on the roof, Batman cocks his 
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head in that direction. Batman is shown to be able to move between these 
two forms of perception with ease. 
 
The manner in which the Batman is shown to use technology in Nolan‟s 
films is greatly different to previous imaginings. To demonstrate this I offer 
a comparison between the cape used in Batman Begins and a device used in 
the earlier film Batman Returns. In the closing stages of Batman Begins, 
Batman attempts to rescue Rachel Dawes from Arkham Asylum where she 
has been held captive and drugged by Dr. Jonathan Crane (Cillian Murphy). 
The Batman is surrounded by police and a SWAT team who are intent on 
capturing him. He needs to exit the building swiftly and preferably with 
some cover. He uses a device which emits a high-pitched sound and attracts 
hundreds of bats which begin to fill the main hallway. He is then able to 
glide down the stairwell of the building using his cape which contracts to 
form wings. As he drops the device down the central stairwell, he follows it 
as he descends (Figure 31). After he reaches the ground, we are shown the 
policemen and SWAT team disabled by the multitude of bats, unable to 
move around them. The Batman, however, moves freely amongst the 
creatures. This is a very different spectacle to that provided in a similar 
scenario in the closing stages of Batman Returns. Kyle/Catwoman has 
imprisoned Shreck in the sewers of Gotham and is about to kill him, when 
Batman enters the scene in order to stop her. However, he is only able to do 
this by sliding down a wire (Figure 32) which he shoots from one side of the 
sewer to the other. He is then able to attach himself to the wire and slide 
across to interrupt Catwoman.  
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Nolan presents the Batman as being integrated with the colony of bats, and 
moving with them and amongst them by utilising the technologies available 
to him. His movements are shown to mirror the speed and ease of the bats, 
as he glides through the air surrounded by the creatures. This integration is 
contrasted with the difficulties that the policemen have in confronting them. 
Nolan‟s imagining differs greatly from Burton‟s depiction which shows him 
utilise the wire to infiltrate the confrontation between Shreck and 
Catwoman. Although he moves with speed, his movements are not free and 
follow a set trajectory which Nolan‟s Batman does not. Burton also has not 
invited a comparison to the Batman‟s movements and capacities to those of 
the bat as has Nolan through his inclusion of the colony in this example.  
 
The Becoming-Cat of Catwoman 
 
As we have seen, the figure of the Batman has evolved throughout its 
history to correspond to a number of constituent features of becoming-
animal and the Body-without-Organs. However, the process of becoming 
that the Batman undertakes is significantly different to that of the Catwoman 
and her becoming-cat. In both Batman Returns and Catwoman, the 
characters of Kyle and Phillips that will become Catwomen are resurrected 
and come into „being‟ to avenge their murders. In has been argued that the 
Catwoman of Batman Returns is an example of the backlash phenomenon 
(Walton), and the Catwoman of Catwoman has been positioned as a 
postfeminist action hero (Stasia). Although the representation of both 
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women is, arguably, heavily mediated by the cultural climate in which they 
were produced and corresponds to a certain cultural convention, both 
characters‟ becoming-cat offers a means of eschewing the conventional 
gender roles and codes traditionally provided for women. 
 
As Priscilla Walton has commented, Batman Returns “revolves around the 
theme of constructing identities and propagating power” (189) and is 
“notable for its dearth of female characters” (188). The four main 
characters, Bruce Wayne, Selena Kyle, Oswald Cobblepot/The Penguin and 
Max Shreck, are all engaged in duplicity to varying degrees. In Burton‟s 
Batman Returns, Selina Kyle‟s „alter ego‟ Catwoman is created by her death 
at the hands of Shreck and her subsequent resurrection. Kyle is introduced 
in the early stages of the film, indeed before we see Wayne/Batman, as 
Shreck‟s personal assistant, which is a role that she does not excel at. She is 
presented as a career-minded woman, albeit a slightly inept one, trying, but 
failing, to further herself in her role by „interfering‟ in Shreck‟s business. 
This ultimately leads to her downfall: while she is preparing for Shreck‟s 
meeting with Bruce Wayne regarding the proposed building of a new power 
plant, she uncovers Shreck‟s dastardly plan to build a capacitor to steal and 
horde Gotham‟s power supply. Upon discovery by Shreck, they have a short 
exchange which ends with Shreck pushing her out of the window of his 
office, which is situated at the top of a very tall building. 
 
We first see Kyle whilst she is undertaking the menial „domestic‟ task of 
preparing coffee in a meeting of Gotham‟s patriarchs, namely Shreck, a 
Gothamite businessman who appears to be revered by the people of 
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Gotham, and Gotham‟s Mayor (Michael Murphy). She interrupts the 
meeting and attempts to make a contribution, which she does not even 
manage to articulate. Shreck asks the grouping to forgive Kyle as she is not 
properly “housebroken”, in a reference that, to an extent, foreshadows her 
transformation into Catwoman. Shreck‟s son Chip (Andrew Bryniarski) 
interrupts the awkward silence in order to take his father to a ceremony in 
which Shreck will light Gotham‟s Christmas tree. Kyle is left alone, 
berating herself, referring to herself as a “stupid corn dog”. Shortly after this 
scene, she is again seen as incompetent, or at least unable to deal with the 
tasks that Shreck assigns to her: as Shreck stands to deliver his speech, the 
film cross-cuts to Kyle in the office, realising that she has neglected to 
ensure that he has his script. He turns to Chip, asking him to remind him to 
“take it out on what‟s-her-name”, which indicates how little he is concerned 
with her as an individual.  
 
Burton goes to great lengths to present the pre-Catwoman Kyle as awkward, 
meddlesome and inept. Her costuming is far from flattering. She is shown 
wearing a brown two-piece suit, with her hair tied back with highly 
unfashionable spectacles (Figure 33). The manner in which Pfeiffer holds 
herself, with hunched shoulders, is also indicative of her unease and 
contrasts greatly not only with the male characters in the boardroom and but 
how she is seen later in the film after her transformation. 
 
The mise-en-scène of the interior of Kyle‟s apartment has also been a point 
of interest and analysis, as it is a parody of stereotypical femininity and 
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clichés feminine behaviour. It is painted pastel pink and adorned with 
decorations that are also pink and/or flowery soft furnishings. There is, 
however, notably a blue stuffed toy cat on her bed. This is perhaps 
problematic: if it is a precursor that indicates that the motif of the cat will 
transgress traditional notions of femininity, then this aligns the cat with 
traditional masculinity. It does not necessary follow that the transgression of 
this sort of femininity should be equated with masculinity. She has an 
unusual neon light which reads „HELLO THERE‟, perhaps as a response to 
her meaningless “Hi Honey I‟m home” which she habitually exclaims when 
she enters the apartment and proceeds to feed her cat. As Kaveney 
acknowledges, this indicates that Kyle is “almost a caricature of the good 
secretary with the hopeless life” (Superheroes! 242). 
  
This representation is, as Priscilla L. Walton notes, “uncomfortably close to 
Susan Faludi‟s description of backlash encoding” (191) and this is perhaps 
the reason why Burton fails at making her a „feminist‟ character. Kaveney 
agrees, stating that this representation of Kyle is part of a “reaction – not 
entirely positive reaction – to feminism” (Superheroes! 242). In her 
analysis, Walton refers to the following quote from the introduction of 
Backlash: 
Women are unhappy precisely because they are free. Women are 
enslaved by their own liberation. They have grabbed at the gold ring 
of independence, only to miss the one ring that really matters. They 
have gained control of their fertility, only to destroy it. They have 
pursued their own professional dreams – and lost out on the greatest 
female adventure. The women‟s movement, as we are told time and 
time again, has proved women‟s own worst enemy. (2, original 
emphasis) 
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The imaging of Kyle in these first moments adheres to Faludi‟s backlash 
thesis. Kyle is exhausted when she returns home and, after discovering a 
message on her answering machine from a boyfriend cancelling their 
liaison, is presented as being unable to sustain a romantic relationship. After 
listening to this message, she receives one from herself reminding her that 
she has to return to the office. As Walton explains, “the secretary‟s 
independence has won her personal paucity. She is unhappy. She can find 
solace only in her work – which itself is not rewarding” (192).  
 
Kyle‟s first meeting with Batman is similarly awkward. It occurs after the 
Circus Gang, led by the Penguin, attacks the crowds of people at the tree-
lighting ceremony. Her glasses are knocked off amidst the commotion and 
whilst she is grappling on the floor to find them, Batman arrives and she is 
grabbed by a clown, who threatens her with a taser and uses her as a human 
shield against the Batman. After he has rendered her assailant unconscious, 
she attempts to draw Batman into conversation, awkwardly asking him if he 
prefers being called “the Batman – or is it just „Batman‟?” (original 
emphasis). He does not respond and walks away without reply. This 
encounter greatly differs from Wayne‟s next meeting with Kyle which 
occurs after her transformation, where she appears confident, articulate and 
stereotypically more attractive, without her glasses and wearing her hair 
loose.   
 
Kyle‟s transformation sequence is highly symbolic. After Shreck pushes 
Kyle out of his office window, Burton cuts to an overhead shot which shows 
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Kyle‟s descent from above. She crashes through several awnings, all 
adorned with the Shreck logo, until she eventually reaches the snow-covered 
ground where she lays crumpled and clearly dead. The film then cuts to a 
number of cats in the alleyways surrounding her. They begin to show 
interest in her body by sniffing her, climbing on her and circling around her. 
As the scene progresses, more cats come and join this ritual. The film cuts 
to her face, which slowly flickers back to life as the cats clamber over her, 
biting her hands and face. As in Batman Begins, we see the pack, the 
multiplicity.  
 
The film immediately cuts back to the interior of Kyle‟s apartment. The 
camera is positioned in exactly the same place as the previous sequence 
discussed earlier, and she mimics her ritual behaviour shown.  She walks in 
a ghostly manner through the doorway, and through to her kitchenette. She 
takes a carton of milk from her refrigerator, pours some in a dish for her cat 
as before, and gorges on the remainder in an animalistic manner. The milk 
spills from her mouth and cascades down her clothes and body. She begins 
to listen to her answering machine whilst continuing to drink the milk. She 
receives the following message: 
We‟re just calling to make sure you‟ve tried Gotham Lady Perfume. 
One whiff of this at the office and your boss‟ll be asking you to stay 
after work for a candlelight staff meeting for two. Gotham Lady 
Perfume: exclusively at Shreck‟s department store. 
 
This message provokes a particularly violent reaction from Kyle. She 
throws the carton at the telephone and begins to scream, tearing the machine 
from the wall and destroying it. She takes her collection of soft toys and 
Green 226 
 
forces them into the waste disposal unit with a wooden spoon with a look of 
determined glee. The level of destruction escalates when she takes a frying 
pan and begins to smash the surrounding pictures and ornaments whilst cats 
enter her apartment through an open window. She then takes a can of black 
spray paint and sprays over the pink paint on her walls, she opens her 
wardrobe and sprays over a cartoon picture of some kittens on a pink t-shirt. 
This in itself is poignant. Whereas the kittens on the t-shirt are 
stereotypically feminine, Kyle is erasing them and using the cat as a symbol 
in a far more transgressive manner.  
 
In the wardrobe she finds a black PVC coat which she will use to make into 
her Catwoman „costume‟. She walks into her bedroom, smashing the neon 
tubular lights so they now read „HELL HERE‟ and continues to deface 
objects with the spray can, destroying a doll‟s house in extreme close-up 
shots. The film then cuts to her cutting up the PVC coat and beginning to 
make her Catwoman outfit by stitching the pieces together. We then cut to 
an exterior shot showing her standing at her window, surrounded by cats, 
with the pink neon „HELL HERE‟ shining behind her. Then, speaking to the 
horde of cats that have congregated around her and on the rooftops around 
her window, declares “I don‟t know about you Miss Kitty, but I feel so 
much yummier” whilst she runs her hands over her now (highly fetishised) 
PVC-clad figure (Figure 34) which has become considerably more 
emphasised than in her brown suit worn prior to this sequence. 
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We are reminded of Shreck‟s comment that Kyle has not been housebroken. 
Here she is literally „breaking‟ the house that is symbolic of her 
containment, using the tools of domestic enslavement (the wooden spoon 
and frying pan) to wreak this destruction. This sequence abounds with 
symbolism and easily reads as Kyle shedding the codes, clichés and 
conformities of stereotypical femininity and feminine behaviour that have 
constrained her in her past. It is an attack on domesticity, a rebellion against 
a patriarchal order and culture that will not allow her respect and freedom 
or, at times, even acknowledge her. Burton has loaded this sequence and the 
mise-en-scène with such signifiers. Kyle uses kitchenware as weapons of 
destruction. This subverts their purpose, transforming them from items of 
the domestic realm associated with the traditionally feminine, to one of 
aggression. Burton also includes items such as the soft toys that are 
associated specifically with girlish/adolescent femininity, and Kyle is also 
shown to destroy these. This may well serve as a metaphor for her 
awakening. Kyle is „growing up‟; she has lost her „innocent‟ perspective on 
the world she inhabits. She destroys these soft toys in the waste disposal 
unit, another subversion for destructive purposes, and her t-shirts adorned 
with kittens and her doll‟s house are painted over in black spray paint.  After 
the long shot that shows her in the window of her apartment, we do not see 
the interior again. Because her character has previously been so heavily 
signified through the mise-en-scène, we now do not know quite what she is 
becoming. 
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Walton comments that while Catwoman “may forge a space for herself in 
the discourse of the film ... she denies that space to other women” (193). 
This is demonstrated in the next scene that features Catwoman. Burton cuts 
to an unnamed woman (Joan Giammarco) walking down a dark side-alley, 
where she is confronted by an assailant (Henry Kingi) who appears to 
attempt to rape her. He is interrupted by Catwoman, who disposes of him 
with relative ease, attacking with high kicks and scratching his face with her 
claws. As the female victim begins to thank her, Catwoman grabs her by the 
face and says “You make it so easy don‟t you? Always waiting for some 
Batman to come and save you”. As Walton has also noted, Kyle‟s 
ambivalence toward her female companions is demonstrated when in 
conversation with Bruce Wayne. Talking of previous romantic 
engagements, he mentions “Vicki” to which Kyle snorts and asks “was she 
an ice skater or a stewardess?” It is interesting that Wayne shrugs this 
comment off and replies that she was a photojournalist, as it is the male 
character who accepts her professional status as unproblematic. The female 
character of Kyle is the one to make stereotypical, derisory comments 
regarding Vicki‟s occupation. 
 
However, Walton‟s criticism of the character does not account for another 
backlash „tactic‟ that Faludi identifies in Backlash. If Kyle‟s presentation is 
steeped in „backlash encoding‟, Walton neglects to draw attention to 
Faludi‟s assertion that one manner of attempting to retrench feminist 
progress was effectively to „divide and conquer‟. Faludi has commented that 
the backlash „culture‟ “pursues a divide-and-conquer strategy: single versus 
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married women, working women versus housewives, middle- versus 
working-class” (17). I would argue then, that Batman Returns is not a 
backlash „text‟ as such, but rather is commenting on the unacceptable 
situation of working women.  
 
Catwoman is a „stand alone‟ film which takes place entirely independently 
of the Batman and Gotham City and, as the title suggests, features her as the 
protagonist, here played by Halle Berry. Despite being a completely 
separate character in a different diegetic world to the Batman, there are 
many narrative and aesthetic similarities between the Catwoman of Batman 
Returns and Pitof‟s imagining of her in Catwoman. She does not have the 
same origins as the Catwoman of the Batman comics: she is neither a 
professional jewel thief (though she does burgle a jewellery shop only to 
return her bounty) nor the alter-ego of Selena Kyle. Mirroring Pfeiffer‟s 
Catwoman, she comes into being after the death, and subsequent 
resurrection of, Patience Phillips. Phillips is an artistic designer for a 
cosmetics company called Hedare, whose owner will subject Phillips to a 
similar ordeal to Kyle in Batman Returns.  
 
Therefore the origin stories of the two Catwomen are roughly the same: 
where Selina Kyle was murdered by Shreck, Phillips is murdered by 
henchmen on Lauren Hedare‟s (Sharon Stone) orders. Phillips discovers that 
Hedare is planning to release a poisonous and addictive beauty cream which 
“reverses the effects of ageing” onto the market. She is chased through a 
factory and seeks escape through some pipes at the bottom of the building. 
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They release a mass of water, and she is drowned and flushed into a river. 
She is washed ashore on an island, where she, like Kyle, attracts a pack of 
cats, one being an Egyptian Mau that has been following her. Again, the 
cats, here created using CGI, crawl over Phillips‟s body until she comes 
back to life. A CGI sequence zooms into an extreme close up of Phillips‟s 
eye, here with a human, round pupil, when it suddenly flickers and changes 
shape to an ellipse similar to the pupil of a cat. 
 
Christina Lucia Stasia has located Catwoman as part of a set of films that 
she terms the postfeminist action film (237). One trait of this film is the 
“shift from fighting bad guys to fighting older women” (241). The contrast 
is evident in both Batman Returns and Catwoman. Whereas the Catwoman 
of Returns is pitted against Batman and the Penguin and is determined to 
take revenge on Shreck, the Catwoman of Catwoman eventually has to do 
battle with Lauren Hedare. Stasia recognises this as indicative of a “shift in 
cultural understanding of what oppresses women” (241), where it is no 
longer patriarchy, but rather “the women who paved these roads” (241) to 
women‟s empowerment that is regarded as the force to react against.   
 
Catwoman makes more reference to the becoming-cat of Catwoman than 
either of the previous filmic incarnations. Although Pfeiffer‟s Catwoman 
adopts the myth of the nine lives, there is little included to suggest that her 
sensory experience has in any way altered. There are simple allusions to 
more clichéd „cat-like‟ behaviour in Batman Returns, for example when 
Kyle devours the carton of milk and when she washes herself whilst sat on 
Green 231 
 
the end of the Penguin‟s bed. Catwoman also includes moments such as 
these, for example Berry‟s character is shown to have an extreme fondness 
for tinned fish and sushi. Both women also develop an incredible acrobatic 
ability that they presumably did not possess before becoming-cat. Pfeiffer‟s 
character back-flips off screen when rescuing the woman in the sequence 
discussed above. Berry‟s Catwoman, when involved in a game of one-on-
one basketball with her suitor Tom Lone (Benjamin Bratt), exhibits an 
extraordinary amount of dexterity and athleticism previously unseen in the 
Phillips character. 
 
Although the Catwomen of Batman Returns and Catwoman have 
similarities in the way their bodies have altered since they have entered 
becoming-cat, Catwoman goes further in exploring her cat-like qualities as 
her sensory experience itself has altered. There are a number of sequences 
that are shown from Catwoman‟s point of view, and these clearly differ 
from what the audience would recognise as human perception. It is clear 
that the film is attempting to demonstrate that Phillips now knows what 
Nagel would describe as „what it is like to be a cat‟. The first of these 
sequences occurs shortly after she is resurrected. Time appears to slow and 
her perception of distance has changed. This is shown by cutting between 
the two modes of seeing: the film cuts to her point of view, where a gull 
seems to be in close proximity. When it then cuts to a shot of her, she grasps 
at the air where she believes the gull to be. We then cut to her look of 
confusion. She perceives the creatures‟ movements in a slower motion. She 
also sees the molecular movements surrounding the creatures: she can see 
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the movements of the air surrounding the gull as it flaps its wings (Figure 
35). The Catwoman here appears to have quicker reflexes because her 
experience of time has altered, and the depth of her perception has altered as 
she experiences the world in a significantly different manner to how we 
assume Phillips would have.  
 
This serves as a metaphor for Phillips‟s ability to see the world differently. 
But it also implies that Phillips has changed at a molecular level, she has 
been forced upon the threshold. Although Pfeiffer‟s Catwoman did inherit 
cat-like behaviours after the transformation scene, such as washing herself 
in a cat-like manner, Pitof depicts Berry‟s Catwoman as altered at the very 
level of her physicality, her molecular makeup. But this transformation, 
shown clearly through the image of the eye, suggests a separation from a 
human point of view. We are reminded of Claire Colebrook‟s comment that 
“the human may have its own tendencies of becoming ... but it can also 
expand its perception to encounter other becomings, such as becoming-
animal” (Gilles Deleuze 133). Phillips‟s perception here has literally 
become expanded as she is no longer a human Being – she is a becoming-
cat.  
 
There are, however, many differences between the presentation of these two 
Catwomen. The Phillips character‟s representation prior to the 
transformation, although unflattering, is not so subject to the backlash 
encoding that Walton has identified. Phillips firstly is shown to have friends, 
relationships that are notably absent from Kyle‟s world. The only interaction 
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Kyle is shown to have outside of the office is via an answering machine. In 
Catwoman, the friends take the form of Sally (Alex Bornstein) and Lance 
(Berend McKenzie). Secondly, Lone is shown to be romantically interested 
in Phillips prior to her transformation. Walton draws particular attention to 
the moment in Burton‟s film where Kyle fails to receive any recognition 
from Batman. Catwoman does not encourage such a dramatic juxtaposition 
regarding her sexual allure pre- and post-transformation as does Batman 
Returns. 
 
There are also similarities in the ways in which Kyle and Phillips are 
portrayed prior to their transformations. Catwoman begins with a voiceover 
monologue from Phillips. This tale, she explains, “all began on the day I 
died”. She describes herself, rather unfortunately, as having been an 
“unremarkable woman” but, as she continues, “the day I died was also the 
day I began to live”.  Like Kyle in Batman Returns, she is lacking in 
confidence, fails to complete her work to the requirements of her male 
superior, George Hedare (Lambert Wilson), and has an unfashionable 
wardrobe (Figure 36). She is told in a meeting with George Hedare that she 
should “get a manicure”, which is hardly a professional comment from a 
male superior. 
 
The way in which Batman Returns and Catwoman conclude is also similar. 
After Kyle/Catwoman kills Shreck in Batman Returns, Kyle absconds. The 
film closes with an image of Catwoman upon the rooftops in Gotham, in 
contrast to Wayne who is taken away in his chauffeur-driven car. Likewise, 
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after killing Lauren Hedare in Catwoman, Phillips/Catwoman is subject to a 
similar fate, shown walking along the rooftops with cat-like dexterity. 
 
Because the Catwomen are both seeking revenge for their murders, they 
adhere to Lisa Coulthard‟s observation that the “action cinema heroine is in 
some ways like the stable masculine figures of classical western or action 
cinema: her violence is rationalized and redemptive, and her acts are solitary 
ones” (171). Coulthard uses as examples The Searchers (John Ford, 1956) 
and Shane (George Stevens, 1953) where “masculine violence is both 
needed and shunned by the community” (172). In both films there is a sense 
of exclusion at the conclusion for both Shane (Alan Ladd) and Ethan 
Edwards (John Wayne) in that both communities ultimately reject them. 
Their violence may be justified  - in the case of The Searchers, Edwards‟s 
slaughtering of a number of native Americans is undertaken in order to 
retrieve his missing niece Debbie (Natalie Wood); in the case of the 
gunslinger Shane, he is preventing the usurpation of the humble homestead 
of the Starrett family by cattle baron Ryker (Emile Meyer) – but they are 
shown to be unable to live in the communities they fought to protect. The 
wounded Shane is shown to ride away on his horse past the graveyard of 
Cemetery Hill, which implies he is riding away to die, and Edwards returns 
Debbie and walks away, alone, into the desert.  
 
The endings of both Batman Returns and Catwoman imply that both 
Catwoman characters no longer wish to exist within normative society: they 
choose to spend their nights alone prowling the city as Catwomen rather 
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than return to their previous, somewhat inhibitive roles. There is a definite 
sense of agency in both Kyle and Phillips: it is their choice. This sense of 
agency is, perhaps, absent from the conclusions of Shane and The 
Searchers.  
 
The alignment of the Catwomen to the life style of the cat separates her 
from a direct correlation with the male hero of the western genre. Although 
it is a popular myth that cats are entirely solitary creatures (Milius 172), it is 
clear that they can only exist as part of human society by regressing to the 
role of Oedipal animal within the bourgeois family. It is recognised that cats 
do not form a pack as such in scientific terms, as they do not hunt together, 
but they can form colonies with other cats. It is here that the Catwomen will 
find a new life apart from the conventional.  
 
If we return to Deleuze and Guattari‟s distinction between animal types in A 
Thousand Plateaus, the conclusions of these films can be read in a more 
positive manner than proposed by Walton. As I noted earlier, there are three 
animals that Deleuze and Guattari identify. The first of these are “Oedipal 
animals” (240), animals that have been co-opted into the bourgeois family 
unit as a pet. They are “individuated animals” (240) that uphold notions of 
individuated identity, those that have been separated from other animals and 
therefore from the pack. It is this animal type that these Catwomen 
endeavour to resist. Indeed, Kyle/Catwoman towards the conclusion of 
Batman Returns suggests as much when addressing Wayne/Batman:  
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Bruce ... I would – I would love to live with you in your castle ... 
forever, just like in a fairy tale ... but I just couldn‟t live with myself, 
so don‟t pretend this is a happy ending. 
 
As we have seen in the case of the Kyle/Catwoman character, much had 
been made of her attempts to resist „domesticity‟ after her transformation in 
the destruction of her apartment. But here she outwardly rejects the offer to 
live with Wayne in conjugal happiness. It is a sign of her becoming-woman, 
her becoming-animal, that she rejects the dominant code. Here reference to 
the fairy tale reminds us of myth and the constructedness of feminine 
identity.  
 
We are presented with an example of the domestic, individuated cat early in 
the film: the cat that Kyle feeds and cares for. We do not see this cat alone 
again, it forms part of the pack that enters Kyle‟s apartment during her 
transformation. For Kyle/Catwoman to join Wayne/Batman at the close of 
the film would imply that she would agree to adhere to different set of 
constraints. This is reinforced when Wayne picks up a lone cat in an 
alleyway where he is searching for Kyle/Catwoman and takes it into his 
limousine, and presumably back to Wayne Manor. But it is with the pack 
that Catwoman‟s future may lie after rejecting Wayne and the adherence to 
societal (and filmic) convention that he symbolises.   
 
Conclusions  
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In these cases it appears that Catwoman is the figure that adheres more to 
the Deleuzoguattarian notion of pure becoming. However, this is not to say 
that the Batman does not have moments of becoming. Both of the 
Catwomen and the Batman of Nolan‟s films go through a destabilising 
process, a deterritorialisation of their identities and subject positions which 
are synonymous with becoming-woman. As we have seen, the Batman‟s 
becoming-animal with the colony of bats and his becoming-machine suggest 
the making of a BwO. However, the Batman/Wayne is shown to be able to 
deterritorialise and reterritorialise without experiencing the same kind of 
risk as Catwoman. Her becoming is absolute, the shattering of her identity 
and subjectivity is not as easily reversible to the extent that she will not 
return to normative society. 
 
This is perhaps symbolised by the Catwoman and Batman costumes in 
Batman Returns. Walton notes how: 
It is interesting that Catwoman‟s costume is obviously pieced and 
stitched together. Her costume poses a marked contrast to Batman‟s, 
therefore, since when Bruce Wayne rips a costume, he opens his 
closet to reveal a rack of identical Bat clothes, each perfect and 
whole. 193. 
 
However, it is to be remembered that Walton‟s comments pertain to 
Burton‟s Batman and the same cannot be said of Nolan‟s Batman. The 
costume becomes symbolic of the process of transformation that 
Kyle/Catwoman is undergoing after embarking on the path of becoming. 
 
Elizabeth Grosz has written that “one cannot become-animal at will and 
then cease and function normally. It is not something that can be put on or 
taken off like a cloak or an activity” (174). In this sense, the Batman does 
Green 238 
 
not strictly adhere to Deleuze and Guattari‟s concept of becoming-animal. 
However, a comparison between the characters of the Batman and 
Catwoman demonstrates that there are certain benefits are of becoming-
animal for women, and that this concept can be seen to work positively for 
women in that it offers an alternative way of living than that prescribed by a 
certain patriarchal society. Catwoman does, in both films, perhaps move 
more towards becoming-imperceptible than the Batman as he is shown to be 
able to reterritorialise, to return to living a „normative‟ life. Catwoman is 
shown clearly to reject an opportunity to do the same. It is both the power 
afforded by Wayne‟s position as man and his position as billionaire that 
allows him to do this: “man, as the subject, has always functioned as that 
stable being or identity which somehow must come to know or perceive an 
outside world” (Colebrook Gilles Deleuze 139). This comparison may 
reveal the risk of becoming-imperceptible for real women, as there is 
perhaps a finer line between becoming-imperceptible and becoming-
invisible than for the male subject.  
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Chapter Four  – The Consequences of Becoming and the X-Men Trilogy 
 
 
 
Patricia Pisters has noted in The Matrix of Visual Culture that Bryan 
Singer‟s first film of the X-Men series has relevance to Deleuzian ideas 
(141). This is largely because it concentrates on „mutants‟ – a band of 
(literally) „post-human‟ characters that have, within the narrative, evolved 
from homo sapiens. As Charles Xavier/Professor X (Patrick Stewart) 
explains in the opening of X-Men: 
 
Mutation: it is the key to our evolution. It has enabled us to evolve 
from a single-celled organism into the dominant species on the 
planet. This process is slow, and normally taking thousands and 
thousands of years. But every few hundred millennia, evolution 
leaps forward. 
 
 
There are many characters in the X-Men series inspired by Stan Lee‟s 
original comic strip that have animal qualities: “Sabretooth [Tyler Mane] 
has the teeth of a tiger, Mystique [Rebecca Romijn-Stamos] is a human 
chameleon, Wolverine [Hugh Jackman] is a man with steel claws who can 
heal himself” (141). Like Ripley in Alien Resurrection, they exhibit certain 
qualities of Deleuze and Guattari‟s becoming-animal. Other characters in 
this world are Magneto (Ian McKellen), who has the power to completely 
manipulate the molecular elements of all metals, Xavier who can read and 
manipulate peoples‟ minds, and Dr Jean Grey (Famke Janssen), who, in the 
first film at least, is psychic and telekinetic. Pisters, however, does not 
continue to explore the films in any depth, but rather uses the mutant 
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characters in order to demonstrate how “contemporary audiovisual culture is 
flooded with a teratologic imaginary” (141).  
 
This chapter endeavours to expand upon Pister‟s comments, exploring how 
the characters and their powers in this world correspond to the subject in 
becoming and the types of becoming discussed earlier in this thesis. The 
narrative scenario clearly resonates with the creative philosophy proposed 
by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, and the bodies that the series presents 
are BwOs, all with different limits and capacities. This philosophy argues 
that we should challenge that “we think of difference and variation as 
grounded upon identity, rather than points of identity being abstracted from 
difference [and] we think of genetics as leading up to man, rather than man 
being an event within a flow of genetic variation” (Colebrook Gilles 
Deleuze 76). Deleuze challenges us to think beyond the bounds of human 
history and identity and the X-Men, to an extent, offers us such an 
imagining.  
 
However, some of the becomings shown in the X-Men films demonstrate the 
limits of adopting Deleuzoguattarian theorising to provide a positive 
methodology for reading the action heroine and the risks that following 
Deleuzoguattarian philosophy may entail. As discussed earlier, these risks 
pose a serious concern which has led to feminism‟s uneasy relationship with 
Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari themselves clearly warn of the 
risks of becoming-woman, in that if the process of destratification it entails 
is not undertaken carefully, the result could end in chaos (A Thousand 
Plateaus 503). We are given an imaging of this chaos, this potential for this 
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annihilation, during the grand finale of the third film The Last Stand which 
is the result of Jean Grey‟s becoming-Phoenix. The final scene featuring 
Grey in The Last Stand, where she is violently killed by Wolverine, also 
demonstrates the extent to which feminism still needs to deal in molar 
politics. 
 
These mutants are feared and hated by a significant proportion of the human 
community, and it is this premise that precipitates the majority of the action 
in all three films. There are two groups of mutants that are “deeply 
politically divided” (Kaveney Superheroes! 7), each with their own 
response to the discrimination that the mutants face. These groups are the X-
Men, led by Charles Xavier/Professor X, and the Brotherhood, led by Erik 
Lensherr/Magneto. Magneto aligns the persecution of the mutants to that 
enacted by the Nazi Party towards the Jewish community: we are told that 
Magneto was imprisoned in a concentration camp through a flashback that 
opens the first film. Having faced this scenario previously because of his 
status as a Jew, Magneto believes the mutants should overthrow humanity 
and take power over civilisation as they “regard genocide ... as the only way 
of saving mutant lives” (Kaveney Superheroes! 7). Conversely, the X-Men 
strive to educate the human community about themselves, and fight for a 
community in which the human and mutant populations may live together 
harmoniously. The base of the X-Men is Xavier‟s school for „gifted 
children‟, where he educates young mutants how to utilise their powers 
responsibly. To an extent this implies that Xavier‟s X-Men represent a 
reterritorialisation of the mutants‟ destratification because they continue to 
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uphold a conventional society dominated by white men. The Brotherhood 
offer a complete challenge to this way of life. 
 
The principal enemies of the mutant communities are all examples of the 
„molar identity par excellence‟ – they are all white, Western men and all 
wield a great deal of institutional power. The first film, the main adversary 
to the mutant community is Senator Kelly (Bruce Davison). He is 
vehemently „anti-mutant‟ because he considers that the mutants will use 
their powers against the human community. As a Senator, his power is 
political. After the flashback to Auschwitz, the film cuts to a conference 
where Kelly is debating a proposed Mutant Registration Act, again relating 
the plight of the mutants to that of the Jewish community in Nazi Germany. 
The Act would necessitate every mutant declaring themselves, and the 
powers that they have, to the State. The speech Kelly delivers to the Senate 
in favour of this Act is extremely conservative and entirely anti-
Deleuzoguattarian and he states “we must know who they are and above all 
what they can do”. His comments typify precisely the focus on being and 
identity that Deleuze and Guattari challenge through their philosophy of 
becoming. Kelly is concerned with knowing the abilities of these entities as 
a method of controlling these capacities and becomings. As Rosi Braidotti 
has commented, “being allows for no mutation, no creative becoming ... it 
merely tends towards self-preservation” („Nomadism with a Difference‟ 
307). His speech continues to reveal that his concerns relate to the 
endurance of the capitalist bourgeois family, speaking of protecting people‟s 
children, homes and money from the threat of the mutants. The prominence 
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of, and restriction of desire to, the bourgeois family is another societal 
convention that Deleuze and Guattari seek to undo. 
 
In X-Men 2 the main adversary is Colonel William Stryker (Brian Cox). It is 
revealed that Stryker‟s son Jason (Michael Reid Mackay) is a telepathic 
mutant, and that Stryker has been siphoning a serum from his brain that can 
be injected and used to control other mutants. Stryker‟s plan is remarkably 
similar to the „Final Solution‟. He intends to capture Professor X and 
manipulate his power through a machine called Cerebro in order to kill all 
the mutants on the planet. His power is military: he is assisted throughout 
his endeavour by a squadron of paratroopers who enact a raid of Xavier‟s 
school and guard his base of operations at Alkali Lake.  
 
The Last Stand sees the main threat to the mutant community through the 
work of scientist Warren Worthington II (Michael Murphy). Worthington 
has manipulated the DNA of a mutant called Jimmy/Leach (Cameron 
Bright). Leach‟s power is to transform mutant DNA back to human DNA if 
a mutant comes within close proximity to him. The threat to the community 
is, then, the Cure. This Cure causes a further rift within the mutant 
community as it encourages further reterritorialisation. Whereas the X-Men 
believe it is each individual‟s right to choose whether or not to take the 
Cure, The Brotherhood want to eradicate this treatment as they believe it 
will one day be utilised negatively against the mutant community‟s will. In 
the later stages of the film, the military are shown to have developed guns 
that shoot syringes of the serum in order to combat a mutant uprising by 
removing their power.  
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That the mutants are shown in opposition to these men increases their 
alliance to Deleuzoguattarian themes. As discussed previously, Deleuze and 
Guattari state that the identity of man is “majoritarian par excellence, where 
as becomings are Minoritarian” (A Thousand Plateaus 291). As discussed, 
there can be no becoming-man akin to becoming-woman, becoming-animal, 
or any other becomings because it is the category of man against which 
everything else is Other. As Deleuze and Guattari state, “majority implies a 
state of domination” (291). The mutants are „minoritarian‟ in that they are 
subordinated in this patriarchal power structure. The powers they are 
fighting that threaten their status and identity all come from masculinised 
zones: the political, the military and the scientific, areas in our society that 
continue to be dominated by white, middle-class men. The mutants are 
therefore constructed in opposition to this molar identity, and offer a 
critique of it. With the possible exception of Worthing in The Last Stand, 
these men are vilified and empathy is encouraged toward the mutants‟ 
predicament. Although the films do encourage a (non-Deleuzoguattarian) 
binary between the human and mutant characters, it is clear that at least the 
first two films act in a Deleuzoguattarian manner by critiquing the molar 
identity of the white, middle-class male and the misappropriation of his 
institutional power. 
 
The films foreground the molecular quality of the mutants from their 
beginnings in a similar manner to the opening credits of Alien Resurrection 
discussed earlier. The opening of each film involves a CGI credit sequence 
where we are shown a mass of molecules, representative of mutant DNA. In 
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doing this the sequences accentuate the molecular nature and flow of life. 
However, in the third film of the trilogy, The Last Stand, we are shown, 
quite literally, a battle between the two types of DNA with the introduction 
of the Cure. If we characterise the mutants as deterritorialised in that they 
are at odds with the dominant culture, the Cure acts to reterritorialise these 
figures as it means that the dominant culture has found a way of negating 
this subculture in this narrative scenario. 
 
Marie/Rogue 
 
The character of Marie/Rogue (Anna Paquin) is the first mutant to be seen 
in the X-Men series. The first film opens with a scene where she, as an 
adolescent girl, is explaining her plans to travel around North America to 
her boyfriend. They share a kiss, and the boyfriend is shown to fall back 
because he begins to have some kind of fit. Marie/Rogue begins to scream 
as she does not know what is happening to him. We later learn that he fell 
into a coma. This is the scene in which Marie/Rogue traumatically discovers 
that she has mutant powers. It is no coincidence that this scene takes place 
in the family home, as the process of becoming she will now undertake is at 
odds with the convention that this home symbolises. The environment is 
shown to be somewhat stifling: it is a claustrophobic scene, with the sound 
of piano practice taking place in the background. It is this family home that 
she must now leave as she has entered into a state of becoming against the 
normative. 
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Directly after this scene, the film cuts to the Senate debate with Senator 
Kelly, and Dr. Jean Grey is speaking. She is explaining that the “mutations 
manifest at puberty, and are often triggered by periods of heightened 
emotional stress”. This is the situation that Marie/Rogue had experienced in 
the previous scene, and therefore, in the process of literally becoming a 
woman, Marie/Rogue enters into a Deleuzoguattarian „becoming-woman‟. 
We are shown that she has run away from home and is undertaking a 
nomadic lifestyle, receiving lifts with truckers between towns in remote 
parts of America. It is on these travels that she encounters Wolverine, 
identifying with him as a fellow mutant. When talking to him she explains 
to him that when people touch her skin “something weird happens”. It is 
clear that she does not know what sort of body she has, the capacities it has 
and what she can do with it.  
 
Wolverine is presented as becoming-animal in a similar manner to the Clone 
Ripley of Alien Resurrection. Shortly after he meets Rogue, the two of them 
are attacked by Toad and Sabretooth, mutants of The Brotherhood, and 
Wolverine is shown to have certain animalistic qualities. He senses the 
danger before it is visually apparent, as he has heightened senses and is 
shown to sniff the air in the manner of a beast. This is also a benefit later in 
the film when he is able to detect that Mystique is posing as Storm, another 
member of the X-Men team. X-Men 2 also contrasts Wolverine‟s becoming-
animal with the bourgeois Oedipal animal of the family home when he is on 
the run from Stryker. However, unlike the Clone Ripley, Wolverine does 
not encounter the pack in the same way. Although he forms part of the X-
Men, who are all becoming in their separate, rhizomatic ways, Wolverine 
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does not share the same speeds, slownesses, intensities and flows of the 
pack in the same way as the Clone Ripley is shown to in Alien Resurrection. 
His remains a becoming-animal, however, because his condition serves as a 
reminder and a challenge to the anthropocentrism of Western culture. The 
mutants encourage us to, literally, think beyond the human. 
 
Rogue‟s mutant power is to absorb and replicate other entities‟ energies and 
life force through physical contact. As Xavier later explains to Wolverine, 
“she takes their energy, their life-force. In the case of mutants she absorbs 
their gifts for a short while”.  It has potentially fatal effects for both human 
and mutant bodies. This is seen in the sequence with the boyfriend which 
was discussed above, but also in a scene involving Wolverine. Wolverine is 
shown in bed having a vivid and violent nightmare, and Rogue attempts to 
wake him up. When she succeeds, Wolverine presumes that he is under 
attack and pierces her torso with his adamantine claws. Rogue then touches 
him in order to borrow his healing power and so prevent herself from dying. 
This is a moment of becoming as the two bodies form an assemblage. But 
her powers make her an embodiment of becoming-woman. She is 
continually on the threshold as a connection making-entity. She alters and 
joins the intensities and flows of the other entity, forming links with other 
bodies that increase her capacities, experiencing life through them and 
altering her perception. She later explains to Wolverine that after this 
episode she can still feel him inside her mind, indicating that this becoming 
is a permanent alteration for her.  
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It is Rogue‟s ability that precipitates most of the action in X-Men. Having 
learnt of her specific power, Magneto kidnaps her in order to force her to 
operate a machine he has developed which turns human beings into mutants, 
altering them at a molecular level by mutating their DNA. The amount of 
energy the machine takes to operate would end up killing him, so Magneto 
wishes to sacrifice Rogue instead. He has situated the machine on Liberty 
Island, and there is a conference of world leaders taking place on the nearby 
Ellis Island. Magneto wishes to force these characters into becoming 
mutants and therefore to destratisfy. We are reminded, through the character 
of Rogue, of Anna Powell‟s comments regarding the Clone Ripley in Alien 
Resurrection, in that assemblages should always be consensual. Magneto 
forces Rogue to form an assemblage with him and the machine which would 
lead to her death. Here we are shown her body being overwritten by man. It 
is a becoming, but it is a becoming that would lead to her eradication. The 
implications of Rogue‟s powers are reminiscent of the critiques that have 
been levied at Deleuze and Guattari in relation to their concept of the girl. 
Rogue is, in a way, denied any specificity and this is partly why she is 
driven to reterritorialise in her adherence to heteronormative convention 
through receiving the Cure. Like the girl of A Thousand Plateaus, her sex is 
neutralised. Rogue‟s body is written over by the act becoming, here by a 
white, Western man, and clearly demonstrates the concerns raised by Sotirin 
and Grosz discussed earlier.  
 
Towards the film‟s conclusion, Wolverine discovers Rogue who is by then 
nearly dead from the exertion of operating the machine. The scene in which 
he stabbed her is echoed here, because he touches her in order to transfer his 
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healing powers. In this act, the becoming is portrayed as quite different from 
the earlier Rogue/Wolverine assemblage. It has not been necessitated by an 
act of violence by either party. But it is also an experienced becoming.  
 
In X-Men 2, Rogue‟s becomings continue to be presented in an ambivalent 
manner. It is clear that she and Bobby are now in a romantic relationship, 
and both exhibit some frustration at unable to engage in sustained physical 
contact. However, they decide to share a kiss when they have gone on the 
run after Stryker‟s attack on Xavier‟s school. The first kiss that is shown 
does not to do either of them any damage. After they part, Rogue exhales 
icy breath. The second kiss, which is more passionate, however, ends with 
Bobby struggling to release himself. This is one of the series‟ first 
indicators, perhaps, of the potential dangers of unmarked becomings, of 
deterritorialisation. 
 
However, the kissing scene is followed shortly by another of Rogue‟s 
becomings. When Bobby‟s family return home, Bobby explains to them that 
he is a mutant. His little brother, who appears to be prejudiced against the 
mutants, calls the police on the pretence that the family are being attacked 
by strangers. The police arrive and treat the party in a hostile manner. After 
the police shoot Wolverine in the head, Pyro takes objection to their 
treatment and begins shooting huge bursts of flames at the police and their 
vehicles. In order to calm down the fires and protect the police from harm, 
Rogue grasps Pyro‟s bare ankle and she is then able to control the flames 
herself. Pyro is disabled through this becoming, but Rogue is able to prevent 
anymore destruction through the use of Pyro‟s powers.  
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The Last Stand offers Rogue a dilemma through the creation of the Cure. 
Throughout the film she is shown to be concerned about her boyfriend 
Bobby/Iceman‟s friendship with Kitty (Ellen Page). Although Kitty and 
Bobby are not shown to be having a romantic relationship, they are shown 
as having the kind of physical contact that Rogue and Bobby are unable to 
have due to the damage her mutation would cause to him. This is most 
powerfully demonstrated when Bobby takes Kitty ice-skating to cheer her 
up after the death of Professor Xavier. Kitty falls into Bobby‟s arms while 
Rogue watches on from a window of the school.  
 
After this episode, Rogue absconds from the school in order to receive the 
Cure. There were two versions of her decision filmed, but in the final 
theatrical version of the film she has decided to receive the treatment. This 
is demonstrated by her removing her glove and taking Bobby‟s hand on her 
return to the school. This also implies her reasons for taking the Cure are 
largely romantic. Although the film ends with the two reunited in the 
school, Rogue‟s future is unsure. It is unclear whether or not she will be 
able to stay at the school for the „gifted‟ as she is no longer a mutant. But 
perhaps she is now becoming-woman in a more fundamental way. Her 
previous mutation has given her an affinity for the unconventional. 
 
The process she undergoes is reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
discussion of the drug addict in A Thousand Plateaus. The addict, they say, 
curtails becoming and the Body without Organs: “drug addicts erect a 
vitrified or emptied body, or a cancerous one: the causal line, the creative 
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line, or line of flight immediately turns into a line of death and abolition” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 285). The body of the addict is one that inhibits life and 
channels desire and as such restricts becoming. This is a situation that 
Rogue has emulated by receiving the Cure – she has returned to a stable 
state of being, curtailed her lines of flight, primarily in order to continue a 
heteronormative relationship with Bobby. Although she explains to 
Wolverine that he “doesn‟t know what it‟s like to be afraid of [his] powers” 
and that she wants to “be able to touch people ... a hug, a handshake ... a 
kiss”, she is only really shown in the film in relation to Bobby. She is either 
shown with him, watching him with Kitty, or in relation to the Cure, which 
implies that her major reason for undertaking the process is to engage in a 
heteronormative physical relationship with him.  
 
Rogue‟s character raises many questions about what sort of life awaits the 
subject in becoming, and the reality of becoming-woman and becoming 
more generally. That her mutant ability restricts her from having elongated 
physical contact with another entity without doing that entity damage 
perhaps highlights the sacrifices that a life of becoming and destratifying 
may involve. In X-Men, the sacrifice she has to make is foregrounded when 
she runs away shortly before she is captured by Magneto. When sitting on a 
train she is shown in shot/reverse to be looking longingly at a woman 
(presumably a mother) stroking a child‟s cheek. However, this is the kind of 
„conventional‟ familial relationship that Deleuze and Guattari wish to put 
into question. She has to make a choice between convention and becoming, 
and chooses the former. 
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Jean Grey 
 
The X-Men films‟ representation of Jean Grey is equally complex from a 
Deleuzoguattarian perspective because it offers both positive and negative 
imaginings of becoming. As the trilogy expands it becomes „her‟ series: her 
use of the machine Cerebro in X-Men triggers a change in her telepathic 
ability that manifests itself throughout X-Men 2 and will result in her 
complete domination of the narrative and screen space in The Last Stand. As 
we will see, she begins as an especially useful character through which to 
explore how analysis based on Deleuzoguattarian ideas of becoming and the 
body can be beneficial to considerations of women on screen. As I shall 
demonstrate, there are moments of action that are allowed by her „mutation‟ 
which make no sense to be read from a psychoanalytic perspective. In these 
moments, I argue, the character breaks free from the psychoanalytic 
paradigm, demanding to be read in an alternative fashion. However, if we 
read her powers and actions as becomings, as her character becomes 
increasingly unstable the Deleuzoguattarian model becomes harder to 
successfully apply. 
 
There are two occasions prior to the scene in which Grey sacrifices herself  
in X-Men 2 in which we are given glimpses of Grey‟s becoming-molecular 
in her becoming the Phoenix. The first of these occurs in the X-Men‟s jet 
after Grey and Storm have rescued Rogue, Iceman, Wolverine and Pyro 
from the confrontation with the police noted earlier. They are being pursued 
by a number of military jets attempting to force them to land. As they refuse 
to do so, the military fire heat-seeking missiles at them. Storm manages to 
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divert and destroy the planes and most of the missiles by creating tornados. 
One, however, remains. Grey begins to focus on the missile and we are 
shown it exploding and then cut to a close-up of her face. Here her eyes 
flicker to a fiery red which will become associated with the character of the 
Phoenix, both later in the film, and in The Last Stand. The second of these 
occurrences happens when Grey is defending herself from Cyclops, who 
attacks her under the influence of Stryker‟s brain serum. She diverts his 
optic blasts by creating a force field around herself. Eventually her power 
grows and overcomes Cyclops‟s blast, diverting it to elsewhere in the 
complex. Again, shortly before she manages this, her eyes flicker with 
redness. As a consequence of the explosion resulting from their duel, we see 
that the complex has undergone significant structural damage. It is 
important to point out that, even at the early stages of Grey‟s becoming-
Phoenix, it is portrayed as a destructive force.  
 
Jean Grey‟s death scene in X-Men 2 has particular resonance with 
Deleuzoguattarian theorising as it presents a becoming-woman in a heroic 
capacity. Grey realises that the dam is rupturing when the X-Men are 
attempting to leave the area, but their jet is unable to take off. To 
demonstrate this, close-ups of Grey are cut next to shots of the rupturing 
dam and the water spraying forth (Figures 37 and 38).  
 
The molecular quality of things is emphasised continually throughout this 
scene. As the dam ruptures, we see the stone of the dam breaking into 
particles, and the water spraying through the wall in molecules. The power 
of the flow of water is accentuated in close-up, slow motion shots that 
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emphasise the molecular quality of both the dam and the water. We are 
being shown a destructive becoming, where the water‟s potential has altered 
to become a threat. This is reminiscent of Sotirin‟s description of the „plant-
wall‟: 
 
The rhizomatic roots of mint plants may break through a seemingly 
impenetrable concrete retaining wall, one molecule at a time; the 
detachment of each concentrated particle by the collocation of a 
plant particle has its own singularity. The molar configurations of 
plant and wall are multiplicities that the molecular lines of becoming 
may move through and beyond, recomposing each into a plant-wall. 
(100) 
 
Here the molar aggregates of the dam and the lake are revealed as a „stable 
configuration of molecular elements‟. The flow of the water that results 
from the breaking down of the molar aggregate of the dam could mean 
annihilation for the X-Men team. But this is contrasted with Jean Grey‟s 
becoming, which results in her becoming Phoenix. By way of her telepathy, 
she realises the dam is rupturing and therefore the peril that faces the band 
of X-Men. This enables her to take action in order to save them. She leaves 
the jet unnoticed, and positions herself in front of it. She uses her telekinetic 
powers to prevent the remaining X-Men from attempting to stop her 
essentially sacrificing herself for them (Figure 39). When a barrage of water 
flows towards her, and again using her telekinetic power, she parts the water 
to protect the jet and herself. Shortly before she „dies‟ she is shown to 
undergo some sort of transformation which, on viewing the subsequent film, 
suggests that she is becoming-Phoenix. 
 
The becoming that is undertaken in this scene demonstrates Elisabeth 
Hills‟s argument well when addressing the action heroine. It makes no sense 
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to contain Grey to the psychoanalytic paradigm – her becoming is clear, her 
powers cannot be said to „masculine‟ her or be (easily) read as a phallic 
appropriation. This is aided by her mutation: her „superpower‟ makes her 
independent from the use of phallic referents such as guns and harpoons that 
Ripley was dependent upon. This is a different body – a Body without 
Organs – that demands to be read differently. Lorraine comments that 
“constructing a BwO entails releasing molecular elements from stabilized 
patterns of organized breaks and flows” (166). This is seen because her 
becoming is accentuated by the editing.  Close-up shots of her are 
continually juxtaposed with close-up shots of the dam rupturing and the 
spray of water and matter which accentuate the molecular elements. What is 
happening to the wall and the water is also happening to Grey. The 
presentation of the molecular nature of things is broadened to include her 
subjectivity as she breaks down traditional cinematic and social codes in 
becoming active, assertive and heroic. It is not Wolverine, Cyclops or 
Xavier that is able to save them, but the female-embodied Grey. 
 
The characterisation of Grey/Phoenix in The Last Stand is vastly different 
from that of X-Men and X-Men 2. Grey is a considerably different character 
than we have been shown in the previous films. This is because she is now 
exhibiting her alter ego, the Phoenix, which is sharing the embodied entity 
we previously recognised as Grey. She returns after summoning Cyclops to 
Alkali Lake, the scene of her demise in X-Men 2. He partially enables her 
return as he unleashes an optic blast into the water which creates a 
whirlpool. As he falls to his feet, he is shrouded in a bright, white light, and 
looks up to see Grey standing at the water‟s edge. Visually, her appearance 
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is very similar to that in X-Men and X-Men 2, the only major difference 
being that she has longer, red hair (Figure 40). After some conversation with 
Cyclops in which she is decidedly aloof, they kiss and she undergoes a 
transformation: her eyes turn black, her veins become visible beneath her 
skin and she appears to in some way absorbing his energy in a similar way 
to Rogue‟s powers. The film then immediately cuts to Xavier in his 
mansion, gasping as if in pain, as he orders Storm and Wolverine to Alkali 
Lake as he has in some way sensed her return. 
 
It becomes apparent as the narrative progresses that Grey/Phoenix has killed 
Cyclops. It is poignant that he is her first „victim‟ because this symbolises a 
major shift in her characterisation. In the first two films, Grey is presented 
as loyal to Cyclops, her husband, despite an implied attraction to Wolverine. 
Grey‟s relationship with her husband clearly functions to epitomise her 
adherence to societal convention. This connection itself begins to break 
down once Grey starts to show signs of becoming-Phoenix. After the flash 
of becoming-Phoenix seen on the jet discussed earlier, the party encounter 
Magneto and Mystique. They tell the X-Men that Stryker has captured 
Xavier and Scott and is keeping them captive in order to hatch his evil plan. 
Whilst preparing for bed, before heading to Alkali Lake to challenge 
Stryker, Grey and Wolverine share an exchange. She explains to him that 
“girls flirt with the dangerous guy, they don't bring him home; they marry 
the good guy”. They share a kiss precipitated by Wolverine which Grey 
does not entirely resist. Eventually, however, she breaks away from him and 
returns to the jet, symbolising her current preference for a more 
conventional relationship through her marriage with the „good guy‟. 
Green 257 
 
 
That Grey/Phoenix disposes of Cyclops in the early stages of The Last Stand 
is significant because it symbolises the beginning of Phoenix‟s disregard 
both for social convention and things that will contain her. At the beginning 
of X-Men 2, when she is discussing how she feels “something terrible is 
about to happen”, Summers attempts to reassure her by telling her that he 
“would never let anything happen to her”. It is telling that he adopts this 
attitude, that Grey needs to be cared for by him and that he, as a male, can 
protect her from harm. That she becomes more powerful than him and 
eventually kills him is a challenge to the dominant order of Man.  
 
The reason for Grey‟s „transformation‟ is given to Wolverine by Xavier on 
his return with Grey‟s unconscious body. In a conversation held over her 
still unconscious body, he explains that when he met her as a young girl her 
power was “practically limitless” and “seated in the unconscious part of her 
mind”. He goes on to explain that he “created a series of psychic barriers to 
isolate her powers from her conscious mind and, as a result, Jean developed 
a dual personality”. This dual personality is split between “the conscious 
Jean, whose powers were always in her control, and the dormant side, a 
personality that ... came to call itself the Phoenix”. Xavier explains that this 
personality is “a purely instinctual creature, all desire and joy and rage”. 
When Wolverine expresses his anger with Xavier for meddling with Grey‟s 
mind in this manner, Xavier responds by saying that “she has to be 
controlled” and that he owes Wolverine no explanation as to his actions. 
The film then cuts to a medium long-shot of Xavier leaning over Grey‟s 
head with his hands on her temples, attempting to restore his psychic blocks.  
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That Xavier undertook these processes in order to control Grey/Phoenix 
undoes much of his portrayal as benevolent patriarch. The image of him 
leaning over her attempting to place blocks in her mind is somewhat 
sinister. Indeed, towards the close of X-Men 2, Xavier comments how Grey 
was always “hesitant” about her powers and how she felt she was being “left 
behind” by the rest of Xavier‟s students. What finishes as a touching eulogy 
takes on more sinister meaning after the revelations of The Last Stand. If 
Grey was not confident in her powers, this was because Xavier made her so. 
He realised that she would become „too powerful‟, more powerful than even 
himself, and took steps to prevent this. It is here that Xavier becomes an 
example of the molar Man. He wants to prevent Grey‟s becoming-Phoenix.  
 
When Grey regains consciousness after being treated by Xavier, Wolverine 
is still watching over her. In the previous two films, Grey has rejected 
Wolverine‟s sexual advances due to her relationship with Cyclops. 
However, here she makes advances toward Wolverine which is a notable 
contrast to the scene discussed above. It is clear that she now feels 
compelled to pursue a non-heteronormative sexual activity with the 
„dangerous guy‟. But these advances are aggressive and even violent. After 
straddling him, they become embroiled in a passionate clinch. She begins to 
scratch deep gashes into his body and undress him using her telekinetic 
powers. Wolverine stops the liaison by declaring “Jean, this isn‟t you”, to 
which she replies firmly “yes, it is me”. This rather problematically seems 
to present female sexuality outside of heteronormative marriage scenarios in 
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a somewhat negative manner. This scene positions her sexual desire 
alongside danger and destruction as she literally tears open Wolverine‟s 
flesh. It may therefore continue to associate female sexuality with ideas of 
castration anxiety and the myth of the vagina dentata.  
 
Xavier‟s death is an act of vengeance by the Phoenix for his interference 
with her evolution. Xavier has visited Grey at her childhood home 
accompanied by Wolverine and Storm at the same time as Magneto and his 
henchmen. Xavier enters the house with Magneto in an attempt to talk with 
Grey to convince her to let him try to continue to „help‟ her control the 
Phoenix. Grey/Phoenix becomes increasingly agitated and challenges him 
about the steps he has taken to control her. Whilst this exchange takes place, 
Magneto is in the background encouraging Grey/Phoenix to reject Xavier‟s 
pleas. When Xavier mentions Cyclops‟s death as an example of her lack of 
control, the Phoenix becomes more enraged. Magneto is thrown across the 
house into a different room. Water begins to flow upwardly, and an 
increasing number of objects begin to rotate around them. She lifts Xavier 
from his wheelchair and suspends him in midair whilst the objects around 
them are reduced to particles and dust. Xavier then begins to be ripped 
apart, molecule by molecule. His suit threads become increasingly worn 
away and his flesh is torn from his body. The film cuts to the exterior of the 
house which is entirely suspended in the air. It then cuts back to the interior 
to a slow motion sequence in which Xavier explodes into dust and 
disappears.   
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This sequence again positions Grey alongside the molecular. However, it is 
a greatly different positioning to that of the sacrifice scene towards the 
conclusion of X-Men 2. In the latter scene, the becoming-molecular 
involved a movement of a destructive flow that allowed not only the 
survival of the troupe of X-Men but also precipitated Grey‟s becoming-
Phoenix. Grey/Phoenix‟s becoming-molecular and the flows involved here 
are almost totally destructive. Grey cannot control the becoming-molecular 
of the Phoenix. This becoming has lead to the annihilation of two figures in 
her life that she had previously loved, albeit two characters that had, 
debatably, inhibited her personal progression and becoming-Phoenix.  
 
After the sequence in which Grey/Phoenix disposes of Xavier, she is clearly 
exhausted and she is walked away by Magneto. Magneto here offers Grey 
more sympathy and facilitates and encourages her becoming-Phoenix. 
However, he undertakes this strategy for his own ends because he wishes 
her to use her powers to annihilate the scientists responsible for the Cure 
and any humankind that stand in their way. He also is shown to regret his 
involvement in her becoming. When she begins to destroy everything 
around her, he realises the destruction of which she is capable and begins to 
flee the area. He is shown in close up and asks himself “what have I done?” 
because she has reached a level of destruction which he had previously not 
imagined.  
 
The finale takes place on Alcatraz, where the laboratory that has created the 
cure is based. It is a grand final battle fought between the Brotherhood and 
the X-Men, who are supporting the United States military in protecting the 
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Cure, the scientists and the laboratory. Phoenix stands alongside Magneto 
with Pyro, Bobby‟s personal adversary. When the troops begin to fire 
specially designed syringes filled with the Cure at her, the Phoenix becomes 
enraged and starts upon a rampage. The nature of this destruction is again 
relevant to Deleuzian theorising as she begins to reduce her surroundings to 
pieces, so reducing everything to an indiscernible molecular flow (Figure 
41). Soldiers, buildings and cars are reduced to particles which circulate 
with the air and there is an upward current of water molecules as the flow 
becomes uncontrollable and beyond even the force of gravity. This is 
reminiscent of Grosz‟s comment that “Deleuze and Guattari describe a 
process of blowing apart the fragments, elements, intensities at work in an 
entity, then the explosion of the fragments into smaller fragments and so on 
ad infinitum” (179). Although she is shown to be the cause of this 
destruction, she is not shown to be able to, or want to, control the flow of 
matter that surrounds her. This perhaps highlights the problems that may 
arise in adopting a philosophy of becoming which aims to disrupt the notion 
of being and identity and the risks of becoming-imperceptible. 
 
It is in these stages of The Last Stand that it becomes an increasingly 
complex task to successfully apply Deleuzoguattarian theorising in order to 
assist in the creation of a methodology to read the action heroine more 
positively and progressively. Elisabeth Hills has argued that 
Deleuzoguattarian concepts such as the BwO and the assemblage may be of 
use when addressing the action heroine in terms other than psychoanalysis. 
But it is clear that her reading and use of Deleuzoguattarian theory is 
mediated by the readings proposed by Elizabeth Grosz in Volatile Bodies. 
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As noted earlier, Grosz herself acknowledged that her reading of Deleuze 
and Guattari‟s philosophies were „highly selective‟. Grosz, however, offers 
a defence of this approach and does proceed to properly evaluate the use-
value of Deleuzoguattarian theory for feminist philosophy. As discussed, 
Grosz offers a number of drawbacks to adopting Deleuze and Guattari as 
well as addressing the benefits she perceives. Hills, however, does not 
explore these drawbacks but rather concentrates on the positive aspects of 
the philosophy in order to break down the binary opposition which she feels 
has inhibited a complete reading of the action heroine. However, there are 
consequences to disabling this binary. The aspects of the theory that Hills 
uses are dependent upon undertaking the philosophy of becoming in its 
entirety, which runs the risk of undoing more than just the male/female 
binary, as the unstable representation of Jean Grey/Phoenix clearly 
demonstrates. 
 
The Last Stand also demonstrates the need to continue questioning the 
cinematic treatment of the „molar‟ category of woman and that we cannot 
abandon a molar identity politics. Grey‟s death scene in The Last Stand is 
extremely problematic from a feminist perspective. In conversation with 
Storm on Alcatraz and amidst the chaos, Wolverine declares that he is the 
“only one that can save her”. As he approaches her, she continues her 
molecular destruction by tearing molecules of flesh from his body revealing 
his adamantine skeleton. Because of his unique healing power, he is able to 
regenerate before she kills him. He reaches Phoenix and declares that he 
would “die for her”, and her angry countenance relaxes and she asks him to 
“save her”. At this point he withdraws his adamantine claws and pierces her 
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through the stomach. The film cuts to a close-up of her face, which 
transforms back to her appearance as Grey, and she smiles (Figure 42), and 
then dies in his arms. Within the bounds of the narrative, and with the 
creation of the Cure, Grey/Phoenix does not have to be disposed of in such a 
violent manner. It needs to asked then why representations of this nature 
continue to be perpetuated in popular film. The ideology that informs such 
images still needs to be interrogated.  
 
We have seen how the X-Men films offer both positive and negative 
imaginings of becoming. Deleuzoguattarian theory is useful and 
illuminating in these cases because it can offer a means of addressing 
conceptually complex bodies such as Jean Grey‟s. It provides a manner of 
discussing her body independent of psychoanalytic theories which have, 
according to Hills, been restrictive as a method for addressing the action 
heroine.  However, as the narrative of the trilogy progresses, the logical 
consequences of this form of analysis become brutally apparent, implying 
that a life of becoming is neither desirable nor tenable. The consequences 
that this has for a feminist film theory which seeks a new model for positive 
appraisals of active women on screen need to be taken into account. This is 
because the benefits of breaking down the binary machine will, in certain 
instances, be outweighed by the risks of the larger project of becoming. 
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Conclusions 
 
Through a series of explorations of the changing figure of the action heroine 
in a number of contemporary science fiction franchises, this project has 
endeavoured to assess the use-value of Deleuzoguattarian theories of 
becoming and the body for feminist film theory. It has examined how 
feminist film theory has struggled to address this figure in a positive way 
which is, I argue, largely due to its reliance on psychoanalytic theory. I have 
proposed that Deleuzoguattarian theory can begin to promote a more 
positive and optimistic appraisal of the action heroine in certain instances. 
Although I have argued these benefits, I have also recognised that this form 
of „interpretation‟ falls short of dealing with all of the complexities involved 
in the representation of women on screen.  
 
In adopting Deleuze and Guattari‟s theory of becoming we are at risk of 
losing a platform from which to discuss and analyse sexist and ideologically 
unsound treatments of women on film. This is because in the 
Deleuzoguattarian method becoming-woman will always take precedent 
over „woman‟ and the real political struggles and lived experience of 
women. It may be the case that feminism‟s interaction with Deleuze and 
Guattari is a “start of a series of explorations and possible alternatives” 
(Grosz 182). However, these explorations may lead us into unsafe territories 
where the subject and purpose of feminism becomes unclear. 
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My literature review introduced the features of becoming that are important 
to my analysis of these sets of films. In discussing the feminist responses to 
Deleuze and Guattari, I endeavoured to demonstrate that alongside the 
beneficial aspects of becoming as a means of deconstructing essentialism 
and exploring areas beyond the binary, there are a number of potential 
problems still to be overcome regarding the use of Deleuzoguattarian theory 
as a means of addressing both screen women and „woman‟. I highlighted the 
key concerns that feminist theory has identified with Deleuze and Guattari‟s 
philosophy in line with Grosz‟s consideration in Volatile Bodies. Although 
Grosz is an advocate of Deleuze and Guattari, it is revealing that she is still 
apprehensive about adopting their work. This signals the uneasy relationship 
between feminism and Deleuze and Guattari.  
 
What all of the franchises I have examined share is that they depict the 
development of characters over time. In the case of the Alien franchise, the 
character of Ripley began in 1979 and, it has been argued, her 
representation at this point in time is indebted to the successes of the 
feminist movement during the 1970s (Gallardo C and Smith). The 
subsequent instalments of the series in 1986, 1992 and 1997 are similarly 
dependent on the cultural and critical climate in which they were produced. 
Series of this nature that are produced over extended periods of time give a 
unique opportunity to view the ways in which cinema can be seen to 
respond to the socio-cultural status of women, and how in a given society 
cinematic representation more generally can be indicative of larger cultural 
and critical trends. 
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Chapter one examined the separate films of the Alien series chronologically 
in order to demonstrate how both the figure of Ripley and the Alien species 
have altered since the series‟ inception. Through my analysis, I identified 
how critical writing concerning Ripley has, at times, been as dependent on 
its context of production as the Alien films themselves. Readings of this 
nature, I argue, are examples of what Althusser terms „guilty readings‟. The 
evaluation they then give to the figure of Ripley can be limited. I therefore 
placed the films and their corresponding criticism in a larger cultural 
context, and argued they could be read together as a „co-text‟. „Dislocating‟ 
readings from their context allows for alternate readings which can lead to 
more positive appropriations of the characters that I examine.  
 
In order to circumvent these limitations, I offered a number of 
Deleuzoguattarian readings of Ripley‟s interactions with the world around 
her and the Alien species. Building on Elisabeth Hills‟s analysis of the 
series, I examined how Ripley‟s strengths and capacities are increased by 
her interactions with other „objects‟ such as machinery, other characters and 
the Alien species. In Deleuzoguattarian terms, this is how she forms 
multiple assemblages. This led to a demonstration of how the series had 
become more Deleuzoguattarian with Alien Resurrection. Alien 
Resurrection is, I argue, the film that resonates most clearly with 
Deleuzoguattarian ideas of the Alien series. That this depiction of Ripley 
„becoming-alien‟ and the Alien „becoming-human‟ occurred whilst we 
approached a proliferation of Deleuzian discourse is perhaps further 
indicative of this „co-text‟. However, I expanded Hills‟s analysis of Ripley 
to suggest that Alien Resurrection offers a consideration of the risk involved 
Green 267 
 
in becoming. The conclusion of Alien Resurrection is, I suggest, somewhat 
precarious: we are left with the Clone Ripley suspended over Earth having 
disposed of her „grandchild‟ in a particularly gruesome way. If this 
detachment is a result of her becoming-animal, it remains to be seen what 
further transgressions and becomings, positive or negative, she may 
undertake. As Lorraine comments, becomings “cannot be captured ... they 
happen behind one‟s back” (129), and in this sense we should be prepared 
for Ripley‟s becomings to lead her to potentially dangerous spaces. 
 
In chapter two I examined the Matrix franchise in order to explore how the 
representation of woman, in this case the character of Trinity, has been 
affected by the franchise‟s larger project. I argue that the Matrix franchise is 
comprised of a number of provocative texts and has deliberately sought to 
garner intellectual discussion. I situated the franchise as an especially 
„playful‟ set of texts that encourage philosophical discussion. Its success is 
demonstrated by the sheer wealth of literature devoted to examining the 
Matrix franchise, in particular the large number of popular philosophy 
anthologies devoted to the subject. It has achieved this response through a 
number of tactics. First through the continual references to external texts 
such as Nineteen Eighty-Four and Simulacra and Simulation and secondly 
through the intertextual nature of many of the separate elements of the 
franchise. 
 
In relation to the character of Trinity and the franchise‟s representation of 
the feminine, I examined how her representation has been compromised by 
the films‟ larger philosophical project. I argued that Trinity‟s character is 
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largely conservative, and also that she functions as a sign of „woman‟. This 
is shown by her correlation to the femme fatale, and her role of 
„handmaiden‟ outside of the Matrix. In my consideration of the criticism 
relating to Trinity, I noted how her material body has been relatively 
unexplored. I suggested this neglect has occurred for a similar reason to the 
critical neglect of Ripley in Alien 3 and Resurrection, because her 
representation is “problematic” (Church Gibson 46). The material Trinity 
does not have as much „critical currency‟ as her digital self. I also aligned 
this neglect to another set of screen women: the „other women‟ in film noir 
who are juxtaposed to the femme fatale. Like the femme fatale, the digital 
Trinity is exciting, subversive and powerful and attracts attention. I 
proposed a reading of Trinity as a Body without Organs as a potential 
avenue of enquiry that would integrate the two sides of Trinity‟s „double 
body‟. 
 
In chapter three I addressed the difference in representation of becoming-
animal for the male- and female- embodied subject as depicted in the 
Batman series and Catwoman. Having identified the Batman as a mobile 
signifier, I argued that the character has evolved to a condition of becoming-
bat. The becoming-bat of the Batman is most strongly seen in the 
Christopher Nolan films Batman Begins and The Dark Knight. Nolan‟s 
imagining of the Batman can add credence to Patricia Pister‟s contention 
that Deleuzian figures are gaining increased visibility in popular culture in 
the current Deleuzian „moment‟. 
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I undertook this analysis in order to juxtapose this Deleuzoguattarian 
analysis with the figure of the Catwoman to explore how becoming may be 
experienced differently for the male- and female-embodied subject. The 
figure of Catwoman in Batman Returns and Catwoman is able to 
demonstrate the positive aspects of becoming-animal as a useful way of 
eschewing certain social conventions. For example, the Kyle/Catwoman 
character in Batman Returns actively rejects a heteronormative life with 
Wayne/Batman in favour of a radically different life as Catwoman. We are 
shown her silhouette on Gotham‟s rooftops and do not know quite what life 
this entails – she has moved further to becoming-imperceptible in that she is 
now „unreadable‟. However, Nolan‟s Batman is able to deterritorialise – to 
undertake experimentation with new assemblages increase his capacities – 
at the same time as retaining enough stability in order to reterritorialise 
when necessary. Although this reterritorialisation ultimately is rejected by 
Catwoman in both films, it perhaps indicates what is it stake for „woman‟. 
Once the „journey of diminishment‟ has begun it is harder for the Catwoman 
to return to society than it is for Wayne and his Batman.  
 
My chapter addressing the X-Men trilogy demonstrated both the advantages 
and disadvantages of using Deleuzoguattarian theories of the body and 
becoming for addressing the action heroine. The X-Men films seem to lend 
themselves to this kind of analysis, because of the nature of the mutant 
condition. The mutant bodies are Bodies without Organs that are constantly 
undertaking lines of flight. As Lorraine describes, “a line of flight is a flow 
of movement that breaks with conventional social codes in the creation of 
new forms of life” (116). The mutants are positioned outside of normative 
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society and pitted against white, American molar men representative of the 
institutions of politics, the military and science. 
 
However, as my analysis of the characters of Rogue and Jean Grey/Phoenix 
demonstrates, the X-Men films present a narrative scenario which also 
serves to remind us of the dangers of becoming, both for the female-
embodied subject and more generally. In Rogue we see the problematic 
formulation of the girl as her subjectivity is continually overridden. This is a 
risk continually in the foreground (Sotirin, Grosz, Lorraine). Jean Grey is an 
especially complex character because of her becoming Phoenix. In X-Men 
and X-Men 2 we are shown a commanding female character whose powers 
are not reducible to phallic referents. This is discussed in relation to her 
scene of self-sacrifice in which she uses her telekinetic powers to divert the 
course of the flow of water resulting from the ruptured dam. This 
demonstration of power takes place without the use of weaponry or 
machinery which can be read in terms of phallic substitutes, which a 
psychoanalytically inclined reading such as Carol Clover‟s may tend to do. 
Grey is therefore open to interpretation in a different way. An analysis 
which assesses her in terms of what her body has the potential to do, such as 
Deleuze and Guattari‟s BwO, seems an apt method for reading this 
character.  
 
The X-Men series continues in The Last Stand to explore Jean Grey‟s 
becoming to a destructive and chaotic end and it is here that 
Deleuzoguattarian theory ceases to be able to provide a basis for a 
methodology to address the action heroine in a more positive manner. This 
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is because The Last Stand offers an extreme imagining of becoming-woman 
with everything that surrounds Grey/Phoenix being reduced to a flow of 
indiscernible molecular matter. This serves to remind us that once we begin 
to break down what for Deleuze and Guattari constitutes the „molar‟, we do 
not know what exactly will result and where, if anywhere, this 
fragmentation will stop. 
 
The final scene featuring Grey/Phoenix is, I argue, an especially worrying 
one from a feminist perspective and indicates how molar identity-based 
politics remain an important area of enquiry. It is here, again, that the 
Deleuzoguattarian method fails to provide a solution because it is 
disinclined to discuss representations of this nature. As Claire Colebrook 
has written in regard to Deleuze‟s philosophy of cinema: 
 
We should not look for the meaning or message conveyed by cinematic 
images ... we should look at cinematic images as representations. It is 
common to complain that cinema offers „unrepresentative‟ images of 
women for example ... but cinema, for Deleuze, is not about representing a 
world we already have, it creates new worlds. We should not criticise the 
way cinema constructs stereotypes, reinforces everyday opinions or lulls us 
into a false sense of reality. Gilles Deleuze 47.  
 
 
 
This being the case, it is difficult to advocate a complete turn to 
Deleuzoguattarian theory for feminist film theory. In her discussion of 
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Deleuze and Guattari, Grosz writes that adopting the Deleuzoguattarian 
method “may be simply the substitution of one inadequate account for 
another, equally problematic, which resolves or overcomes some problems 
but creates others” (182). In doing away with molar categories and 
problematising notions such as being and identity in favour of a plane of 
immanence, flows and becomings, we are left on an insecure footing to 
analyse and challenge potentially ideologically unsound treatments of 
women on film such as Grey‟s final death scene in The Last Stand.  
 
In conclusion, Deleuzoguattarian theory may provide a starting point to 
providing the methodology that Hills advocates but cannot be said to offer a 
definite answer to the perceived problems facing feminist film theory. 
Deleuze and Guattari may be used to highlight the shortcomings of 
psychoanalysis and binaristic models of thought in addressing the figure of 
the action heroine but because of the risks involved in possibly achieving a 
utopian becoming-imperceptible cannot be seen as a definitive solution. 
Any analyses of the action heroine undertaken with Deleuze and Guattari 
should be done with sufficient caution. These experiments should highlight 
the risks that are involved both for woman as a concept and real embodied 
women. It is therefore important for feminist film theory to retain links to its 
(political) foundations. The nature of representation in these cases suggests 
we cannot afford to dislocate ourselves from discourse which seeks to 
address why women on screen are treated in this manner. Such discourse 
cannot be discarded in favour of a philosophy that would relegate the 
struggle of the women and the women‟s movement to a utopian philosophy 
of becoming. 
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Figure 1: The wrecked ship in Alien 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The „chest-burster‟ of Alien 
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Figure 3: Ridley Scott‟s low-angle crotch-shot in the 
final scene of Alien 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The „stereotypically butch‟ character Vasquez 
of Aliens 
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Figure 5: Ripley „becoming-machine‟ in Aliens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The canine Alien of Alien 3 
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Figure 7: Ripley in fatigues with shaved head in Alien 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The Clone Ripley in Alien Resurrection 
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Figure 9: Call, the boyish android, in Alien Resurrection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Rousseau in Alien vs. Predator 
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Figure 11: Room 101 in The Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Baudrillard‟s Simulacra and Simulation in 
The Matrix 
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Figure 13: The body in the Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: The spoon in The Matrix 
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Figure 15: René Magritte‟s „Ceci N‟est Pas une Pipe‟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Trinity in The Matrix: Reloaded 
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Figure 17: Noir tropes in „A Detective Story‟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Trinity‟s death in The Matrix: Revolutions 
 
 
 
 
Green 282 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: The „slimy rebirth‟ of The Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Robin in Batman Forever 
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Figure 21: Robin in Batman Forever 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Alfred Pennyworth attending Bruce Wayne 
in Batman Forever 
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Figure 23: The bat-suit adorned with nipples in Batman 
and Robin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Marlene Dietrich dressed as a gorilla in 
Blonde Venus  
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Figure 25: Uma Thurman dressed as a gorilla in Batman 
and Robin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26:  Wayne Manor with semi-nude male statues 
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Figure 27: Bruce Wayne exhibiting bat-like behaviour 
in Batman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: The „becoming-bat‟ of Bruce Wayne 
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Figure 29: The sonar machine of The Dark Knight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Lucius Fox and the sonar machine in The 
Dark Knight 
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Figure 31: Batman descending the stairwell in Batman 
Begins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Batman‟s entrance on a wire in Batman 
Returns 
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Figure 33: Selena Kyle prior to becoming Catwoman in 
Batman Returns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Catwoman in Batman Returns 
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Figure 35: Point of view shot from Patience Phillips in 
Catwoman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Patience Phillips in Catwoman 
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Figure 37: Close-up of Jean Grey in X-Men 2 as she 
senses that the dam is rupturing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Close-up of rupturing dam in X-Men 2 
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Figure 39: Jean Grey‟s sacrifice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Jean Grey‟s resurrection as the Phoenix in 
The Last Stand 
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Figure 41: Jean Grey as the Phoenix in the finale of The 
Last Stand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Jean Grey‟s death in The Last Stand 
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